نشریه نسیم خرد
سال نهم شماره 1 (پیاپی 16، بهار و تابستان 1402)

According to Avicenna’s exposition of ‍the demonstration of necessity and possibility based on the evidence of the subsistence of reality, an external being either is existent by necessity because of its nature, or has no necessity for existence and non-existence, and its existence is provided by a necessary being outside the chain of possible beings. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz has considered contingency as the possibility of doubt in propositions governing the reality, and the way to get rid of this doubt is to accept a necessary being that has given the world a necessity. When David Hume, considering Leibniz’s exposition, objects ‍the demonstration of necessity and possibility, he states that, firstly, merely possibility of doubt in external beings does not make the necessary being be confirmed because the same doubt applies to the necessary being; and, secondly, the concept of the necessary being is inconsistent: the necessity only describes the analytical propositions, and not the propositions governing the reality; therefore, one can cast doubt on the existence of a necessary being, which is not compatible with its being necessary. In this study, we aim at giving answers to these objections using the analytical-descriptive method by relying on the principles and foundations of Avicenna’s exposition, and state that, firstly, possibility means the lack of inherent necessity of external reality in relation to existence and non-existence, from which existence of necessary being can be understood; therefore, Leibniz has confused probable possibility and essential possibility, and that, secondly, the imputing necessity to an object in the capacity of a mental image and in the orbit of the primary predication does not entail its external realization to make it incompatible with the possibility of doubting its realization.

Suhrawardi is among the philosophers who, compared to other philosophers, developed his intellectual system in an innovative manner. Suhrawardi’s illuminative intellectual system is the result of his thoughts in philosophy and mysticism, and the ultimate of his illuminative school is to achieve the station of mystic perception and theosophy using intuition and reasoning. The pure soul is an important pillar in the wayfarer’s intuition; and since the soul has descended from the world of the dominant lights to the world of nature, it may have diseases just like the body. In his treatises, the Master of Illumination opened a new door in philosophy by discussing the disease of the soul, and sought to provide a mystical and ethical solution for the treatment of the human’s rational soul through his illuminative way of thinking. Suhrawardi’s method for treating the diseases of the soul is expressed as an allegory because it is considered as a part of his mystical materials; and it is regarded as a moral matter because it is a prescription for all wayfarers. By recognizing the symbols in Suhrawardi’s allegorical treatises, we can identify his moral way of treating the diseases of the soul.

The production of religious science is one of the most important prerequisites for the realization of Islamic civilization; therefore, it has always been a concern for the Islamic thinkers. Various solutions have been proposed for religious-scientific production. One of the centers with a long history, which has paid special attention to this subject-matter and presented considerable works and theories on it, is the Academy of Islamic Sciences in Qom. It is a mistake to present a theory on the production of religious science before explaining its identity, and it will make researchers suffer many fallacies; so, to determine the ‘identity of religious science’, the academy has investigated the six occidental and sociological aspects of the process of the science production, including epistemological, philosophical, logical, methodological, and theological. In this study, the first two bases have been examined. Considering the occidental basis of the process of science production, the members of the Academy believe in the non-divine nature of the sciences produced in the modern world; and considering the sociological basis, they have proposed twenty-seven correlative modes of ‘factors’, ‘stages’ and ‘levels’ of science production.

This study examines the position of reason in the sphere of mysticism, using the descriptive-analytical method, considering Muḥyīddīn Ibn ‘Arabī’s viewpoint. After analyzing the literal and idiomatic meaning of reason, the author investigates the reason and its orders as well as the relation between the orders of reason with the mystics’ views, and pays attention to its value and authority, and in the end shows how the scope of application of reason is from the mystics’ point of view. According to this study, reason has been condemned in mystical works in three places and following it is considered reprehensible: 1) Where it claims the monopoly of knowledge and considers itself to be the only way of knowledge and a tool of awareness; 2) Where reason sinks into the vortex of fantasy; 3) Where it returns from certainty by sight (‘Ain-al-Yaqīn) and intuition to the certainty by knowledge (‘Ilmul al-Yaqīn), and the report of reason replaces the intuition of the heart. It seems that universal reason and particular reason can have value and validity, provided that the latter does not exceed its limits and territory: this is because if reason goes out of its limits and territory, the dispute between the mystics and the others will begin.

One of the alleged instances of the incompatibility of reason and religion is the controversial issue of the physical world’s temporal contingency, meaning having a starting point, which philosophers have always tried to deny and theologians have tried to prove. In this dilemma, theologians have even accused some philosophers of blasphemy. The theologians have cited both intellectual and narrative evidence for this claim, but in this study, only the narrations related to this subject-matter have been examined. In this paper, an attempt has been made by using the Shia narrative authorities and categorizing the narrations about the contingency of the world and relying on the frequencies of the narrations based on verbal and intellectual evidence to show that, despite the claim of theologians about the physical world’s temporal contingency based on the appearance of the narrations, with a deeper view and without mental prejudice, we can find that these narrations not only do not indicate this claim, but also, based on the same documents, may even refute this claim, and, in some narrations, we can find the indication of eternity of the world.

Hellenism is a strange period in the history of philosophy, between the Ancient and Middle Ages. This period includes important thoughts such as Epicureanism, Stoicism and Neo-Platonic philosophy and has had considerable effects on the following centuries. Based on the books and sources available on Hellenistic philosophy, this study reviews the anthropology of the two schools: the Epicureans and the Stoics; and, in this way, it tries to review a part of the history of anthropology. The results of this paper showed that ancient Greek doctrines had penetrated the lower layers of Hellenistic philosophy (Hellenism), but Hellenistic philosophers were not just imitators and had considerable innovations. Relying on the instrument of sense and the material-atomic attitude to the world, Epicurus considered man a being consisting of a collection of atoms, so he denied life after death. Respecting moral virtues and defending responsibility, he assumed that man was free from predestination and considered his happiness to be pleasure and freedom from suffering. On the other side, by adding the element of ‘acknowledgment’ to sensory perceptions, the Stoics changed the criterion of knowledge and had been formalistic with a materialistic attitude. They considered man’s identity to be in form or pneuma. In this study, using a descriptive-analytical method, after presenting an explanation of epistemological and cosmological frameworks, the four following topics are discussed: ‘human identity’, ‘determinism and freedom’, ‘man’s relationship with Allah and life after death’ and ‘human happiness’ in Epicurean and Stoic philosophy.

Jurists have always considered some sciences as the introduction and necessity of Ijtihad in jurisprudence. There is also a need for preliminary sciences in other spheres of teachings of religion to infer them from religion. Islamic philosophy is one of the sciences that has an important place and multiple functions in Ijtihad in two areas of religious beliefs and teachings related to the humanities today. The discussions and findings of Islamic philosophy- especially in some of its parts such as theology, the manner and quality of the creation and the connection between the world and Allah, eschatology and anthropology - have multiple functions in correct and deep inference in these two deductive areas of religious teachings. The explanation of these functions, in addition to revealing the importance and value of dealing with the science of Islamic philosophy and providing a firm answer to the opponents of this science, increases our awareness and understanding of how to use Islamic philosophy more widely in the sphere of inferring religious treachings. In this study, the author has referred to the works of contemporary Muslim philosophers, as well as the verses of the Qur’an and Hadiths, and while stating some commonalities between Islamic philosophy and religious teachings, he has explained the four functions of Islamic philosophy in Ijtihad and inferring religious teachings.

Kant and Hegel are philosophers and theorists in ethics. Using a descriptive-analytical method, this study aims at comparing Kant’s and Hegel’s ethical theory and discovering the commonalities and differences of these two theories. The findings of the study show that Kant puts the ethics as the goal in itself instead of the ethics as a means to reach the goal, believing that ethical precepts should be carried out because of the duty and motivation to do the duty, not as a means. According to Kant’s general law, only good will is unconditionally good, and all other things become good when they are accompanied by good will. By combining the idea of law and the idea of the end in itself, Kant proposes the idea of autonomy and enters the sphere of ‘freedom’ from that point. Hegel also relies on freedom more than anything else, but unlike Kant, he seeks to make morality particular and insert it in the man’s individual and social spheres. Furthermore, he reconciles morality and action based on inner nature and desires. According to Hegel, individual satisfaction, freedom, and morality can be gathered together when we follow the beliefs and social values of an organized society. Unlike Kant, in Hegel’s moral theory, firstly, the conflict between satisfying natural desires and doing one’s duty is resolved; secondly, unity is established between individual and collective interests; thirdly, the individual’s particular moral duties and obligations are also clarified.

The truth of revelation has always been the scholars’ concern, and the study on how prophets and their Imams gained knowledge can be considered as a step in explaining this truth. Using a descriptive-analytical method, this study examines Mulla Sadra’s and Allameh Tabataba’i’s views on how prophets and Imams gained knowledge. The connection and union from the existential intensity of the prophet’s or Imam’s soul with the active intellect are considered as the origin of the infallibles’ knowledge by Mulla Sadra. He could explain how prophets and Imams gained knowledge based on the principles of transcendental wisdom, but his view was not without problems. Allameh Tabataba’i, while benefiting from the principles and concepts of transcendental wisdom, was able to compensate for the shortcomings of Sadra’s view by using the verses of the Holy Qur’an methodically and analyze it in a way that is more compatible with religious texts, verses and traditions. The findings of this study include setting forth some shortcomings of Mulla Sadra’s viewpoint and explaining Allameh Tabataba’i’s method in analyzing the Infallibles’ knowledge.

Philosophical mentalism is one of the most important topics in philosophical epistemology, which can be said to have priority over other issues of this science: until the problem of mind and mental existence and the correspondence of mind and object are not explained precisely, no useful result can be obtained regarding the value of perception, science and information; and until we are not sure about the value of information, discussing other issues of philosophy and even other sciences will not be useful and reliable. Therefore, the discussion about mentalism and consequently mental existence and examining its epistemological role are of special importance. Avicenna’s view, as the great Islamic philosopher, about mentalism can inform us about the origin of many differences on the issue of the value of science and information. Using a descriptive-analytical method, this study aims at justifying the external differences around science and information from Avicenna’s viewpoint by examining his theory and rereading his arguments in proving mental existence and its correspondence with objective existence.

Scholars of any religion have always assumed the truth of that religion and sought to prove the superiority of their religion over other religions. They have presented numerous and various arguments and claims to prove not only the validity of their religion, but also the invalidity and deficiency of other religions. This is because they have believed that two religions cannot be rightful and true at the same time, so they have typically turned to religious exclusivism. The theory of religious pluralism, centered on John Hick, asserted the rightfulness of all religions and believed in religious pluralism, a theory whose traces can be seen in Frithjof Schuon’s and Mulla Sadra’s views. Schuon was a Muslim theologian who, in the school of traditionalism, believed in the unity of the essence of all religions by separating religions into essences and shells of religion; and Mulla Sadra was one of the Shiite philosopher who, through his comprehensive theory of salvation, considered the concepts of happiness and salvation to be graded and overarching concepts in all religions. Mulla Sadra and Schuon, influenced by Ibn Arabi’s mystical foundations and by presenting numerous arguments, considered all religions to be rightful and in accordance with truth. This paper expands and compares these two Muslim philosophers’ views using a comparative analysis and concludes that Mulla Sadra, who believed in the salvation of all human beings, was a Universalist, and Shuan, who sought to sprinkle truth on all the thoughts in the sphere of religion was an extremist pluralist.

The title of a book expresses its nature and content. By referring to the Islamic scholars’ books, we find that the titles of the books often include their authors’ worldview. Considering the titles of books in the Islamic period, this study aims at extracting and explaining the authors’ views and worldview. The possibility of discovering the realities of the world, belief in the unseen world, the mysteriousness of the world, the need of man for guidance, the need of a lamp for guidance, the level of the audience in understanding the truth, the lighting nature of knowledge, the enlightening nature of knowledge, the objective nature of knowledge, and the recalling nature of knowledge are the most important keywords that can be extracted from the titles of these books.