فصلنامه دولت پژوهی
پیاپی 31 (پاییز 1401)

The author considers Schmitt's and Agamben's state of exception as "Voluntary State of Exception" and propose a new type of state of exception (entitled "Involuntary State of Exception"). Then he explains the foundation and possibility of this second type of state of exception in Iranian society. The author's main argument is that by the gradual combination of the four inevitable super-events (including "general crisis of capital accumulation", "expansion of digital technology in everyday life", "increasing class displacement" and "generational transformation of the dominant traditional power elites"), Iranian society is on the path of a triple great imbalance and an all-out historical discontinuity and ultimately, entering an involuntary state of exception. The author calls this potential state of exception as "Fundamental Question of Iran" and determines the specific process of its occurrence in four stages including "early formation", "great transformation", "liminality", and "hour of involuntary state of exception".According to the author, with the beginning of the "liminality stage" and especially with the oncoming of the "hour of involuntary state of exception" in Iranian society, the existential condition of power elites and social forces transform and everyone feel that they have entered a new historical stage. Therefore, excitement, anxiety and conflict grow in the society. From his point of view, although Iranian involuntary state of exception is not an ultimate and constant situation and there is a possibility of rethinking; However, both power elites and social forces are exposed to some specific great paradoxes.

This article is to consider analyzing the reasons of industrial sector slowdown in the economy and weakening the status of owners of infant industries during the first decade of the Islamic Republic of Iran from a neo-institutional perspective. For this purpose, “institutional-ideological” and “pre-institutional” conditions have been analyzed through historical context to clarify the institutional-historical mechanism leading to weakening of the industrial bourgeoisie and declining of the position of industry and industrial capitalism in the political economy of Iran. The methodological approach of this article is of the type of qualitative historical analysis in which documentary data extracted from official economic and statistical reports, memoirs, written works, and especially conversations with elites (governmental policy-makers and private industrialists active in the period under review), as well as historical, economic, and political analyses by other researchers and experts have been considered and utilized. The study shows that at the time of formation of post-revolutionary governmental and economic institutions in Iran, a set of interrelations institutional and pre-institutional factors in historical evolution and transformation shaped a path-dependent process in decision making institutions and mindset of decision makers in respect of economic policies of the country which was in contradiction with industrial capitalist development. This approach was one of the main factors inhibiting industrial growth and development in the country during the following decades.

The task of an intelligence agency is to monitor the ideas and behaviors of groups that are in conflict with the established system and are trying to overthrow the existing system. Monitoring opponents of the political system is not the sole task of an intelligence agency; Rather, it is the task of an intelligence agency to fight subversive opposition groups. Information institutions are an important part of a political system. The fundamental theory of the establishment of the state and the political-legal system determines the policy of the intelligence agencies. When two words are mixed, the breadth of a compound double word is lost and they are limited and conditioned by each other, and the word that is combined with the other word loses its semantic / functional independence. In this article, the political theory of the Intelligence and Security Organization of Iran is considered a lexical fusion due to the dual structure of government (republic and Islamic). Whenever a theory is chosen from among the various political theories that underlie the theoretical basis of government and is the basis for the actions of government and its institutional subdivisions (including intelligence agencies), the government and the intelligence agency are limited to theoretical underpinnings. Using Bernard Crick's model, the author tries to show how a change in the fundamental political theory of a state can led to a change in the character and actions of a country's intelligence organization.

The purpose of this article is studying the trend of changes in government size in Iran and analyze it from the perspective of government efficiency in the light of theoretical literature and to examine empirical comparisons with leading economic countries. The article intends to describe the situation of government size in Iran, to answer the question how the size of government in Iran and its developments can be analyzed? By presenting and comparing government size data in Iran with OECD member countries, high-income countries, high-income middle-income countries and low-income middle-income countries, the article shows that first, the size of public government in Iran has decreased and in contrast to production and supply Direct private goods by the government have been on an upward trend, and secondly, the size of public government, which means exercising sovereign duties and providing public goods in Iran, has become smaller compared to the groups in question. The results of the article show that the size of government in Iran has gone through a trend contrary to the findings of recent studies of political economy to reduce the production of private goods and strengthen the regulatory performance of government and the supply of public goods. The trend of government size changes in Iran in the period under review is consistent with the theoretical requirements of the supply-oriented approach, according to which the change in government size is more a function of government requirements than a demand of citizens.

The Islamic Republic of Iran cannot be classified in the classical models of regimes in political economy, and understanding the internal and external logic of its behavior in conventional theoretical frameworks faces difficulties. This research seeks to present a conceptual model in understanding the nature of political order and behavioral drivers in the Islamic Republic of Iran under the theories of political economy. Uncertainty in the fundamental relations between the institutions of the state, market and civil society has organized the political economy order of the Islamic Republic in a way that, while being incompatible with all kinds of classical liberal, socialist, fascist and communist orders, elements of each of these orders has in it. This uncertainty is rooted in the simultaneous presence of two conflicting philosophical bases regarding the nature and functions of the state, which are conceptualized in organic and instrumental approaches, and these two conflicting philosophical bases, in the simultaneous existence of parallel and hierarchical structures of conflicting social roles have been determined. In addition, the rentier nature of the state in Iran, as a mediating variable, has weakened the possibility of adjustment and reform in this political economy system. In this research, an appropriate conceptual model for understanding this order of political economy has been conceptualized in " Rentier pseudo-capitalist state".

Iran's economy has not experienced high growth rate during past decades despite huge revenue from oil export. This shows ineffectiveness of resource allocation in Iran economy. The cause of such a resource mis-allocation has been disputed by different theories. In this paper, a political economy approach is used to explain such an inefficiency and it will be shown that it provides a better and more comprehensive approach in compare to the rival explanations. The core idea of the paper is that institutional arrangement in the pollical system evolved after Iran revolution from one hand and the quality of institutions on the other hand leads to high social discount rate which dominates short-termism to long-termism. From institutional point of view, high quality institution helps to relax some political economy constraints and provide incentives for economic agents to follow long-term benefits rather than short term one. In the absence of high-quality institutions, supporters of the status-quo allocation prevail the forces who support reallocation to achieve optimal allocation. As a result, transition from current negative equilibrium to superior one is blocked. In another word, economic reform requires high-quality institutions which support reallocation of available resources. Otherwise, different political economy constraints prevent to prioritize superior allocation to inferior one.