فصلنامه دولت پژوهی
پیاپی 33 (بهار 1402)

Water issue" has been one of the main issues of Iranian human life throughout history, and the research about it can shed light on various aspects of the political, economic and social life of Iranians. Artificial irrigation has long been one of the necessities of people's lives in this semi-arid climate. The dispersion of water resources, which was subject to dispersion of the population, required the country to have an innumerable number of dams, aqueducts, reservoirs, wells and streams. Building a dam to store water and control floods and building aqueducts, which sometimes reached tens of kilometers in length, required spending a lot of money and a lot of labor. At first glance, the government was expected to be responsible for the creation and repair of water facilities as institution that has the most resources of the country. The question is, considering that pre-modern governments played a minimal role in solving people's problems and providing their necessities of life, to what extent did the Qajar government accept responsibility for the creation and repair of these facilities in the territory of Iran? What evidence confirms the minimal involvement of Qajar government in the water issue? What were the reasons for the non-interference of the government in water supply and how could the people be responsible for solving this problem? Our assumption is that the Qajar government did not consider itself obligated to provide water to villages, farms and even cities with minimal interference in civil affairs, and the countless number of dilapidated dams and aqueducts is a sign that the government has a duty in this field for He did not imagine and only in a few cases where he was sure that the profit would quickly reach the treasury, he accepted a small investment. In the meantime, the further some areas were from the center, the less government intervention in their irrigation systems. Also, the Qajar government looked at the water issue as an opportunity for earning money by selling running water and collecting taxes from other water sources. Governors of the provinces were also interested in creating irrigation system for their fields only if they were the owners of land in that province. In the meantime, the main burden of creating and maintaining water facilities was the responsibility of the people, who mainly provided the expenses to the landlords and the labor to the subjects. The tradition of endowment was another factor that weakened the role of the government in this field. People's participation in the construction and repair of dams, aqueducts, reservoirs and streams, as well as group oppressions and settlements, as well as collective conflicts, along with the management of water distribution and the selection of Mirabs, led to the emergence of self-organized groups and circles and their greater cohesion in society. Previously, the views of people like Karl Marx and Karl August Wittfogel about the active involvement of Asian governments in solving the water problem in semi-arid climates had gained supporters. Marx believed that in these areas, governments took control of limited water resources and established water supply security, and by managing water resources, they made the producers highly dependent on themselves, and made the government subjects critical. Influenced by him, Wittfogel also realized the need of these communities for huge water supply facilities that only the government could cover. He knew the first and fundamental factor of the formation of the absolute power of the government in these regions. In our research, we have tried to show by relying on a lot of data from the history of Qajar era Iran that not only the government was not involved in many waters supply matters, but also the realities and limitations of the pre-modern world, the Qajar government in planning to intervene in the water issue, especially in remote areas. From the center, he was disabled. This research was done with descriptive-explanatory method and using the documents, especially the petitions of the Majlese Tahqiqe Mazalem. The theoretical framework of the research is derived from Patricia Crone's point of view about the minimal government in the pre-modern world. Previously, no independent research has been conducted on the minimal role of the Qajar government in the water issue.

After the massive and sudden attack of ISIS on Iraq, the existence of the Iraqi state and nation and the sanctities of Muslims were under serious threat. While ISIS was approaching gates of Baghdad and the Iraqi army and security forces were not able to deal with it, with Ayatollah Sistani's fatwa regarding jihad to confront ISIS and ward off this real danger, a defense-security organization called Hashd al-Shaabi, consisting of volunteers People and militia groups, which are considered the military arm of Iraqi political parties and currents, were formed. The Iraqi state, which was in a state of emergency, supported the formation of this new defense-security organization and provided it with financial, logistical and weapons support. With the threat of ISISremoval and the end of state of emergency, the existence of such an organization, which is mainly controlled by militia groups, has become a significant challenge for Iraqi state, which seeks to obtain a monopoly on the use of legitimate force. Therefore, after 2014, all heads of the Iraqi government have tried to prevent the formation of a parallel defense-security institution outside the government's control by adopting different strategies. This article, in which the data has been collected by referring to library and online sources and explained and analyzed with a descriptive-analytical method, seeks to find an authentic answer to this question: "The relationship between the Iraqi government and Hashd al-Shaabi and its constituent militia groups. How has it been?" The findings of the article show that the relationship between the Iraqi government and the militia groups was subject to the requirements of the time in such a way that in emergency and threatening situations, the government used the capacity of these groups and in the absence of these conditions, these groups were considered by the government as a disturbing, undesirable and threatening element, a range of control policies and strategies have been applied to them by the Iraqi government. In the post-crisis era, the Iraqi government, as a system actor that considers itself committed and accountable to the existing rules, norms and order, cannot support the anti-systemic actions of the militia groups that it cooperated with and supported during the ISIS crisis in the form of Hashd al-Shaabi. to bear Therefore, since 2014, the governments of Haider al-Abadi, Adel Abdul Mahdi and Mostafa Al-Kazemi have tried to control these groups as much as possible through adopting a series of strategies and measures. Among the four strategies of repression, containment, collusion and integration, these governments have put two strategies of collusion and integration on their agenda. The reason for choosing these two strategies is that, firstly, Hashd al-Shaabi and its constituent groups are still considered strategic allies of the government, and the political currents of which these groups are considered as their military arm participate in the political process and in the formation of the government. Secondly, even if these groups strongly deviate from the government's criteria and the relationship between the militia groups turns from reconciliation to conflict, the Iraqi government does not have the ability to restrain or suppress these groups. In the collusion strategy, the Iraqi government tries to relatively control the actions of Hashd al-Shaabi groups by granting some concessions and through financial and logistical support tools. As well, in the integration strategy, the Iraqi government has put the recruitment of the Hashd al-Shaabi and its integration in the official Iraqi defense-security structures on its agenda, and the heads of the Iraqi government have issued orders and adopted measures in this regard. Collusion and integration strategies have not been able to be fully and effectively implemented due to the resistance and opposition of the commanders of the militia groups and their insistence on their organizational independence and ideological and identity foundations, and these two strategies have only been implemented superficially and formally.

Problem:

 Sweden is considered as a small state in terms of its domain, surface area and extension, population, territorial extent and the grandeur of its military power; Sweden and other Nordic countries are states that do not rank as big states in terms of hard power components. However, a look at the role and influence of these governments at the international level has shown their great influence.

Question: 

The question that arises here is how, despite Sweden's small measure, this country has a great moral influence in the domestic, regional and international dimensions.

Hypothesis: 

The hypothesis of this research responding to this question is that; Swedish government, by playing a moral role at the international level, has been able to introduce itself as a moral superpower and makes influence the arrangements of international relations. This government takes a special position in many international conflicts and that position is a mediator. In the peacekeeping missions of the United Nations, both the forces of this government are stationed and it pays many budgets to carry out these missions.

In the human rights attempt that take place in developing countries, this government is considered among the supporters of women's movements and other human rights movements. Also, this government is considered to be a constant in the fight against climate changes. The image of Sweden is carved as a well-functioning utopia; Both in the outside world and among the Swedes themselves. The hospitality of the Swedes has caused the experience of Sweden to be painted as an extreme immigration policy and as a arrogance sign in other European countries (Sanandaji, 2021: 62).

"Neutrality has been an important part of Sweden's international brand identity" (Bjereld, 1994: 238). Sweden is free of military alliances. This means that "we do not agree on mutual defense guarantees and we ourselves are responsible for the defense of Sweden." On the other hand, the freedom of our military alliance does not create an obstacle; participating in international defense cooperation. In practice, Sweden's position has turned into non-commitment, and the public strongly supports its continuation, however, Sweden's political elites support NATO membership (Ydén, Berndtsson, & Petersson, 2019). This indicates the renaming of the idea of neutrality or non-commitment after the Cold War to respond to the demands of the international environment of the 21st century. However, the aspiration of neutrality in Sweden as well as in Finland is an issue that has changed according to the new security needs of these two governments. The Swedish brand of neutrality and non-commitment can be understood as human values and a basis for Sweden's self-perceived legitimacy to act in global affairs. These (non-commitment and neutrality) are two important concepts in political debates such as NATO membership debate (Simons, Manoilo, & Trunov, 2019).

Sweden's ethical motivations have led to the foreign policy behaviors formation and have sought policy-making results that characterize the more practical layers of this country's foreign policy. The role of feminist foreign policy, the moralism of foreign policy and Sweden's environmental policy are topics which can be mentioned. International relations have traditionally been introduced as the science of analyzing the relations of great powers. Basically, the rationalist mainstream of international relations pays attention to governments from the point of view of the size of power. However, some of the states are considered as small states in terms of the size of their military power, population, territory and other hard components of power, the Nordic states are included in this division of states. these governments, by accepting international roles, internal links with the international normative environment and assuming humanitarian duties, undertake missions that become brands in the world. have become international in humanitarian, feminist, immigration, peace-oriented, neutrality and non-commitment fields. Sweden is one of the leaders among the small Nordic countries. Sweden has created an image which corresponding "human rights government", "environmental government", "green government", "electronic government", "free government" with TV this image which has transmitted internationally. Tarif", "feminist government", "peace-keeping government" and "immigrant-friendly government". However, although international commitments have been made for these roles of Sweden, there have also been damages; Among the contradictory policies of political parties in the country regarding the Swedish brand in some of these fields.

The theory and practice of policy making in today's world has found a very vital role because the legitimacy of governments which is measured by the ability to solve public problems through public policy. If the government lacks the ability to solve public problems, no other element can legitimize its continued rule. From perspective of public policy making discipline, there is no achievement for any public policy unless policy makers and citizens have active and intense participation in the policy making process as well as policy implementation. Because in a public policy making relationship, one side as a policy maker is obliged to solve the problem of the other side. This relationship, as one of the most influential relationships on people's life quality, needs to be carefully regulated and guaranteed. The law, as a normative discipline is supposed to regulate relations between these two agents. In the initial conception of representative democracy, as a legal and political frame work of governing society, people were completely removed from political and policy-making processes by electing representatives and were only subject to the decisions of their representatives. In other words, in classic version of representative democracy, almost all of political power is in the representative bodies’ hands. It is possible that minority and pressure groups try to present their issues as public problems by influencing such institutions. In democratic age there is a political and legal tendency to maximizing the role of citizens in policy making process in order to prevent any legitimation's crisis which may be raised from representative democracy shortcomings. The mentioned weakness can be considered as systematic and deep corruption in a decision-making system. In order to fix this weakness, the basic step is to redistribute powers and jurisdictions between different actors of the process of policy making, because studies on current democracies demonstrate that, the first step in policy making process, i.e., recognizing the public problem, is the most important, critical and crucial one. In other words, if the people do not have any role or influence in the first step of public policy making, the whole process will be at a very serious risk. This paper, using descriptive and analytic approach, criticized legal framework of recognizing the public problem in Iran. In Iran, due to the great legal authority and authority of the legislative body, such mechanisms have not been foreseen for the people and even other institutions. Even a powerful institution like the presidency cannot resist the decisions of the legislative body. So, it seems democracy in Iran is still very similar to the classical type of representative democracy and needs to be revised and accompanied by recent developments in the knowledge of politics and law. By distinguishing between representative-centered and citizen-centered approach to policy making, the author, proposed a shift from former approach to latter, in interpretation of legal documents specially Iran's constitutional law. The shift will lead to participatory democracy and multi-level policy making. This new approach, by emphasizing the role of people as diagnosers of public problems, reduces the risk of semi-public problems being included in government programs and policies. The proposed approach says no problem is a public problem unless it affects the ordinary life of reasonable number of citizens. Before reaching to this stage, the government should not allocate any budget to solve it. The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran has provided the possibility of interpretation in favor of the proposed approach in many parts considering the decisive role of the people, including in Article No.: 59. Creating mechanisms to realize such a role for the people is one of the necessities of Iran's current decision-making system. By considering the countries experiences such as Italy and USA, suggestions such as veto rights for the people regarding the issues raised in the policy-making institutions, and the right to raise the issue for them to be discussed in the same institutions can be proposed as necessary mechanisms. In these countries, at the request of the people and upon reaching a certain number, the legislative assembly will be required to remove an issue (a semipublic-problem) from the agenda, or put an issue on its agenda.

The view that education should be in accordance with the ideals and goals of the ruling political system is always considered one of the governments and the cultural and social policy makers of the societies main concerns. This is important that in the form of change management, which has always been considered by the executive managers of the governments. In the investigations related to the government in Iranian society, paying attention to the field of education and creating changes and transformations in it and adapting it to the goals of the Islamic Revolution has always created a challenge between the public sphere and the policy-making sphere in such a way that the issue of change and transformation in Education has become a tragic tragedy. One of the most extensive disputes in recent years between the field of education and the government in the system of the Islamic Republic of Iran is the preparation, approval and implementation of "the fundamental transformation document in education". This important document has been prepared and approved by the highest executive authorities of the government as an upstream document for change and development in the education system.The government in the system of the Islamic Republic of Iran was hoping for such a change and development that the document on the fundamental transformation of education in line with the vision document of 1404 and the comprehensive scientific map of the country and the approvals of the Expediency Council, in the session No.Unfortunately, the implementation process of this document continued facing serious challenges in such a way that after ten years of its approval, it has not been successful in the implementation phase. Therefore, the important point related to the current research is the discussion of social policies that governments apply to change the behavior of large sections of people. In this regard, the purpose of this research was to investigate the process of approving and implementing the document of fundamental transformation in education by adopting the critical approach government in society of the "Joel Migdal". Because from Migdal's point of view and in contrast to Weber's view of this social existence, the government is not a coordinated and coherent entity, but rather a conflicting entity that sometimes works against itself, but this process is not the same for all governments, because governments have the same ability are not.  In accordance with Migdal, strong governments are governments that have the necessary abilities to influence, regulate social relations, extract resources and distribute or allocate resources for social transformation through design, policy and program implementation, on the other hand, weak governments are those that are willing or They do not have the ability for making such social changes.The mentioned approach, while providing empirical evidence and conducting field research, deals with the process of making government decisions and their implementation with a different perspective than the Weberian perspective. Therefore, contrary to the state-oriented views that place an important role on the government in the process of transformation of the third world and transitioning countries, she does not consider the government to be the only main player in the political field. In other words, Migdal believes in the dispersion, division and fragmentation of power in networked societies and does not consider the power of the government to be Leviathan-type and maximal.This research was conducted with a qualitative approach and semi-structured interview method in order to collect data and also by using thematic analysis technique to analyze the interviews. A total of 15 interviews were conducted at high levels of policy making and implementation, which led us to the necessary theoretical saturation. The interviewees presented their opinions on topics such as their general attitude towards the fundamental transformation document, the strengths and weaknesses of the document, the obstacles to the implementation of the document, the different types of resistance formed during its implementation, and the role of the education expert body in this regard. The findings of this research show that, as Migdal's theory predicts, the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran is not a unified organization that can easily implement its approved laws. Rather, there are many competitions and disagreements both inside (the taste preferences of the executive authorities, inconsistency between institutions, etc.) and outside it due to the structure of the network society (influence of social political groups and currents, etc.), which hinders the executive It becomes the document of the fundamental transformation of education and similar documents and laws.This review also shows the conflicting interactions of various official and unofficial centers in charge of guiding the people; Centers that try to pull the behavioral and normative pattern of the society in a certain direction, that too in a government structure called formal education and in the form of the Ministry of Education.Of course, such a perception, if it is the statesmen true belief, leads to the simplification of reality and causes statesmen to make unenforceable promises or adopt unenforceable policies without considering the existing facts. Or they don't consider the necessary requirements to implement their policies, the consequences of which are many implementation failures and depriving people of their trust in the government and its ability to solve society's problems.  The executive proposal of this plan is for the government to make optimal use of the existing ability in the organized public sphere in order to find problems and provide solutions, especially in the field of education; Failure to include this importance (not considering public demands and demands) in the formulation and implementation of transformational and structural plans will not only lead to the implementation stage; But in the end, it will cause society's disappointment in political institutions and reduce the society's political trust.

The view that education should be in accordance with the ideals and goals of Prebendal state as one of examples of corrupt states is a type of state that in which power elites and government agents demand rights in excess of their rights at the level of the political system. Basically, prebendal state is the product of some factors such as elites’ mental perceptions and the trust and authority-citizenship culture at the cultural level, legitimacy and ideology at the political level, and rentierism and the big state at the economic level. The present article focuses on this main question that what are the consequences of prebendal state in IRAN during the second Pahlavi era? The hypothesis of the article seeks the consequences of such a state at two levels, individual and systemic consequences. The theoretical framework of the article is inspired by Max Weber's views and Richard Joseph's prebendal    state theory. In the analytical model of the article, the prebendal state is as an independent variable and its consequences at the individual and systemic levels are considered as dependent variables. Methodically, the type of research is qualitative and the approach of the article is descriptive –analytical and the research method is based on library –documentary analysis. The findings of the article indicate that the prebendal state will lead to to alienation at the individual level and   at the systemic level it will lead to the emergence of five types of crises such as legitimacy, efficiency, identity, accumulation and hegemony.The emergence and gaining of power in Iran during the second Pahlavi era had two lasting and effective consequences at the individual and systemic levels. At the individual and social level, it can be considered as the most important consequence of alienation, distancing and the emergence of a gap between the people and the elites of the country and finally the separation of the people from the Pahlavi system. The white revolution and agrarian reforms at the level of villages and industrialization, urbanization, modernization at the level of cities along with the weakening of the traditional middle class, administrative modernization, etc. have been the basis for such an outcome.At the system level, the establishment and expansion of the prebendal state in the country and the penetration of all power structures and the unaccountable access to huge oil resources and preventing it from being directed towards development-oriented investment and production provide the basis for the emergence of all kinds of crises in the country. brought including legitimacy crisis, identity crisis, hegemony crisis, accumulation crisis and efficiency crisis which intensified and eventually led to the fall of the Pahlavi regime system.In this article, the consequences of the prebendal state in the second Pahlavi era are analyzed in detail in two separate sections. In the first part, agrarian reforms and physical-identity displacement of villagers are examined as the first step of personal and social alienation. A process that physically led to the expansion of marginalization in big cities, and in terms of identity, it created a disintegration and an identity gap between rural immigrant villagers and urban dwellers. In the continuation of the policy of development, modernization and industrialization of the second Pahlavi regime, its effects and consequences on the alienation of urban people and the destruction of traditional classes in the cities are discovered and explained. In the second part, the consequences of gaining power and expansion of the prebendal state in the country and exclusive access to huge oil resources and preventing it from flowing towards development-oriented investment are examined in order to identify the causes of various crises in the country, crises that lead to the downfall of the regime. Pahlavi ended.The aim of this article is the examination of the consequences, results and effects of the prevalence of prebendalism in the second Pahlavi period, which crystallized on two individual levels - social and systemic - the political system. We have shown how the prebendal policies of land reforms and urban and industrial modernization of the Pahlavi system at the individual-social level led to alienation, distancing and the emergence of a deep gap between the people and the elites of the country and ultimately the separation of the people from the Pahlavi system. Also, based on numerous documents and sources, it was explained that the white revolution and agrarian reforms at the village level and industrialization, urbanization and modernization in the cities along with the weakening of the traditional middle class, a deep rupture between the rural and urban classes with the second Pahlavi regime and the prebendal elites. The ruler created it, which eventually led to the uprising of the rural dwellers along with the city dwellers against the system and the rulers of the second Pahlavi era.At the level of the political system and system, the establishment and expansion of the prebendal state in the country and the penetration of all the power structures and the unaccountable access to huge oil resources and preventing it from being directed towards development-oriented investment and production will cause all kinds of crises. provided in the country. Among them, the legitimacy crisis, identity crisis, hegemony crisis, accumulation crisis and efficiency crisis which intensified during this period and ultimately led to the fall of the Pahlavi regime and the destruction of prebendalism in Iran. By marginalizing civil parties and groups and sidelining independent politicians, the prebendal system caused the lack of meritocracy and the placing of incompetent people who were dependent on the king at the head of the country's political, administrative and military-security system, which had no result but the reproduction of corruption. Because the agents and corrupt and dependent elites had to accept and continue the current relations for their survival in the pyramid of power. In this situation, the ways of communication and the link between the government institutions and the elites with the people were broken and the vacuum in the relationship between the government and the society caused the regime to not have a correct and accurate understanding of the people's wishes and demands, and as a result, it could not act based on the people's demands. The result of this was the failure to reform the affairs, creating dissatisfaction among the people and turning them to underground, secret, radical and revolutionary activities. In addition, such a situation in relation to government institutions and elites connected with the people caused the political institution to become informal and political and economic relations to be outside the legal framework due to political corruption, which resulted in nothing but the distance of the government from the people and the deepening of the gap between the state and the nation.

In 1978, the Islamic Revolution achieved victory with the aim of fighting injustice, oppression, tyranny, establishing security, freedom, independence, and most importantly, forming a single nation. After the victory of the revolution, the first Shiite democratic system was established under the title of Islamic Republic based on the principle of divine sovereignty (Islamism) and people's sovereignty (Republic). Undoubtedly, the establishment of an Islamic state is one of the ultimate goals of the Islamic revolution, so that the laws and rulings of the Islamic religion are implemented, which, in addition to regulating the current affairs of the people, also guides the direction of the society towards perfection and nearness to God. But until today, the actions and efforts taken were not enough and the Islamic state has not yet been realized in the real sense. Therefore, the explanation of Ayatollah Khamenei's point of view as the great leader of Iranian society and also as the most important Shiite thinker in the Islamic world regarding the foundations and indicators of the Islamic state is very effective and can be a guide for the formation and theoretical and practical activity of the Islamic state. Because during his leadership period, he explained the five stages of the objectives of the Islamic revolution (Islamic revolution, political system, Islamic state, Islamic society and Islamic civilization) and drew the Islamic state as the most important and third stage of this process and repeatedly They have emphasized the importance and necessity of forming an Islamic state as an important factor in the realization of Islamic civilization. Therefore, it is requisite and necessary to explain his point of view regarding the foundations and indicators of the Islamic state.Question: This research seeks to answer the question that, from the perspective of Ayatollah Khamenei, how are the foundations and indicators of the Islamic state drawn? The method of this research is based on the qualitative content analysis method, in order to benefit from this method, attention was paid to the hidden themes of Ayatollah Khamenei's statements from 1981 to 2022 and inference and extraction of meaning was made from it. Thematic search of the word (Islamic State) among the statements of Ayatollah Khamenei was obtained with the help of MAXQDA software, and the search results of his statements were prepared in the form of a slip, which is about the topic of the foundations and indicators of the Islamic State.  The next step after collecting the slips is the analysis procedure in three ways: purification, explanation and which is the structure analysis procedure of this research. The next step is to specify the units of analysis, which are divided into word (symbol), theme, character (personality), paragraph and title (item), and in this research, the unit of analysis is paragraph. The next step is coding to determine the categories. The next step is coding to determine the categories, which in this research was done in an open and inductive approach, because the qualitative view prevails in it. Therefore, for this coding, it is necessary to read and review the text of the statements 2-3 times, line by line, and then convert it into the smallest possible component, where similar codes are merged and categories are extracted from these codes. And finally, each of these categories is analyzed and interpreted. Using qualitative content analysis method, three categories were determined regarding the foundations of the Islamic state and ten categories were determined regarding the indicators of the Islamic state, and each of these categories was analyzed and examined, and several points can be made from the findings. He deduced the basic:From the point of view of Ayatollah Khamenei, the Islamic state is the most important and the third stage of the five-fold process of the ideal of the Islamic Revolution, and if it is not fully realized, the Islamic society will not be formed.What distinguishes the Islamic state from other states; Its Islamic foundations and orientation are rooted in the connection between religion and politics in Islam, the necessity of social life and the necessity of realizing a virtuous life for the Muslim community in material and spiritual dimensions.From his point of view, the model of the Islamic State is the prophetic and Alawite state, which has indicators for the formation of the Islamic state at present, the most important of which are justice-oriented, adherence to the standards of religious democracy (importance of people's vote and opinion)., anti-tyranny, law-oriented, value-religious orientation, preservation of Islamic identity, service, science-oriented, wisdom-oriented, fight against corruption, etc.

Imagining government as a powerful and all-encompassing institution which effectively controls a geopolitical area has affected the basic role of this institution in the development discourse. Because the government is considered as the main basis of political, economic and social order, its representative role is significant. Today, many thinkers and international organizations believe that the government still plays an essential role in advancing the process of development and poverty reduction but the problem is that always some governments have not been able or willing to play the expected roles. Many governments, due to various social, political, economic and structural reasons do not have the ability and capacities necessary for carring out development and poverty reduction, or basically do not show much political desire and will in this regard. Since the 1990s, those states that their governments lack the necessary ability to perform normal functions and lead their society to development have been known as fragile states. This is a concept that is more related to developing countries. On the basis of this, the main question of the current research is "what are the criteria for evaluating the capacity and willingness of fragile states in planning for development and poverty reduction?" The research method used in this research is systematic review and information are collected using library tools and internet resources. The theoretical framework of the research is based on Torres and Anderson (2004). From the point of view of Torres and Anderson, the development capacities of a government include the foundations of government authority, administrative capacity and efficiency, economic efficiency and the effective exercise of political power. A government that lacks these capacities or has these features just to a limited extent will lose its capacity and ability to advance development and reduce poverty to a large extent. In addition, from thier point of view, along with these features, the political will for development and poverty reduction must exist at the top of the government. In other word there should be an explicit political statement that shows the commitment and desire of a government to advance development and poverty reduction programs. As well, in this direction, attention should be paid to the existence of strategies, tools and motivations for implementation, so that services are provided in the best possible way and has the character of inclusiveness. Finally, Torres and Anderson (2004) present a fourfold typology of governments (weak willingness and capacity governments, strong willingness and weak capacity governments, strong willingness and capacity governments, and weak willingness and strong capacity governments) that can be used to identify the criteria for evaluating the capacity of fragile states in development planning and poverty reduction. The results of the research findings show that governments in fragile states could have a proper planning in order to improve development capacities and reduce poverty by strengthening the foundations of authority, effective exercise of political power, efficiency in macroeconomic management, administrative capacity for implementation, along with the political commitment to reduce poverty and provide comprehensive services. Based on this, the governments that have weak political desire and will, even if they have the necessary capacities for development and poverty reduction, will not succeed. Similarly, those states that have a strong political desire and will but lack the necessary capacities, will not be successful. In transition countries, where governments are usually more fragile, rapid changes may lead to instability. Therefore, it should be emphasized on gradual reforms and more accountability of governments in these countries. As the Iraq experience clearly shows, dramatic changes—including a sudden move toward fully competitive elections—in countries with weak cohesion, fragile institutions, and a history of intergroup hostility can be highly explosive and undermine the entire reform agenda. So, it is better to give priority to solidarity and security and gradually carry out broader reforms in the field of development and poverty reduction so that do not explicitly threaten the status quo. Limits such as increasing transparency and carrying out budgeting methods, strengthening non-governmental organizations, creating a strong civil society, strengthening public cohesion and trust, increasing income and reducing unemployment, improving the rule of law and the government's capacity to judge and implement it can improve relations between governments and people and provide the basis for other actions. It seems that the biggest determining factors eventually are the government, its leadership, policies and institutions; This does not mean ignoring the role of the society as sustainable development requires roles of both government and society. The development-seeking government and the development-seeking society, with their desire and high capacities for development, are the key to success in the advancing development and poverty reduction.