نشریه مطالعات اوراسیای مرکزی
پیاپی 31 (پاییز و زمستان 1401)

Every crisis that happens, the nature and messages of the actors are different. In other words, domestic crises have domestic effects and consequences, and international crises have international effects and consequences. The crisis may not be an exception to this rule and it has results and consequences, and these consequences will definitely expand with its continuation, but it can be recognized according to the effects of all and its consequences. What is certain is that this is the main cause of this crisis. Ukraine is a country with a special geopolitical position between the European Union and Russia. This geopolitical situation has caused Ukraine to inadvertently enter into international conflicts, which have generally been between the three powers of Russia, the European Union, and the United States. In fact, Ukraine has been a victim of geopolitical danger, which has always caused many conflicts and displacements in this country throughout history, and this issue has made it unable to have an independent internal policy and always fluctuate between the East and the East. The crisis of 2014 (Ukraine), which arose after the non-signing of the cooperation agreement between Ukraine and the European Union, can be considered in the framework of competition between great powers.

A question has been raised about this research, what is the impact of this crisis and does it have any consequences for European countries, Russia, Europe and the United States?Research Hypothesis: Every crisis that occurs has different nature and effects, actors and messages. In other words, domestic crises have domestic effects and consequences, and international crises have international effects and consequences. The crisis may not be an exception to this rule and it has results and consequences, and these consequences will definitely expand with the continuation of the crisis, but it can be recognized due to the continuity of all its effects and consequences. What is certain is that this issue is the main cause of this crisis.

The research method is descriptive-analytical in the form of a qualitative method based on content analysis and using the threat balance theory as an intellectual framework. Stephen Walt believes that governments not only balance against power, but may also balance against threats. Walt believes that the threat is the core of countries' concern. To understand the extent of the threat, factors such as threatening intentions and behavior, geographic proximity, and offensive power of the threat source must also be considered. The situation of Ukraine is such that this country is placed between Russia and the West, and if each of the parties dominates this country, they will be in a higher position and will subsequently gain the ability to create threats. Russia felt threatened by Ukraine joining the European Union and NATO and considered it a strategic threat and reacted to it. In fact, Russia's sense of danger from the emerging threats led this country to adopt a balancing act against other powers.

The crisis of 2014 in Ukraine, which led to the non-signing of the cooperation agreement between the representatives of this country and the European Union, can also be considered against this power. Yanukovych announced that he has no ally to join the European Union. This was followed by a demonstration in Kyiv’s Independence Square protesting Yanukovych's decision not to join the European Union. The demonstration turned violent. Following these developments and the deterioration of the local internal situation, Viktor Yanukovych was removed from the presidency, elections were held on May 25, 2014, and Petro Poroshenko was elected as the President of the Republic. Following these incidents, serious protests started in the east and south of the country. On February 26, pro-Russian separatists took control of the Crimean Peninsula. A few days after these events, on March 16, 2014, the people of Crimea joined Russia by holding a referendum, and this peninsula became part of Russian territory. After Crimea’s independence, separatists demonstrated in Luhansk and Donetsk, demanding secession from Kyiv. With the efforts of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the warring groups signed the Minsk Protocol in September 2014 with the aim of a ceasefire. After a month-long ceasefire, a second Minsk agreement was signed in February 2015 by the leaders of Britain, Russia, some French and German officials to revive the previous agreement. Therefore, the consequences of this crisis are not limited to everyone, but it has many effects and consequences for all parties involved.

The crisis of 2014 was the result of the friction of the great powers, as well as the readiness of the internal conditions in Ukraine. Following this crisis, the demarcations of the Cold War era were reestablished, but in this period the competition was more economic and both sides benefited more from economic and political tools. EU-Russia relations were at a high level before the crisis, the volume of trade between these two powers was high, and these relations were not suitable for the United States because by destroying Russia, the world was moving towards multipolarity. This leads to a situation in which the United States can no longer exert power alone as a hegemon. Therefore, with this crisis, the relationship between Russia and the European Union has decreased significantly, and the European Union has approached the United States to deal with Russia and has increased its relations with this country.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Israel with the aim of getting out of its regional and international isolation has been trying to expand its relations at different levels with the South Caucasus and Central Asian countries in the framework of peripheral doctrine. In this regard, it has been successful in expanding relations with some regional countries including Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. A variety of literature has been created in the field of Israel's main and strategic goals for cooperation with the Republic of Azerbaijan in recent years, however, no successful research has been done regarding the nature of the relations between these two actors. Therefore, this feature of the selected topic distinguishes it from previous studies that have been done before. In order to understand the dimensions and depth of relations between Israel and the Republic of Azerbaijan, the important indicators of strategic relations have been adopted in connection with the important axes of cooperation between the two actors in different fields to understand whether their relations can be called strategic alliance or technical cooperation.

Which of the concepts of Strategic Alliance or tactical cooperation is more effective to show the interaction between the Republic of Azerbaijan and Israel?Research Hypothesis: Studies show that the cooperation of two actors lacks the majority of strategic alliance indicators including the uniqueness of relations, the depth of relations, convergent strategic goals, institutionalization, and the precise definition of enemy concepts, the threat and presence of competitors, excluding the friendly atmosphere in bilateral relations and to some extent long-term cooperation. As a result, compared to the concept of strategic alliance, tactical cooperation has more explanatory power to understand and model the relationship between the two actors.

In order to explain the main idea of the research, this article uses the Qualitative method of structural and interpretive modeling which has been used in this article and has tried to use the collected data in order to obtain a suitable model for the analysis of relations between the Republic of Azerbaijan and Israel. The review of various research indicates the fact that for the analysis of relations between Israel and the Republic of Azerbaijan, conceptual frameworks can be more productive than theoretical frameworks. Therefore, strategic concept has been chosen to explain the typology of the two actor’s relations. It seems that the following components constitute the most important indicators of strategic relations that have been applied in Israel-Azerbaijan relations to determine its typology.The existence of converging strategic goals, which can be considered as the starting point of strategic cooperation based on which players receive the initial understanding that they can achieve their goals through mutual efforts.The existence of long-term, authentic and deep cooperation between the two players, different from the temporary alliance that is created to achieve specific goals at a specific time or to deal with specific events.The incomparability of relations which includes the expansion of high-level official meetings between the two actors, the increase in mutual economic cooperation, the creation of a common market by addressing tariff and non-tariff issues and the deepening of military cooperation.Institutionalizing cooperation in which the two actors are expected to be members of an efficient regional or intra-regional organization.The existence of a friendly atmosphere in bilateral cooperation that has been influenced by the historical and cultural backgrounds and the appropriate path to solve problems.Having a common threat or enemy that forces the actors to work together and come up with strategies to deal with it.

Israel's view of the Republic of Azerbaijan can be interpreted and analyzed in the form of three approaches: the containment strategy, the Greater Middle East plan and the peripheral doctrine, based on which it has tried to use Azerbaijan's capabilities against Iran. On the other hand, the goals and security plans of Azerbaijan, including the solution of the Karabakh crisis, instability in the South Caucasus region, tension with other regional and extra-regional countries, has caused Azerbaijan to adjust its policy towards Israel to use Jewish lobbies in the US Congress for fulfilling the military requirements of this country. In addition, it has been shown that the axes of cooperation between the two actors, such as trade and energy, have not been deepened compared to their cooperation with other partners and more recently, the increasing growth of military deals has been fueled by growing regional instabilities.The beginning of the cooperation between the two actors dates back to 1991 and after that their cooperation began in various technical, economic, infrastructural and agricultural dimensions, however the depth of relations between the two sides has not expanded and Israeli competitors, including Turkish, Russian and European companies have been most successful in concluding economic cooperation agreements with Azerbaijan. Also, despite the fact that Azerbaijan is a member of numerous organizations such as ECO, Commonwealth of Independent States, it does not cooperate with Israel in any joint organization and their relations are not institutionalized, so much so that Ilham Aliyev used the word iceberg in 2009 to describe the nature of their relations which are mostly secret and informal.

Statistical analysis and relational experiences show that the concept of technical cooperation is more useful and constructive than strategic alliance to understand the relationship between the two actors. Due to the lack of depth and varieties in economic cooperation, weak institutionalization, distinct strategic goals and having a different driving force of foreign policy, their relationship cannot be classified as a strategic alliance. Another significant point that should be noted is that there is a positive correlation between the increase in instability in the South Caucasus and the increase in cooperation between Israel and the Republic of Azerbaijan.

The North Caucasus region has always been restless and subject to tensions and crises that have continued since the time of Stalin and there is no clear vision for this region in the near future. Exploring the political and security activities of Russia in this region can be helpful and effective in understanding the root causes and dimensions of these crises. The north Caucasus is a special region in the Russian federation where many ethnic groups such as Kabardians, Balkars, Circassians, Chechens, Ingush and other peoples live. Russia plays a big role in this region. The problem of the current research is to investigate the ethnic and territorial policies of Russia and its effect on the spread of ethnic conflicts and extremism in the North Caucasus.  The findings of the present research show that the ethnic policies and Russification of the Caucasus region by the Russians are in line with the historical, geographical and cultural de-identification of the people of this region, making these ethnic groups dependent on the Russian government, curbing the influence of NATO and the United States in this region and energy security. Also, the events of the Islamic world, including the rise of the Taliban, Al-Qaeda and the ISIS and its security implications for Russia and its regional allies have prompted it to adopt a combination of containment, confrontation and engagement measures in the region. The question that arises here is the effect of Russia's ethnic policies on extremism and political stability in the North Caucasus.

 The political space creation strategy was in line with the historical, geographical and cultural identity of the people of this region, making these tribes dependent on the Russian government and creating permanent divisions and duality between the tribes, so, it led to extremism in north Caucasus.
The research method is qualitative and content analysis type. In this research, with an analytical approach, an attempt is made to explain why the competition, tension and continuous conflicts that have cast a shadow on this region in the North Caucasus region for several decades.
 The method of collecting information is using library resources, including domestic and foreign books and articles.
Theoretical framework is based on Martin Marjer’s ethnic politics. The ethnic stratification system of a society is formed by the nature of the internal relationship between groups, the scarce resources for which they compete for and most importantly, the ability of one group to impose its dominance on others. According to Martin Marjer, three important patterns of behavior reinforce ethnic ideology, escalating ethnic strife, extremism and inter-ethnic division. These three patterns are: the first pattern: adaptation. The second pattern: Egalitarian pluralism. Third pattern: contradictory, conflicting and unequal pluralism

 adaptation or assimilation: groups may be culturally similar or assimilated and interact freely with each other. This process means assimilation, or they may remain culturally distinct and socially distinct. This process is called pluralism. Adaptation means a process of distinct reduction. This process occurs when members of two smaller societies or cultural groups assimilate.

 Egalitarian pluralism: Equal pluralism implies the creation of equality between different groups with independent cultural and structural independence that is roughly balanced in political and economic power. The third pattern: antagonistic, conflicting and unequal pluralism. Unequal pluralism is mainly pursued in colonial societies and racist regimes; but some of its features can be seen precisely in societies that pursue egalitarian assimilation and pluralism. In such a society, the ruling state is in the hands of the dominant ethnic group and the majority of people are not citizens but subjects. In this ethnic policy, the goal is to maintain or expand inequality between groups, and to allocate all political power and a major share of material wealth to the dominant group. The presence of many ethnic groups in the Caucasus region has created problems and has exposed the region to conflict and tension because there is a serious division between these ethnic groups based on the policy of land division. Since its entry into the Caucasus, Russia has emerged as a hegemonic power and has taken effective measures towards its Russian system and model.

The findings of the present research show that the ethnic policies and Russification of the Caucasus region by the Russians are in line with the historical, geographical and cultural de-identification of the people of this region, making these ethnic groups dependent on the Russian government, curbing the influence of NATO and the United States in this region and energy security.

In this study, an attempt was made to study and analyze ethnic policies in Russia and its impact on the spread and development of extremism in the North Caucasus. Today's political map of the Caucasus and central Asia includes countries that are unstable due to real and potential disputes over land and water, ethnic and non-ethnic conflicts as well as Russian and non-Russian differences. The roots of these differences and unrest in the North Caucasus and Central Asia must be sought in the expansionist policies of Tsarist Russia and its successor, the Soviet Union, especially under Stalin, whose ideology was used with the same methods even more violently. The nationalist movement, revenge for the devastation and devastation caused by the aggressive and warlike policies of the Russians, has brought violence and extremism to the region.

The tension and conflict between Baku and Yerevan in the last three decades has affected Iran's bilateral relations with both of these two countries. On the other hand, the Economic influence of rival powers in the region, has doubled Tehran's regional concerns. Therefore, preventing the threats and taking advantage of existing opportunities have become a significant necessity for Iran. According to mentioned conditions, in the period of 2013-2021, Tehran tried to use economic opportunities created by its new approach in foreign policy in light of the JCPOA.Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan are considered as Iran's getaway to reach Russia and Europe. We will use Geopolynomics topic as a conceptual framework in evaluating Iran's bilateral relations with Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan, emphasizing the approach of Rouhani's government in the field of foreign policy between 2013 and 2021. This article uses the phenomenological method to analyze the collected data.

This article intends to address the following question to some extent. What was Rouhani's government's approach to bilateral relations with the Republic of Azerbaijan and Armenia?

Tehran has prioritized economic issues in its foreign policy in the post-JCPOA period. Tehran's geo-economic attitude towards the expansion of relations with the Republics of Azerbaijan and Armenia shows a significant example of a new approach. In the past decades, the relations between Iran and Armenia have continued according to the existing capacities but bilateral relations between Iran and the Republic of Azerbaijan have experienced a more cooperative approach compared to the last decade. The outstanding geo-economic position of the Republic of Azerbaijan improved the status of this country in Iran's foreign policy and as a result, strengthened Tehran-Baku relations (between 2013-2021) compared to Tehran-Yerevan relations.

  Geopolynomics is an analytical tool to explain the policy issues facing the post-Cold War world and the 21st century. It could be said that Geopolynomics is an informal intergovernmental regime. In fact, this term serves as informal rules between governments for economic cooperation and regional integration by taking into account the security concerns of the other side.  In other words, Geopolynomics is created from the combination of Geopolitics and Geo-economics. Therefore, it can provide a useful conceptual framework for analyzing a wide range of issues such as transit corridors, transportation, energy and trade exchanges by considering security issues. 

After the first Karabakh war Armenia faced with many geopolitical obstacles and economic challenges imposed by the Republic of Azerbaijan and Turkey. Therefore, cooperation with Iran is very attractive for Armenia to circumvent the imposed restrictions. Tehran-Baku relations are affected by geopolitical problems (Karabakh conflict), ethnic issues, religious ideology, the presence of extra-regional powers (arms cooperation with Israel) the legal regime of the Caspian Sea and its common resources most of which have had a negative impact on Tehran-Baku relations. Based on the main foreign policy discourse during president Rouhani’s administrations (2013-2021), the importance of Geo-economics has become more prominent. It seems that geo-economic elements have had a greater impact on the development of bilateral relations between Tehran and Baku than Yerevan. It is also noteworthy that geopolitical concerns remain active despite Geo-economic cooperation. This issue can be examined in the following three aspects:1) The meeting of high-ranking officials,2) Important agreements reached between the two sides regarding construction of transit corridors,3) Trade volumes. n the period mentioned in this article (August 2013 to August 2021), 47 high-level meetings were held between Tehran and Baku officials. Also, more than 130 meetings were held between the ministers, deputies and senior managers of the two countries. In comparison with the Republic of Azerbaijan, only 23 high level official meetings occurred between Iranian and Armenian officials and less than 40 meetings were held among low-level government officials. The abundance of meetings can indicate the political will to cooperate. In the discussion of South Caucasus, transportation and energy exchange is the most important measure of cooperation. In this regard, the Rouhani administration has signed several agreements with Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan. It is important to point out that these republics are parts of International North-South Corridor. This multi-purpose corridor connects Iran's southern coasts in the Persian Gulf with Russia and Europe. There is no independent railway between Iran and Armenia. The contract for the construction of this railway line was approved by the governments of Armenia and Iran in 2009.  By the end of 2013, the cost of this route was estimated at 3.5 billion dollars. This project was never implemented due to its high cost. On the other hand, Iran- the Republic of Azerbaijan railway is under construction. In addition, Iran is eager to export gas to Europe through south Caucasus region. While the transportation pipeline in Armenia is not developed, the Republic of Azerbaijan has a high potential to connect Iran to the South Caucasus gas pipeline and TANAP in Turkey. The volume of transactions between Iran and Armenia in 2020 was about 400 million dollars. This volume in 2012 was about 275 million dollars. The trade balance between Iran and Armenia has always been in favor of Tehran. On the other hand, the volume of transactions between Iran and the Republic of Azerbaijan has grown more than Armenia. This volume was less than 270 million dollars in 2012 and reached 495 million dollars in 2019.

This research was conducted with the aim of evaluating the economic and political situation of the Republic of Azerbaijan and Armenia in Iran's foreign relations. The main findings of the article were that bilateral relations between Iran and the Republic of Azerbaijan increased more than the relations between Iran and Armenia from 2013 to 2021. The stated conditions are a normal choice for Iran because the geo-economic position of the Republic of Azerbaijan has more potential for expanding bilateral relations with Iran. Contrary to the Republic of Azerbaijan's geo-economic importance, Armenia is Iran's vital geopolitical partner in the South Caucasus.

Trade has long been one of the main engines of economic growth and development of countries and almost all economists, economic schools and thinkers have paid great attention to it. In line with Iran's accession and considering the importance of trade development between Iran and the member countries of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), this study examines the multilateralism of Iran's trade with other members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, toexamines the multilateralism of Iran's trade with other members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization for optimal use of its geopolitical position in the period of 2017-2020.

The main question of this research is: Is Iran moving towards convergence with different groups? Will convergence with the Shanghai Group help the Iranian economy? What is the degree of similarity between Iranian trade and members of the Shanghai Group? What variables are important for Iran's convergence with the Shanghai group?

The hypothesis of this research is as follows: Iran's economy is moving towards convergence with different groups. Convergence with the Shanghai Group helps the Iranian economy. The degree of similarity between Iranian trade and members of the Shanghai Group is high. The variables of population, distance and GDP are important on the convergence of Iran with the Shanghai group.

To calculate the commodity composition of trade and the intensity of similarity of exports and imports between Iran and the eight countries of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization between 2017 and 2020, two Cosine indexes and the Finger-Kreinin (FK) index have been used. Also, the studies were performed using Finger-Kreinin (FK) similarity index and Cosine index as well as data panel model with random effects.

According to the Cosine index, the highest value is obtained for Pakistan (0.610869) and then India (0.545614), and the lowest similarity is obtained with Uzbekistan (0.269423), Russia (0.250048), and Kazakhstan (0.221851). According to Finger-Kreinin (FK) index, the highest degree of similarity with Pakistan and India with (44.5385) and (40.51033) and the lowest degree of similarity with Uzbekistan (28.19768) then Russia (27.3071) and Kazakhstan (25.08058) is calculated. Therefore, the correlation co-efficient of the results obtained from the two Cosine indexes and the Finger-Kreinin (FK) index is clear that this value (0.86499898) has been obtained, which indicates the high correlation of the above two indices in a way that confirms the results of each other. That is, in the Finger-Kreinin (FK) index and the index of Cosine, it has a high correlation with Pakistan and India. It also has the least degree of similarity with the countries of Uzbekistan, Russia and Kazakhstan. The results panel data model with random effects showed that the coefficients of distance, population, and GDP in both models were meaningless. Population variables in both methods had a positive effect on Iranian trade and the GDP variable had a negative effect on Iranian trade. On the other hand, the distance variable in estimating the model is negative with Finger-Kreinin (FK) index and positive in the Cosine index. Interpretation of the results obtained from estimating the patterns implies that; The coefficients of distance variability in both models are meaningless, i.e. Iran's trade plan is not based on using the potential of closer countries. The variable coefficients of GDP indicate the power of the opposite country to absorb the goods of Iran, which is meaningless in both models. Variable population coefficients have been obtained in both meaningless models, i.e. Iran's trade plan is not based on the use of crowded markets and their demand. Therefore, the findings of estimating the patterns indicate that Iran has not yet revised its trade plan in accordance with the optimal use of the Shanghai Group's geopolitical opportunities. Also, real-world statistics show that China, although both in terms of population and GDP can be a good opportunity for the export of Iranian goods, has a significant role in Iran's import basket. Despite both of these advantages, Iran's supplies only 0.16 percent of the Russian economy, much less than one percent. Despite having all three geopolitical advantages of proximity, distance, high population, and high economic growth, India has a very small place in Iran's trade basket. Despite its economic strength, large population, and bordering Iran, Pakistan has not yet received much attention in the trade basket with Iran. Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, in addition to Shanghai Group, joint membership in ECO Economic Cooperation Group, as well as Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, in addition to Shanghai Group, joint membership in ECO and Eurasian Economic Union as well as the proximity of distance and growing economies, have a low place in the business map of Iran. Therefore, real-world statistics show that Iran has not yet modified its trade plan to make the most of the Shanghai Group's geopolitical opportunities.

According to the results obtained from the estimation of patterns as well as real-world statistics, both of which do not take advantage of the opportunity to join the Shanghai Group and make the best use of its geopolitical position, the following policy recommendations are proposed: 1-  fundamental revision of Iran's trade plan has been made and Iran's trade portfolio has been targeted and tracked based on the benefits of proximity, population and economic growth of countries to make the most optimal use of membership in the Shanghai Group to develop Iran's trade. 2- Iran should make efforts to complete and make good use of the south-north corridor as soon as possible, because a major part of the geopolitical position of trade with China, India, and Pakistan can be expanded with the completion of this project, especially the Chabahar port project. It can be very helpful in this direction. 3- Iran must do everything in its power to position and use the new Silk Road, i.e. the connecting corridor (one belt-one road), because this project is the most important commercial geopolitical megaproject in the current situation.

The Russian army is developing some reconnaissance and interceptor vehicles such as the S.300 systems to defend strategic areas belonging to some of its allied countries. Another defensive shield system was also produced on a regional scale, such as the S-400 which is more capable than the S-300 system. During this process, the Russian military began production of the S-500 defense system. Production sites of S-300 and S-400 missile systems were established in some vital regions of Russia (in Kaliningrad and Crimea) and the territory of some allied countries. However, the Russian defense shield is technically weaker and more limited compared to the Western countries defense shield, but without a doubt, this plan will not remain at these levels.  The development of Russia's defense shield means that Russian leaders intend to defend their country against the threat of Western ballistic missiles. Of course, these equipments increase the offensive power of Western countries, especially by carrying tools and increasing missile defense systems. One of the main tools of Russia's defense shield is the S-300 missile system.The PMU S-300 model is capable of countering an attack missile with a speed of Mach 2-8 and a range of 1000 km. This system was established in Armenia, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Belarus. The S-400 system is also capable of shooting down stealth aircraft, ballistic missiles, hypersonic missiles and drones with a range of 400 km. But two tools only work on atmosphere.The S-500 system is also in the final stage of production with a range of 600 km and a speed of Mach 7, which is capable of shooting down hypersonic missiles and spy satellites. It is expected to be fulfilled by 2025. In addition, the Russian military has developed some ground-based early warning radars called Voronezh.The Voronezh MD model has an inspection area of 6000 km and has the capacity to detect 500 targets. Of course, this radar is only an early warning system and is not compatible with any interceptor device. Reconnaissance satellite technology has also been used for defense. Currently, several Cosmos class satellites are in service and will be deployed in outer space for this purpose. The Russian military plans to upgrade this technology and surveillance. The plan to deploy Russian missile defense systems appears not as a tactical plan, but as a strategic plan. This plan is simultaneously qualitative and quantitative in the development of detection and interception systems as well as early warning systems.Research Question: “Why is Russia thinking of creating a missile defense shield?

The hypothesis of the article is that "the concern of Russian leaders about the Western plan to create a missile defense shield has led to the development of their own missile defense tools."

This is a historical and descriptive method with an emphasis on monitoring Russia's anti-ballistic systems, as well as examining the country's official doctrine in the field of security and foreign policy.  This research also deals with the situation of the Russian authorities.   

The research results show that the US and NATO defense shield was the main motivation of the Russian authorities to create missile defense systems. The US and NATO missile defense shields consists of SM3 interceptors, Aegis radars and early warning satellites. However, each part is separated but they are connected by all. They will be deployed in four stages in the mentioned areas, which can defend the American forces and its allies. Those regions are American homeland, Alaska, Greenland, South Persian Gulf and South Korea. They are also carried by destroyers in the Mediterranean and the Pacific. In parallel, NATO is building its own defense shields in some places in the center and east of the continent, which are: The radar station in Turkey, the Aegis radar system in Poland and the THAAD system in Romania and the command section in Germany. The four Aegis radar systems installed on the ships they command are in the port of Rota (Spain). Some say that the third and fourth parts of the defense shield are capable of targeting Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles. The defensive shield also protects Western countries that have developed their offensive capacity in conjunction with defensive tools. Due to the withdrawal from the INF Treaty, there are no restrictions against the West. Putin’s opposition to Trump’s extension of the New Start Treaty without any conditions and Trump’s insistence on concluding a comprehensive agreement annoyed Russian authorities. In addition, Russian authorities are not happy about the establishment of a Western defensive shield near the country’s western borders. These actions cause Russia to react in the same way.

Russia's action in the development of defense systems is one of the main factors of change in the military doctrine of this country. Previously, the Russian military organized its strategic tools around the doctrine of nuclear deterrence and parity. But Russia is trying in the same direction in response to the deployment of Western missile defense elements in some strategic parts of the continent. As a result, Russia's new doctrine is based on an offensive and defensive strategy. Nevertheless, the current interactions between the West and Russia have created a new round of arms competition, especially in strategic defense tools. Russian defense systems are not at the level of their Western counterparts either in terms of content or technical quality. But these are accompanied by offensive tools that have been developed in strategic areas to pose the same threats against the West. According to this emerging trend, the Russian missile defense zone will also cover more strategic areas in the future.

The subject of the current research is to investigate the factors affecting the policy of the Russian government towards Islamic trends in Russia as a group of important minorities in this country between 1991 and 2011. One of the basic issues in multi-ethnic and multicultural societies such as Russia is the method of government policy and its management in dealing with ethnic groups and the culture of minorities. Political management in multicultural countries requires its own abilities, often each country uses its own unique policies and it may be challenging to write a single version for all countries. On the other hand, various political, social, historical, economic, etc. causes lead them to the political methods that govern them. The multicultural social structure among Western liberal democracies has somehow led to policies that increase the government's capacity to deal effectively and efficiently with ethnic and cultural pluralism within its sovereign borders. However, it is essential to note that policy-making in non-democratic systems such as Russia, which have a multicultural social structure and authoritarian political structure, has been different from the policies of democratic societies. 

Why has the Russian government's policy towards the Islamic currents in this country fluctuated between control, confrontation, and interaction?Research Hypothesis: It is hypothesized that the central government of Russia's policy toward Islamic currents due to some internal factors such as the nature of the hybrid authoritarian political system as well as some external factors such as the developments in the Islamic world and the emergence of groups including Taliban, al-Qaeda and ISIS and its security effects on countries such as Russia, which have significant Muslim populations, have fluctuated mainly in the form of control, confrontation, and interaction.

The method of this research is qualitative with a descriptive-analytical approach, and as test theory research, the description in this research is done using models and theories. The analysis uses the model called "Instrumental multiculturalism in hybrid authoritarian regimes." In this model, multiculturalism in a state that possesses both authoritarian and democratic elements is often instrumental and does not necessarily inherent in the acceptance of this concept and is used as a tool in the hands of the government to maintain cohesion and survival. In hybrid authoritarian regimes that are multicultural, they use multiculturalism as a tool to achieve their various goals. This means that, on the one hand, accepting the multicultural nature of society recognizes the rights of minorities and allows them to operate in the political and social spheres.On the other hand, relying on its authoritarian nature, it demands the complete loyalty of these groups. In this model, governments do not always adhere to the main features of multiculturalism, such as equality, social justice, self-government and minority rights and other liberal aspects of this theory. They remain within the core components of the concept of multiculturalism only as long as the interests, security, and survival of states are not threatened. Suppose that minorities deviate from the circuit of loyalty to the state. In that case, the authoritarian nature of the state is manifested and some policies of confrontation, exclusion and marginalization or strict control and supervision of the granted democracy emerge. In explaining this model, it should be said that the concept of multiculturalism with ethnic and cultural diversity in a single political society has been accepted as a reality both in terms of positive effects and despite some security threats.The process of this research was such that the theories of multiculturalism and authoritarianism were studied with a comparative approach, and their main and most prominent features were identified. Then, the components and assumptions of multiculturalism and authoritarianism in Russia were examined and the data obtained from this study led to the formation of the model "instrumental multiculturalism in hybrid authoritarian regimes". Based on this, the article was analyzed about the fluctuations of the government's policy towards Islamic movements.

Russia's hybrid authoritarian political system is a context that intentionally or unintentionally creates an atmosphere of control or instrumentalism of authoritarian or democratic elements in domestic and foreign politics. In other words, the government does not follow a single policy toward different Islamic currents. Instead, various policies based on interaction and tolerance are proposed in line with the interactive policies of the government and what is referred to as the right of self-government and the policies of control or confrontation. In addition, by adopting three parallel policies, the Russian government has pursued the policy of recognizing Islamic currents as the dominant intellectual current of a significant group of Muslims in this country.

The findings of the research show that firstly, the government's policies towards Islamic currents have both internal and external dimensions. Secondly, the government does not follow a single policy towards the Tatar and North Caucasus Islamic currents. Based on what the model of "instrumental multiculturalism in hybrid authoritarian regimes" showed, the government's policy towards the Tatar movement is based on interaction and tolerance, and in this regard, it follows the model of recognizing cultural differences. On the other hand, although the North Caucasus movement was able to gain independent power in the administration of internal and especially military affairs compared to the Tatar movement, it is witnessing more controlling or confrontational policies of the central government. By conducting a study based on the mentioned model, it was concluded that the first policy of the Russian government is interaction and tolerance with Islamic currents. Parallel to that, the policy of confrontation and strong control over radical and independence-seeking currents and the third policy is political participation and instrumental use of Islamic currents.

How to interact with Russia as one of the great and influential powers of the international system has always been one of the important issues of Iran's foreign policy, which has various political, security and economic aspects. In this way, as much as the West and the United States became the "other" in the form of enemy in Iran's foreign policy, the policy of looking to the East and being close to states like China and Russia became more prominent in the form of East-oriented friendship patterns and regional friendship patterns. In general, Iran's relations with Russia can be analyzed at three levels of analysis: "bilateral relations", "regional relations" and "international relations". In this regard, the main aim of this research is to deal with the main reason of Iran's tendency towards Russia from the perspective of a theoretical narrative. 

 The main question of this research is that which of the theories of alliance and coalition in international relations literature can better explain why Iran is tending towards Russia?

 In this research, our assumption is that among the various theoretical narratives of alliance and coalition between states, neorealist narratives such as the theory of "Balance of Threat" or "Bandwagoning Policy" provide a better perspective of Iran-Russia relations. Because due to the lack of economic interdependence between Iran and Russia, as well as the lack of a common identity between them, the “economic interdependence theory” or “identity-oriented theories” cannot correctly explain the tendency of Iran to be closer to Russia.

  In terms of method, this research is based on a case study in a theoretical framework (adaptation of the theory to the case) as one of the qualitative research methods. The method of collecting data is document study and use of virtual resources.

To answer the main question of this research in the first part of this research, we will discuss the nature of relations between Iran and Russia and the indicators of cooperation between them. In this topic, we will understand that according to Russian national security documents, Iran is only an important partner of Russia in some areas and regional issues. But on the other hand, Iran wants a strong alliance with Russia beyond a regional cooperation. In this regard, this claim can be proved by mentioning some cases at the level of "speech acts" and also "practical actions" of Iran's officials.
In the second section, we examine Iran's policy towards Russia in the form of creating a balance of threats, a balance against the common threats of the United States for both states. Based on this assumption, Iran, as a security-seeking actor who has an understanding of the threat from the united states, tends to form a security alliance with Russia in order to contain its threat. Therefore, common identity factors have no role in the tendency to unite with Russia. According to this assumption, Iran is only looking for security ties with Russia, and economic ties and making profits have no place or are not the first priority in Iran's policy of proximity.
In the fourth section, we will examine the orientation of Iran towards Russia in the form of " Bandwagoning Policy". According to this theory, the main reason for Iran's tendency to unite with Russia is not to contain the threat of the unites states and maintain security, but the main reason is to increase the country's power and development, in fact, the union with Russia is an opportunity to gain benefits and results. According to this theory, Iran as a rebellious revisionist state with unlimited aims that has limited resources and ability to change the order (revolutionary change), with the Russia as a revisionist state with limited goals that has the necessary resources and ability to change the status quo (gradual change) is accompanied in order to benefit from the capabilities of this state in changing the existing situation and to have a share in the victory. So, in adopting a follow-up policy, two factors are very important: The amount of state power that is followed, the amount of benefits that can be obtained from the following policy, and according to the variables of Russia's power, Iran can gain political, security and economic benefits from following that policy.
The research findings show that in the "Balance of Threat" theory factors such as containing the threatening states, the importance of the US threat as a common threat to both states, considering Iran as a security actor, considering the alliance as a security alliance against a common threat, the elites' perception of the threat factor and the aggressive intentions of the threatening state are very important. In contrast in the " Bandwagoning Policy" theory factors such as gaining profits, the unimportance of the common threat of the US, considering Iran as an opportunistic and profit-seeking actor, considering the alliance as an extended alliance for profit, the importance of Russia's power compared to Iran, the importance of the perceptions of the elites and their calculation from profits and losses that results of the " Bandwagoning Policy" are very important.

Finally, we conclude that both narratives can be useful, although in each of these two theoretical perspectives, the "causes, motivations and results" of Iran's policy towards Russia are interpreted quite differently from each other.  On the other hand, in the second theoretical narrative, we should distinguish between Walt's and Schweller's narratives about "Bandwagoning Policy". Because Schweller's narrative is a suitable narrative for explaining Iran's policy towards Russia.

The connection between Sufism and politics in the contemporary history of Afghanistan began with the establishment of Ahmad Shah Abdali's Government (1747). Ahmad Shah Abdali had a good relationship with other Sufis. The Dastarbandi (turban ceremony) tradition has been established for the kings at the hands of Sufi elders and gained their support in his campaigns. The role of Sufi elders during the reign of Durranis and Muhammadzais is also very important. With the invasion of Britain and the Soviet Union and the emergence of internal conflicts between local rulers, the presence of Sufis in the country's politics increases. From the perspective of "Political Sociology" whose main topic is the analysis of mutual relations between the government and social forces? The possibility of finding the open and hidden role of the leaders of the Naqshbandiyya, Qadiriyya and Chishtiyya sects, opposing political officials, supporting them, reacting against the British aggressors has been investigated. Sufis have always played a role in the political and social developments of Afghanistan and have enjoyed great respect and closeness in the government systems. With the British and Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Sufis mobilized the people against the colonial forces by organizing their political and jihadi activities in the form of political organizations. Although the relationship between Sufism and politics in Afghanistan had ups and downs but Sufis have always been respected in the government. Kings and ministers participated in their assemblies and monasteries and were consulted for the administration of the country. In the contemporary history of Afghanistan, Sufis have always resisted internal oppression and injustice and foreign aggression, as mentioned earlier.

The main question of the article is how has been the quality of relationship between the Sufi sects and the political ruling in contemporary Afghanistan and their role in the country’s political power?

The hypothesis is that Sufis, within sects of Naqshbandiyya, Qadiriyya and Chishtiyya, have had a significant influence on high-raking offcials, and the courtiers and royals in Afghanistan. Their elders and leaders have played a crucial role in the Afghan politics and power systems. They often played greater contributions in the removal, appointment of kings and political leaders and legitimizing the power as well as creating political parties in the country.

The current study has been conducted, based on content analysis method which is a type of qualitative analyses and from the point of view of "Political Sociology" whose principle subject matter is the analysis of mutual relations between governmental power and social forces in contemporary history of Afghanistan. One can examine the visible role of the leaders of the Naqshbandiyya, Qadiriyya and Chishtiyya sects in confronting political officials or supporting them or their reaction against the British and Soviet aggressors.

The link between Sufism and politics in the contemporary history of Afghanistan is undeniable. The elders of Sofia always have a special place in the political and power apparatus of Afghanistan.  They have played an important role in deposing and installing kings and emirs and legitimizing their power.  As mentioned, Ahmad Shah Abdali was a follower of Naqshbandiyya sect and he established the tradition of coronation and turban cermony by the Sufis elders. He enlisted the support of Sufi masters to persuade his followers and disciples in the fields of warfare and politics.  But his sons and descendants could not use the capacity of the Sufis like him. With the arrival of Muhammadzais, the amirs of that time also maintained the relations by establishing causal links through marriages with the Sufi families, in order to gain their support. With the invasion of British troops into Afghanistan, a new chapter was established in the relationship between the Sufis and the government, and the Sufis took a step with political and jihadist movements established in the political and power scene of Afghanistan and engaged in armed struggle with the aggressor forces and their internal agents.  In general, elders and followers of Naqshbandiyya and Qadiriya sects have been more involved in the politics and power system of Afghanistan than other sects. Basically, in the contemporary history of Afghanistan, apart from legitimizing the political government, Sufi leaders played a prominent role in resolving the family disputes of the nobles or taking power by the local rulers. Sometimes they themselves had a place in the governing body. But with the passage of time and the involvement of new elements and factors in the political situation of Afghanistan, it seems that the influence of this group in politics and power has decreased compared to the past. The responsible factors can be analyzed in other research works.

The results of the research show that the connection between Sufism and politics has always been accompanied by ups and downs since the beginning of Ahmad Shah's reign. he had a good relation with other Sufis. The Sufis also supported him during his campaigns. But with the invasion of British forces and then Russia into Afghanistan, the Sufis rushed to the political and power scene of Afghanistan with greater coordination and started an armed struggle against the aggressor forces and their internal agents.  In addition, Sufis have played an important and prominent role in various political and governmental positions in recent years.

Relations between Iran and Russia have a long history. The relationship between the people living in the regions known today as the Russian Federation and the Iranians goes back thousands of years. But it was in the last two hundred years that the relations between the two sides reached their peak. In tsarist Russia, geopolitics and Russia's desire to develop its territory in the south was the most important factor in bilateral relations. With the rise of the Soviet Union, the ideological element was also added to this trend. The Soviet Union considered Iran as one of the countries leaning towards the West and based on this, it adjusted its foreign policy toward Iran. As a result of this historical relationship, different images of Russia have been constructed in the minds of Iranian elites and ordinary people. Many works have been written in Iran about the history of Iran and Soviet / Russian relations, and there is a lot of information about the image of Russians by Iranians. However, Iranian researchers have not paid much attention to the image and position of Iran in the Soviet Union/Russia. This is despite the fact that, according to constructivists, the identity of players of the international system has a vital role in their relations. They believe, identity is a relational phenomenon. This means that regardless of the image that each actor has of himself, the image of other actors will also be of great importance in determining bilateral relations.There are different ways to identify the constructed image of a country in other countries. One of the best sources is to check educational resources. Especially in the Soviet Union, which had a very ideological view of education, examining educational sources can be very useful. Based on this and considering the significant identity changes that occurred with the collapse of the Soviet Union, it is expected that the constructed image of Iran in the educational resources of the Soviet Union/ Russian Federation has faced significant changes.Accordingly, in this article, we examine the image of Iran in the Soviet Union/Russian Federation and determine the impact of identity changes that occurred in Iran and Russia on this image. In this regard, in qualitative research, using the case study method, we examine the constructed image of Iran in history textbooks in the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation.

During the last one-hundred years, what image of Iran has been created in Russia and how have the developments of the two countries affected it?Research Hypothesis: In the past one-hundred years, a marginal image of Iran has been constructed in Russia, and despite the identity changes that have occurred in Iran and Russia, there has been no change in this constructed image.

According to constructivists, the identity of players has a vital role in forming relationships between them. Constructivists consider identity a relational and variable phenomenon formed in different periods. Another essential characteristic of identity, according to them, is that it is relational. In this sense, regardless of each player's image of themselves, the image that other players make of them also plays a vital role in defining their identity. In this regard, by using the theory of constructivism, we will try to identify the constructed image of Iran in Russia and open a path to identify the effect of this constructed image on the relations between the two countries.This article is the result of qualitative research. We use the case study method to conduct this research. A case study analyzes a specific research plan and examines a problem. Its purpose is to use the available information to predict future trends. Considering that the main sources of our research were the textbooks of the Soviet Union/Russian Federation, we have used the thematic analysis method to conduct our research.

Based on the information obtained, we concluded that the image of Iran in the Soviet Union/Russian Federation is marginal and unimportant. The identity changes in both countries have not changed this image.

The study of the history of relations between Iran and Russia highlights two important features: first, the disconnection and instability of bilateral relations; Second, the dependence of these relations on the position of two countries, especially Russia, in the international system. Another critical point revealed in this article's result is that despite the changes in both countries in the last 100 years, there has been no significant change in the mentality of Russians towards Iran. Based on the travelogues of Russian travelers and textbooks of the era of the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation, it can be said that relations with Iran were not very important for the Russians. In addition, the Russians' narrative of the relations between the two countries is distorted and different from the Iranians' narrative of history. Another noteworthy point is the lack of attention from Russian history education sources to the occurrence of the Islamic Revolution and the fundamental changes that took place in the Islamic Republic of Iran.As a result, considering the demarcations formed by the decision-makers of the Islamic Republic in recent years in the "Looking to the East" policy and expanding relations with Russia, it is appropriate to take measures to portray Iran more accurately in Russian society. With the creation of a more accurate image of Iran in Russia, we can hope for the expansion of mutual relations and more cultural exchanges and strengthen bilateral relations.

During recent decades, Iran and Turkmenistan have become reliable neighbours. But when these two countries want to develop their cooperation in the field of energy and export their gas to Europe through Turkey, they face different obstacles and challenges in issues such as bilateral relations, the Turkish energy market and the European Union. The purpose of this research is to examine the situation of Iran and Turkmenistan in the field of energy and the issue of gas transit to Europe through Turkey.Research Question: The main question is, what are the opportunities and challenges of Turkmenistan gas transit from Iran and Turkey to Europe?

The hypothesis of this research is based on the positive relations between Turkey, Iran and Turkmenistan and the geopolitical position of Iran, the connection with the opportunities and sanctions of the United States on Iran's energy sector, Russia's pressure on Turkmenistan for the exclusive purchase of gas, which is the most important challenge for the transit of gas from Turkmenistan to Europe.

In this paper, the qualitative research method for studying the hypothesis is based on Peter McLaughlin’s functional explanation. The data collection tool is based on library and internet resources. The theoretical framework of this research is based on the regional system proposed by Louis Cantori and Steven Spiegel. By combining this framework with functionalism, it examines the cooperation and competition of governments and analyzes the factors of convergence and divergence in the relations of these countries.

The analysis of this research shows that Iran and Turkmenistan have expanded their economic relations. The opening of the Mashhad-Sarkhs-Tajan railway lines and the Bafaq-Bandar Abbas railway line is considered as an important economic measure for the development of economic and trade relations between Iran and Turkmenistan. Also, the cooperation of the two countries in technical and engineering projects with numerous investments of Iranian technicians in this field has also been important.  Iran and Turkmenistan pursue their economic cooperation within the framework of the Joint Economic Commission. The main export of goods from Iran is related to Turkmenistan, and since 2013, the volume of trade between the two countries has increased, especially with Khorasan Razavi Province.With 5900 industrial units, 46 mineral resources and approximately 800 mines, Khorasan Razavi province has a high rank in the production of products such as saffron, pistachios, pomegranates and medicinal plants and mainly exports these products to Turkmenistan. The implementation of the border-crossing-permit plan between Iran and Turkmenistan has also provided the basis for the movement of nationals of both countries in the border areas.Turkmenistan’s gas reserves are scattered throughout the country. In addition to the huge gas resources and significant production in this country, the discovery of Yultan gas field near Iran's Daulatabad field has put Turkmenistan in the focus of Iran's attention. The desire of Iran and Turkmenistan to cooperate made Turkmenistan agree to the construction of the country's first pipeline in July 1995. The Kerpcheh-Kordkoy pipeline was built in 1997 at a cost of over $200 million to transport gas to northern Iran from the Kerpcheh gas field. With abundant gas resources, Turkmenistan negotiated with Iran to export gas from Iran to Europe via Turkey. Due to its geopolitical position, Turkey has become an energy pole and this has created an opportunity for this country to gain more economic benefits. The European Union (EU) has become heavily dependent on foreign energy resources in recent decades.Due to its geopolitical position, Turkey has become an energy hub that connects the Middle East, Russia and Europe. Many gas pipelines pass through Turkey, transporting gas from Central Asia and the Middle East to Europe. However, some of these pipeline projects have been suspended for some time. Turkey has given the green light to Iran’s presence in the Turkish gas market (to Europe) and the Tabriz–Ankara pipeline operates in this direction. 

The findings indicate that first, long borders and economic capacities in Turkmenistan are like the gateway for Iran to enter this country and the two countries have cooperated in the field of natural gas transportation projects. Second, Turkmenistan’s rich gas resources and various gas fields led this country to build the first Kerpcheh-Kordkoy gas pipeline with Iran, which met the gas consumption needs of Iran’s northern provinces. Simultaneously with the construction of this pipeline, the issue of Turkmenistan gas transit from Iran to Turkey was raised so that Iran would receive transit rights. With Najmuddin Arbakan coming to power in Turkey in 1997, bilateral relations between Iran and Turkey improved significantly and Turkey's economic growth has led to an increasing need for gas imports. In this regard, Turkey has increased its gas transit pipelines in recent years. Europe's effort to diversify its gas imports from exporting countries and not relying only on Russia has provided the opportunity for Turkey to become the energy hub of the region by importing gas from Iran (and even other countries) and using its geopolitical position to re-export energy and gas to European markets. The improvement of relations between Iran and Turkey and the transit of gas to Europe have strengthened their economic growth, but the US sanctions against Iran and possible obstruction of gas exports by Iran in the case of incresing US pressure, may prevent them from making profits in their bilateral transactions.

In late 2021, Western intelligence services began issuing warnings about Moscow's readiness to invade Ukraine, although Russian elites, including Putin, denied the claim. But to the dismay of observers and the concern of Western nations, he ordered an invasion in February 2022. At first, this action was supposed to be a short and decisive operation with the aim of overthrowing the Zelenskyi government. But the field calculations were wrong and Moscow admitted that every war has its own path and does not necessarily follow the pre-planned path and the plan of the military commanders. The 2022 Russian war on Ukraine sparked different and even contradictory analyses. Some believe that because of NATO's eastward expansion and Ukraine's desire to join this security alliance, the Kremlin is opposed to any option except war. Other scholars believe that Putin attacked Ukraine because of Moscow's strong desire to be recognized and respected as a "great power" or because of elements of Russia's strategic culture. Other studies have focused on Putin's personal characteristics and ambitions as the main source of the attack.  This article examines the role of Putin's perceptions and miscalculations in relation to the issue of war. 

The key question of the study is: How have Putin’s misperceptions affected his policy towards Kyiv? There are also a few minor questions, such as: How Putin understands the international position of Russia and its relations with other countries, and how he perceives the intentions of other great powers.

This study hypothesizes that Putin's misperceptions of Russia's military might, Ukraine's will and power to resist, his misperception of Ukraine's intentions and his misunderstanding of the reactions of third parties critically contributed to and precipitated his decision to go to war.

To determine the main variables of the research, a conceptual framework, based on the findings of some key scholars of the psychology of International Politics, namely Jack Levy and Martin White, has been adopted. According to the conceptual framework, 3 main categories of misperceptions play an important role in leading countries to war: 1) Misperception of oneself and enemy’s military capabilities; 2) Misperception on the enemy’s intentions and the degree of its animosity, and 3) Misperception on the intentions and reactions of the third parties. The second tier of the conceptual framework includes two key elements of Russian strategic culture, “fear” and “arrogance” which according to Martin White, are the main elements of a war. All of these factors could pave the way for a costly and all-out war. To investigate the role of these factors in the 2022 war in Ukraine, the research method of qualitative content analysis has been used. Directed qualitative content analysis, unlike conventional inductive approaches, is a comparative research approach.  In this method, the researcher uses the existing theory and literature to determine the key concepts and variables. Based on those concepts and variables, the researcher begins to collect, code, decode and analyze the data. In the current study, according to the variables of the conceptual framework, the author has directly and indirectly pointed out Putin's views in this field in order to extract his possible misconceptions about Ukraine crisis. In collecting information related to Putin's words, the writer has referred to the interviews and documents published by the Russian Foreign Ministry. To strengthen the reliability of the research, the findings of the existing literature have also been examined. The collected data has been coded, decoded and analyzed in the conceptual framework.

Cognitive and psychological factors have played a significant role in creating the ground for the war in Ukraine. There is some evidence that highlights the role of the misperceived Russian elites, mainly Putin, in the war against Kyiv. These misconceptions are: 1) Misunderstanding of Ukraine's own and military capabilities, a) overestimating Moscow’s military capabilities and b) underestimating Ukraine's military capabilities 2) Misperception on the intentions of Kyiv; including a) Overestimating the animosity and evil intentions of Ukraine, and b) Underestimating the enemy’s will and courage to resist and 3) Misunderstanding of EU and US response to ongoing events, mainly underestimating their harsh and long-term response. These misconceptions, combined with two key elements of Russian strategic culture, fear and arrogance, led Russia to escalate the crisis into an all-out war. These findings contribute to the literature by articulating a meaningful conceptual framework.  Combining cognitive factors with elements of Russian strategic culture can be useful for explaining some fascinating and illusory issues of Russian foreign policy.

Russia invaded Ukraine for a variety of reasons. Geopolitical, geo-economics, geo-strategic and even geo-cultural factors played a role in pushing Moscow on the path to war. These factors had taken roots for a long time and didn’t appear suddenly. The findings of this paper help to explain why Putin chose the war path despite previous restraints. Elements of Russia's strategic culture highlighted Moscow's perceived threats and called for an immediate response. In the process of orchestrating a credible and decisive response to threats, elements of this misperception helped significantly to convince Putin that the time had come for a military strike. The role of these misconceptions in the form, tactics, and objectives of the initial mobilization of Russian forces is quite clear. In short, Putin and other military elites’ misperceptions, along with fear and arrogance, paved the way for his war in Ukraine.

After the disintegration of the USSR, Central Asia as an important part of this political system was exposed to serious changes and developments. Bankrupt economies, the persistence of outdated patterns and traditions of political action, and fragmented identity foundations plagued the Central Asian republics in the early 1990s. Regarding the issue of identity, during the Soviet era, Moscow worked to suppress the emergence of any ethnic (Turkish, Persian) or religious (Islamic) identities that would pose a threat to the ideology of Communism. But with the collapse of this union, the Central Asian republics were in a position in which Iran and Turkey were trying to use identity-based foreign policies to invest in new geographies. In the meantime, the political elites of the Central Asian countries decided to accept the models presented by the international actors to get out of this impasse. The Islamic Republic of Iran and Turkey were two neighbors that were mentioned more than others in the minds of the leaders of these republics. Considering some common cultural-identity heritages of these two countries with these republics, both of these powers tried to penetrate this region by using cultural elements.But the cultural policies of Tehran and Ankara gradually faced serious obstacles.

What is the main challenge facing the cultural diplomacy of Iran and Turkey in Central Asia?

For Iran, the securitization of its cultural agendas and for Turkey, the whisper of Ottomanism and fear of Turkey's regional dominance is the main challenge for their cultural diplomacy toward Central Asia.

This research is applied based on purpose and descriptive based on data collection. Also, this research was done after the event. This means that the researcher studies the possible cause of the dependent variable and the independent and dependent variables that occurred in the past. In this article, Public and cultural diplomacy have been selected as the theoretical framework and will be explained subsequently.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Central Asian republics underwent serious changes. The fundamental question is "Who am I?" Or, to be more precise, the identity crisis has been raised as an important challenge for these republics. Moscow could not give them a new identity, and therefore the identity crisis was formed in parallel with the political, economic, and security crises in the new republics. In this situation, these countries sought to create an identity from the very beginning of their independence, so that it would be a solid foundation for them to form a nation-state. The near horizon of these republics was Iran and Turkey, with whom they had identity and cultural affinity more than others. With the knowledge of the elites of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Republic of Turkey about this loss, the revival and consolidation of cultural relations along with political, economic and security relations were put on the agenda of Tehran and Ankara. Iran entered into cultural relations with these republics based on categories such as cultural, linguistic (in a more limited dimension), religious and historical commonalities. But the main issue for Iran was the security perspective.Turkey defined Central Asia as a land for its cultural influence due to some important factors such as extensive linguistic and religious commonalities and pursued diplomacy and cultural efforts towards this region in the 1990s. Turkey also faced challenges in the way of advancing its cultural policies. Turkish imperialism and the arrogance of Central Asian Turks is the key to understanding Turkey's cultural challenges in this region. Iran's cultural foreign policy officials should be aware of the sensitivities and security concerns of Central Asian leaders and remove the perception of "other" from Iran in all their cultural activities in these republics. To improve the status of Iran's cultural diplomacy in Central Asia, this article suggests that Iran should follow strategies at three national, regional, and global levels.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the countries of Central Asia faced deep identity crises and were unable to establish their nation-states. Also the Central Asian republics were exposed to serious changes and developments. The basic question "Who am I?" Or to put it more precisely, the identity crisis has emerged as an important challenge for these republics.  With these developments, the arena was available for actors like Iran and Turkey more than others. Because both Iran and Turkey had characteristics that made it possible for them to be active in Central Asia. However, due to the lack of proper understanding of the Central Asian environment, Iran and Turkey made some strategic mistakes. Ultimately, they failed to capitalize on the Central Asian identity crisis. However, Turkey was a little more successful compared to Iran.

In the era of cultural globalization, one of the important media issues is the transnational exchange of television production, which has been named "television formats". "Idol" is one of the most popular television formats with the theme of singing competition, started in British program "Pop Idol". Adapted to Idol TV format many official copyrights and more than that unofficial copies have been produced around the world. This research deals with this phenomenon from the perspective of cultural-media policy and is defined in the theoretical framework of the concept of globalization and reception theory. The research is about Afghanistan. Culturally, Afghanistan has ethnic and linguistic diversity.  The diversity of ethnicities and the historical conflicts between them have caused the absence of a strong "national identity" in the country. In addition, the ups and downs history of Afghanistan in the last half century and the experience of different types of governance and the presence of foreign forces in different periods in this country have made the study of Afghan society a complicated matter.

The experience of an unofficial copy of the TV Idol format as "Afghan Star" before 2021 in Afghanistan and before the re-establishment of the Taliban is studied here (during the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan era). The main question is "How has the Afghan society received this copied format" and "to what extent these receptions have been in line with the goals of the country's policy".

This is a qualitative study and there is no hypothesis in the usual routine of quantitative studies.

For this purpose, the "case study" method has been used to answer the main research question. The main focus of the research is on only one television program and the content and audience of this program have been analyzed. Many cultural phenomena in the era of globalization are often viewed through the lens of the theory of cultural imperialism. Here a different theoretical framework, the reception theory, is used. In reception theory, it is said that the audience has an active response to the media message and the production and reception stages (encoding and decoding) are independent. This means that messages may be perceived differently at the receiving stage than the original intentions of their creators at the production stage.

Afghan Star seasons were produced in Afghanistan since 2005. TOLO TV channel, a commercial television station in Afghanistan, has produced "Afghan Star". Until 2021, 15 Star seasons and three Superstar programs were produced and broadcast from this program. Each season of this program was produced and aired during one year. The program was broadcast on Thursday and Friday nights on Tolo TV. The program also had its own website and social pages on YouTube, Facebook, Twitter and Instagram, and it has communicated online with its audience in these ways.

The findings of this study showed that the "Afghan Star" program, despite its similarity to the global versions of the Idol TV format, has been able to be effective in the local context and become a successful product in the global-local market to attract the audience. But beyond the commercial aspects, the success of this program was hindered by the possible cultural-media policies of its creators. Afghan Star and Ethnic Challenge, Afghan Star and Traditional / Modern Challenge, Afghan Star and Gender Challenge, Afghan Star and the issue of foreign troops, and Afghan Star and Diaspora issue are aspects of glocalization of Idol TV format in Afghanistan society as well as fields of different reception for the audiences.The local versions of "Pop Idol" even in the developed countries have created controversies in the area of ethnicities and races. Therefore, the ethnic challenges surrounding the local version in Afghanistan are not exceptional issues, but they are more important in the challenging and critical context of this country. It seems that although the structure of the Afghan Star program has created this opportunity for people of all ethnicities, but due to the existence of deep ethnic conflicts and nation-building crisis in this country, instead of reducing the conflict, this opportunity led to fueling new ethnic differences and tensions in Afghanistan.

Before the withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan in 2021 and the domination of the Taliban forces in this country, the results of the historical analysis in Afghanistan showed that despite several historical periods, efforts have been made to develop democracy, especially since 2002 and after the fall of the Taliban, but this country has not achieved an institutional democratic government. The results of the Afghan Star Program study are consistent with the results of these analyses. Some ethnic events in the Afghan Star seemed to be a sign of the incomplete democratization process in Afghanistan. For example, sometimes the singing competition looked like a political election campaign. Optimistically, the Afghan Star can be seen as an exercise in the process of democratization.  On the other hand, with a pessimistic view, it can be said that this television program, by strengthening ethnic, gender, traditional/modern, etc. divisions and contradictions, provided an opportunity for the emergence and strengthening of extremist groups and became a factor in weakening the democratization process in Afghanistan. With the withdrawal of foreign forces from this country and the collapse of the social political order of the twenty-year period of the "Islamic Republic of Afghanistan" it can be said that the second view was realistic. The socio-political collapse in a very short period of time showed how far the cultural-media policies related to the security and economic policies for this country have gone in the wrong direction.

Understanding the personality traits of political leaders and their perceptions and ideas on politics is one of the basic issues in the field of political psychology. How emotional-psychological conditions affect people on the one hand and structural-situational factors on the other, are the decisions that have been made and why option "A" was chosen instead of option "B"? The importance of this matter is that it can provide the basis for personality analysis, understanding of attitudes and behaviors and relative predictability of the political sphere. "Operational code" is one of the useful and practical techniques for the methodical analysis of political figures and understanding the psychological nature of their attitudes, beliefs and actions, the texts of their private or public statements through the study and analysis of diaries, letters, speeches, notes, interviews and press conferences and secondary sources or reports of government activity by external observers such as journalists, historians or political commentators.The importance of this article is the methodical use of operational code analysis with the aim of not being satisfied with the psychobiography genre and examining the psychological characteristics of the individual while paying attention to the situation. The main discussion in related to operational code analysis reflects this cognitivist proposition that beliefs as "mental representation of reality" are important in explaining global politics in various ways, which are not considered in neorealist, neoliberal, and constructivist theories. While leaders can act to change the balance of power, domestic and international institutions and cultural norms in the long term.The nature of cognitive theories differs from rational choice models and structural theories of foreign policy regarding the role of beliefs as causal mechanisms. Instead of passively reflecting the reality, they examine the leaders' decisions by shaping the leaders' perception of the reality and act as cognitive and motivational bias mechanisms that distort and block the information, slows down or recasts incoming information received from the environment. This role for beliefs is especially notable when the environment is uncertain, that is, when information is scarce, ambiguous, contradictory, or so abundant that it is difficult for leaders to organize and process. Also, when new information conflicts with the leader's prior beliefs based on old information, stereotypes, or other cognitive biases associated with threats to self-interest, or when triggered by strong emotions such as fear, anger, shame, hatred. In this paper, while introducing the operational code analysis method, its dimensions and analytical nature in relation to Putin's personality will be examined and criticized.

The main question of this paper is how Putin understands the nature of politics and what does he know, what does he feel and what does he want about the exercise of power in Political affairs? The main idea is how beliefs interact with "mental representations of reality" and enable decision-making processes by shaping leaders' perceptions.  In this paper, while introducing the operational code analysis method, its dimensions and analytical nature in relation to the personality of Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin will be examined and criticized in the form of understanding his philosophical and instrumental beliefs.

  An operational code analysis method for analyzing Putin's personality using a "complete and verbatim file of public conversations", including speeches and interviews, classifications of statements concludes that Putin's beliefs are issue-specific and shows that a combination of competing on some issues and participation in others is consistent with his diverse operating code. In fact, Putin reflects "the traditional and instinctive feeling of Russian insecurity" and the philosophical origins of Putinism, however diverse they may be, are all based on two pillars: the idea of ​​empire and the justification of war. His operational code indicates that he will mimic his environment like a chameleon.

Putin cannot be expected to act in a normative manner when those involved with him do not. Putin will reciprocate "bad" and "good" behavior, and the failure of cooperation is likely to be bitter and long-lasting. One aspect of Putin's behavior that seems to be an integral part of his self-image is his emphasis on predictability. Putin operates on the assumption that forecasting is a two-way street. You cannot be unpredictable and instead expect the world to be predictable. This is consistent with Putin's central philosophical belief in the "duality" of political life: predictable and coordinated when it is orderly, arbitrary and ruthless when it is not. Putin focuses on "Historical Russia" as the basic legitimacy of his political authority (charismatic and historical legitimacy). He clearly identifies and then defends an official historical narrative that promotes ethno-centrism in relation to the concept of state and civilization (triad of nation, state and civilization). The need for continuity, stability and order and avoiding "ontological insecurity" and "ontological anxiety" related to displacement, trauma and tragedy are the main drivers of Putinism. Putin avoids appeals to ideology and is by no means a revolutionary, preferring, as we can see, the flexibility of a pragmatic approach. During his time, Russia has become a country that has been called "lone power". Russia has no real allies and has damaged its most important link, Germany. According to Russia's official discourse and according to foreign policy practice, Putin's strategic goals seem to be twofold: First, Putin insists that Russia be recognized as an independent strategic and autonomous actor in the international system. Second, Russia seeks to preserve its exceptional identity as a great power and its status, honor, respect, prestige and equality, which makes it possible to achieve the first and the most important goals which are internal stability, the status quo of the elites and the continuation of Putin's power in Russia. Like all human beings, Putin is a complex actor who operates in an ambiguous and unpredictable situation. Furthermore, our data support the interpretation of Putin as an opportunist rather than a grand strategist.

The operational code analysis method is one of the most widely used techniques for understanding and systematically analyzing the nature of political personality and understanding their attitudes, beliefs and actions by paying attention to the psychological characteristics of people and at the same time paying attention to the situation. The findings of the research show that Putin should be seen as an opportunist and not a great strategist, that although he is good at designing tactics, there is no strategy in between and he cannot be successful in the long run.

This study aims to examine the issue of new Ottomanism, which has become a prominent discourse in the foreign policy of the Turkish government, by considering historical issues and paying attention to the evolution of the Turkish government's policy. By reviving the geography of the empire, new-Ottomanism has attracted the minds and attention of many scholars and commentators. The claim of new-Ottomanism is controversial and that is why there are many opinions and interpretations about it. Crossing national borders and what Sykes-Picot called the nation-state is not without controversy. Hence, in many studies, considering the geography and territory of the land that is thought of neo-Ottoman politics; such an approach has been interpreted in line with the Turkish government's determination to expand regional and even territorial authority. Concerns are being raised about the geopolitics of some countries, and Iran is no exception to this rule. Therefore, numerous interpretations of the policy of new-Ottomanism and the threat of this policy were written for some countries in the Middle East, the Caucasus, and the Balkans. It is important to examine such a policy, given its prominence over the last two decades and the targeting of various governments, especially Iran.

Why are the Turkish political elites inclined to Ottomanism and how can the impact of this policy on Iran be analyzed?

Such a policy is a response to Turkey's internal crises and a ploy to find a solution to Turkey's internal identity crisis and a sign of the failure of ethnic nationalism (Turkism) rather than a threat to Iran's territorial integrity and identity.

 The present study by qualitative method examines the discussion of new-Ottomanism in the foreign policy of the Turkish government. In this regard, an attempt is made to offer a different reading of neo-Ottoman politics by considering the two categories of politics and geography. Also, considering that new-Ottomanism is a return to the past, historical issues are not neglected in the present study. The importance of the three components of politics, geography, and history in the interpretation of new-Ottomanism shows that research is of a fundamental type and can be proposed in the humanities framework. The Content was collected and arranged in a library method. To explain the idea of research, an attempt is made to reflect such a discourse in Turkish foreign policy, and especially towards Iran, by analyzing the discourse and re-reading the ideas of the founders of neo-Ottoman policy. Studying the policies of the political elites of the Turkish government along with paying attention to the internal conditions and events of this government in the last few decades, provides the possibility of why neo-Ottomanism is valid in foreign policy.  In this research, the foundations of Constructivism theory are also used to provide a comprehensive understanding of new-Ottomanism policy.
 

New-Ottomanism has become an important discourse in Turkish politics since the AKP came to power. Several interpretations have been made as to the historical background and purpose of such a return. Unlike the Young Turks and the Republic of Turkey, new-Ottomanism insists on geography that is more close to the imperial system, a system in which a wide range of nationalities, religions, and groups were ruled by one. Many scholars and commentators have analyzed such a return in the meaning of the Turkish government's expansion of authority and geographical influence. So, there is a concern about Iran's geopolitics that new-Ottomanism policy may affect Iran's geopolitics and some of Iran's identity geography. In the present study, with the historical reading of new-Ottomanism, it was argued that new-Ottomanism policy could be considered more a tactic or solution to resolve Turkey's internal identity crises than a threat to the territorial integrity and identity of Iran.

Geopolitical idealism under the name of new-Ottomanism became more important and heated when dissatisfaction with politics and governance arose in Turkey. The incompatibility of the Turkish Kurds, the failure to join the European Union, the coup, the change of political system from a parliamentary to a presidential one, the Gulen movement, the tendency towards authoritarianism in domestic politics, and the rise of the Syrian Kurds, especially in the Syrian crisis and Kurd' resistance against Daesh (ISIS) which improve the position of the Kurds in northern Syria are concerns and crises that the Turkish government is aware of.
Therefore, the policy of new-Ottomanism, which comes at the same time as such crises, seeks to use the capacity of geography and history to deviate minds from deep internal crises. New-Ottomanism also suggests that the insistence on Turkish nationalism and ethnocentrism failed to solve the problem of Turkish identity and that the Turkish Kurds remain a serious issue for the government. As a result, returning to Ottomanism means defining everything under geography, including Turks and Kurds.  Although such a policy may face Iran with problems, it cannot create an inherent and complete threat to Iran's territorial integrity.