فصلنامه حکمت معاصر
پیاپی 35 (پاییز و زمستان 1401)

Ṣadrīan philosophy holds that all kinds of memory, as well as all kinds of perception (sensory, imaginary, or rational/intellectual), are non-material. On this account, perceptual forms are identically retained. They remain in the core of our souls and never go out of existence. Remembrance or recollection is to give attention to and recognize the very same initial forms. In this way, when it comes to memory, Ṣadrīan philosophy fundamentally diverges from its predecessors as well as modern sciences. Because, these modern sciences do not see the need to assume the immateriality of memory. They often suggest that information is stored in the material brain through a kind of encoding, attributing the constancy of memory to the constancy of genetic and neuronal encoding. In this article, I adjudicate these opposing views. To do so, I overview arguments presented for the immateriality of memory both in Ṣadrā’s own works and those of his commentators. I then show that, pace Ṣadrīan philosophy, materialism about memory is more plausible than the immateriality view. I propose a simple materialistic explanation as an alternative—i.e. an explanation in terms of a distinction between the epistemic mind and the non-epistemic brain memory—to criticize Ṣadrīan arguments and unveil their fallacies.

In this research, I analyze and then appraise the relevant views by drawing on a philosophical method and logical tools. On occasion, we cite the achievements of modern sciences as well.

For Ṣadrā, sensory and imaginary perceptions are immaterial. These immaterial forms are identically retained in memory, and then the same identical immaterial forms are recollected. In his discussion of the “traversing movement” (al-ḥarakat al-qaṭʿiyyah), he makes it explicit that the mind, unlike the changing physical external world, has the following characteristic: whatever occurs moment by moment in it remains the same and in an instantaneous, rather than gradual, way. Ṣadrīans hold that when, say, a lunar eclipse happens, a form is present to me, and when the eclipse ends, another epistemic form is created in me, while the first form still remains in my mind. In this way, the initial form does not go away, but rather a new form is added. Another argument presented by Ṣadrīans is that, when dying, people “instantaneously” remember everything they perceived throughout their lives. Moreover, memory is characteristically recognitional; that is, it involves the recognition that the remembered thing is identical to what was initially perceived. However, “identity” is incompatible with the materiality of memory. Changes in the brain also demonstrate that memory is not material: brains and their nerves change with all of their material contents, while psychological memories remain in the mind after years.I think all of these arguments are objectionable. Suffice to say, Peripatetic philosophers believe that sensory and imaginary mental forms are material, and then assume that no mental form goes away, but remains in its own realm. Such constancy does not necessarily have to do with immateriality, since such constancy of the material is conceived in modern philosophy and physics in terms of the growing block view of time.In critique of therecognition argument for the immateriality of memory, for example, we might say that it proves too much: The basis of this argument is the very paradox of Meno, which challenges not only the memory but also any kind of knowledge.Similarly, the identity argument proves too much and therefore it is objectionable in that if identity could show the immateriality of memory, it could establish the immateriality of the material world as well. For instance, the mountain I see today is identicalto the one Isaw yesterday. So, these are identical, without the mountain being immaterial. Since identity does not imply immateriality in these cases, it does not imply the immateriality of memory either.In response to the argument from brain change, we might say that, before their destruction, brain cells transmit their physical information to the young cells, which in turn transmit the information to other cells before they die. As an analogy, suppose that an audio tape lasts for twenty years, but before it expires, we record its content on another brand-new tape, which retains the same audio.In addition, since Ṣadrīans believe that the retained perceptual forms are directly present to us, they must say that we have knowledge-by-presence of them, albeit unconsciously. The idea of unconscious knowledge sounds implausible to me.To establish the immateriality of memory and imaginative forms, Ṣadrā also tries to undermine the material account of memory. He argues that the many forms we have perceived in our lives cannot be imprinted in our finite, and even small, material brains. However, this seems unlikely only for Ṣadrā while it is not impossible by itself. It simply can be explained away by modern science:it has been established today that a large amount of information can be stored in very small memory cards.A major objection I raised against the Ṣadrīan view is that errors in memory are incompatible with its immateriality and with being remembrance a matter of knowledge by presence. For just as sensory perceptions cannot be kinds of knowledge by presence because they involve errors, remembrance cannot be a kind of such knowledge because of errors it involves.Moreover, I argue that not only Ṣadrā’s commentators, but also Ṣadrā himself, failed to stay committed to the consequences of the immateriality of memory, as he sometimes says, and rightly so, that memories are destructible. This is an obvious endorsement of changes in such perceptual forms, which imply their materiality and inconstancy.

Pre-Ṣadrīan philosophies as well as the prevalent scientific view present a far more plausible account of memory and how sensory and imaginative forms are retained than the Ṣadrīan constancy and immateriality account. Alternative materialistic explanations and the objection from errors in memory, as well as a host of other reasons, call Ṣadrīan arguments into question, including the sudden survival of movement, instantaneous detailed recollection of all forgotten memories in abnormal states or under unusual pressures, conceiving particular meanings as they were initially perceived by some old and sick people without any distortions, recognition and identity, and constancy of memory despite changes in brain cells.

The supernatural (malakūtī) origin of things is an immaterial, illuminated, and self-subsistent substance, which Muslim philosophers, particularly Illuminationist philosophers, call the “Lord of Species” (rabb al-nawʿ); that is, archetype. In Illuminationist philosophy, lords of species or lords of talismans (arbāb al-ṭilismāt) are the domineering horizontal lights (al-anwār al-qāhirat al-ʿarḍiyya) or equivalent intellects (al-ʿuqūl al-mutakāfiʾa), which al-Suhrawardī identifies with angels or illuminated essences in Zoroastrianism. Of all the species, the human soul has a supernatural origin or a lord, which is known in Islamic philosophy as the “tenth intellect” (based on how plurality issues forth from unity) and in religious terminology as the “Holy Spirit” (rūḥ al-qudus) or Gabriel. Almost all Muslim philosophers identify the lord of the human species with Gabriel or the Holy Spirit, who mediates God’s grace and is the giver of the forms (wāhib al-ṣuwar).

Statement of the Problem:

Just like other Illuminationist Platonist Muslim philosophers, Afḍal al-Dīn Muḥammad al-Maraqī al-Kāshānī, an Iranian philosopher in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, believed in two worlds: physical and spiritual. In his view, the physical world is an image of the higher world. He held that particular sensible forms and meanings in this world are mortal, all being images or representations of eternal forms in the intellectual world. On his account, each species in this physical world has a specific (species-related) form as an absolute universal in the non-physical world. The main question of the present article concerns Afḍal al-Dīn Kāshānī’s view of the lord of the human species, given that his philosophy rests upon illuminations, intuitions, and consciousness. Indeed, how does he define the nature of the human soul as supernal origin of the human species? A survey of Afḍal al-Dīn’s philosophical works reveals that his view differs from that of other Muslim philosophers, opening a new path to philosophical discussions of the lord of human species.

Method of Research:

The method of research in the present article is analytic-descriptive based on library studies. We first surveyed the philosophical problem of the “lord of species” in philosophical works before Bābā Afḍal, and then elaborated upon the Illuminationist view of the matter based on al-Suhrawardī’s works. We then accounted for Afḍal al-Dīn Kāshānī’s theories of the spiritual origin of souls in terms of the theory of correspondence between macrocosm and microcosm based on his philosophical works, and then adduced evidence from his philosophical essays to expound his view of the lord of the human species. The contribution of this research is elaboration of the distinction between his view and the views of other Muslim philosophers, which is left unnoticed in other relevant research into Bābā Afḍal’s works. This article considers his view to bring to light the connection between Islamic philosophy and mysticism. For by characterizing Azrael as the lord of the human species, he says that the outcome of the soul is voluntary death or the stage of annihilation.

Afḍal al-Dīn Kāshānī asserts that the soul is pre-eternal, having an intellectual origin that counts as the director and trainer (lord) of the soul. Afḍal al-Dīn’s angelology is closely tied to his principle of the correspondence between macrocosm and microcosm. Accordingly, he matches the four archangels in macrocosm (Michael, Israfil, Azrael, and Gabriel) with the four souls within humans (microcosm); that is, the supernal soul, the retaining soul (al-nafs al-ḥāfiẓa), the inscribing soul (al-nafs al-kātiba), and the rational soul (al-nafs al-nāṭiqa). Contrary to other philosophers who identify the lord of the human species with Gabriel, he identifies the nature of the human soul or the lord of human species with Azrael, the angel of death.Bābā Afḍal believes that forms and meanings are separate (albeit mutually entailing) parts, where the former belongs to the physical world and the latter to the spiritual world. He holds that to separate form from meaning is indeed to separate physical beings from spiritual beings. The world of forms is the world of annihilation and mortality, and the world of meaning is the world of immortality and eternity. On this theory, he concludes that Azrael is the true nature of the soul in that the human soul has the function of receiving things and taking the spirit of meanings from templates of forms, just as Azrael takes life from things. The human soul is mainly characterized by knowing things or by consciousness, which is indeed to take and receive the life of things—that is, their meanings and truths—from their forms.

A survey of Afḍal al-Dīn Kāshānī’s works shows that, on the problem of the lord of human species, he offers a view distinct from the views of Peripatetic and Illuminationist philosophers before him. Contrary to other philosophers who identify the lord of human species with Gabriel or the tenth intellect from among all the angels or intellects, he identifies it with the angel of death, Azrael, as the origin and true nature of the rational soul, based on form-meaning bifurcation. He maintains that, having arrived at self-consciousness by virtue of turning away from forms and turning to meanings, the human soul observes truths, and by shedding the light of meaning on forms, the concealed will be disclosed to it.

Epistemological issues in architecture are related to the movement of people in space. According to the philosophical concept of movement and MullāṢadrā's theory of substantial motion, perception refers to people's gradual perception of architectural spaces. Deep understanding of mosque-school spaces is not possible without movement. In order to achieve a deep understanding of these spaces, the observer must move in the space, and after experiencing physical and mental movements, he should promotes his perception level. The question of this research in the form of a case study is that, considering the variety of accesses in the Agha Bozor Mosque-School of Kashan; How does movement promote perception from the material level to the spiritual level? This research is descriptive-analytical and case study, and its results show that, despite the existence of separate paths (for prayer and educational performance) in the spaces of the mosque-school, the observer experiences three orders of movement (visual, physical and mental) by moving in each of these paths; in the form of four pillars in the mosque and three pillars in the school; It guides the observer's perception (in line with MullāṢadrā's perceptual hierarchy) from the sensory level to the imagination, and then to the intellectual level.

Intelligence has a wide range. Degrees of intelligence can be divided into primary and secondary intelligences..Examining the word intelligence with various words almost synonymous in transcendent wisdom such as intellect, science, wisdom, etc. shows that human intelligence is dependent on higher intelligence.Artificial intelligence, which is the achievement of human intelligence, has very precise functions such as learning, optimization, generalizability.By describing, analyzing and comparing the intelligent machine with man, we can better understand the distance between human consciousness and the knowledge of the first causes and the entry of multiplicity and contradiction in the material world with the higher worlds.Traces of morality and will can be seen in different levels of reason, as well as in the types and varieties of intelligence in psychological issues...Although it seems that some of the human intelligence goes back to the way of performance in the field of ethics and voluntary actions, but due to the effects of external or previous conditions on human voluntary actions, the differences between these two types of secondary intelligence (human intelligence and artificial intelligence) It descends to a lower limit.Paying attention to the truth of the will and its effect on morality cannot explain the difference between human intelligence and the systemic functions of intelligent machines.Regardless of emotions, inner states or presence sciences, even the will cannot be the original distinction between human intelligence and artificial intelligence

Muslim Peripatetic philosophers believe that physical objects are composites out of matter and form, holding that each natural kind involves a form other than the physical form, with which physical objects turn into various kinds, hence the label “specific [i.e. kind-related] form” (or form of species). Suhrawardī opposes Peripatetic philosopher on this matter, raising many objections against the view. Mullā Ṣadrā believes that Peripatetic philosophers are right, responding to Suhrawardī’s objections. In this article, we consider and criticize the arguments by Peripatetic philosophers, the objections by Suhrawardī, and Mullā Ṣadrā’s replies to the latter. We argue that although some of Suhrawardī’s objections do not work, attempts by Peripatetic philosophers and defenses by Mullā Ṣadrā do not suffice as proofs for the existence of specific forms.

In his book, Ḥikmat Ishrāq (2017), Yazdanpanah formulates Suhrawardī’s critiques of the Peripatetic arguments for the existence of specific forms, supporting Mullā Ṣadrā’s replies to Suhrawardī. The article “Recognition of the concept of nature in Suhrawardī’s philosophy in light of criticizing the specific form” addresses why Suhrawardī rejects the existence of specific forms and what implications it has, but it does not grapple with the arguments themselves (Dibaji and Nasekhian 2020). Qavam Safari in his “Theory of form in Aristotle’s philosophy” (2015) and Ahmadi in his “Substantial form” (2003) study the form and its features and applications for Aristotle. Kompani Zare makes a short reference to Suhrawardī’s critiques of the Peripatetic account of specific forms in his “A brief survey of Suhrawardī’s natural science” (2015).

Arguments for the Existence of Specific Forms:

First argument: physical objects have various effects. For instance, water has effects and features different from those of the air. The source of those effects cannot be the physical form shared by all physical objects. Moreover, it cannot be the hyle, which is pure potentiality and is thus the same in all physical objects. There should therefore be another source in physical objects, which is the cause of those effects, and that is the specific form.Second argument: In each kind of physical object, there is an entity over and above the hyle (or matter) and physical form, which is exclusive to and inseparable from that kind. That entity is either an accident or a substance. The first horn is false because this entity constitutes matter, which is a substance, while an accident cannot constitute substance. This constitutive component of matter is a specific form. For just as matter is not void of physicality, it cannot be imagined without being exclusively attached to a kind of physical object.Third argument: when a form changes, the physical object’s quiddity changes too. So, a form is not an accident in that a thing’s quiddity does not vary with the change of its accidents. The thing with the change of which the quiddity (our answer to the question of what it is in its substance) changes is a substance, rather than an accident. Otherwise, a substance would consist of accidents.Fourth argument: specific forms are parts of specific substances. The part of substance is a substance. For instance, the quiddity of fire is not exhausted by its physicality, but consists of a physical object and an entity with which the nature of fire comes to be.

Critique and Analysis of the Arguments:

An objection against all the arguments for specific forms is that they all are quiatic proofs (al-burhān al-innī), which are not characteristically certainty-conferring. This is because form the existence of an effect, one can know about the existence of its cause, but one cannot thereby know its nature. We cannot thus say with certainty that the cause of various effects issued from physical objects is their specific forms. The cause might be something else, whose nature is totally obscure to us.The objection against the first argument is that the horns are not logically restricted to those enumerated in the argument. So, the logical possibility remains that something else is the source of those effects, such as a certain combination between component particles of physical objects as discovered by modern sciences. Another objection is that the combination of physical objects out of matter and form, which is the basis of this argument, is an analytic combination, and thus, form and matter are analytic, rather than external, parts of physical objects. From the fact that, analytically speaking, physical objects have such parts, it does not follow that they have those parts in the external world as well.The middle term in the second argument is a difference we see in physical objects, rather than being constitutive of matter, which Mullā Ṣadrā adduces as evidence for his claim. This is because being constitutive of matter is a middle term for proving the substantiality of forms, rather than its very existence. Just like the first argument, it assumes the existence of matter and physical form to show that there should be a third entity in physical objects. On this account, all objections against the first argument also work against this argument. As for the third argument, it is true that when essential properties of a thing change, its quiddity (the way we answer the question “what is it?”) change too. However, the reverse of this claim, which is deployed in this argument, is not always true; that is, we cannot say that whenever the answer to the question of “what is it?” changes, the essential properties also change. For instance, when water turns into ice, the answer to its “what is it?” question changes, but this is not to say that its form changes too. The fourth argument does not provide us with an independent argument for the existence of specific forms. Indeed, it is based on the preceding arguments, which makes it vulnerable to Suhrawardī’s objection: the principle that the part of a substance is a substance is true only if we know that the thing in question is a substance in all respects.

It turns out that none of the arguments above suffice as proofs for the existence of specific forms because, on the one hand, all of these are quiatic proofs, which cannot apply to quiddities, and on the other hand, each argument is susceptible to separate objections.

Shihab al-Din yahya Suhrawardi, illuminationist philosopher, explaining his epistemological views, proposed a new point of view that known as illuminationist relation and in this way he considers the acquisition of many perceptions, including vision, of through of intuitive knowledge.The present research focuses on the nature of knowledge by presence and its role in the problem of “vision.” It considers the following key question: Does Suhrawardī mean the same thing by “knowledge by presence” in all degrees of perception from the most primitive external levels—that is, vision—to the deeper levels? Then, given his epistemic model, can we treat him as a phenomenologist? The present article considers the nature of knowledge by presence in the process of vision according to Suhrawardī and presents a different approach to it. By reference to Suhrawardī’s discussion of issues of vision and a conceptual clarification of “presence,” we show that Suhrawardī could not have used the term “knowledge by presence” in the case of vision in its common sense as opposed to “knowledge by acquisition” (al-ʿilm al-ḥuṣūlī). Instead, this is a different notion, and thus the term is equivocally used in his work. Moreover, we argue that his epistemological model for vision is phenomenological. The method of research in the present article is qualitative and analytic

This study aims to investigate the relationship between the world of unity and the world of plurality based on Quranic reading and tries to reject the rival theory and the hypothesis of "establishing a relationship between unity and plurality based on the personal unity of existence" based on studies and analyzes. Examine the basic Qur'an. The body of research consists of: explaining the personal unity of existence and critique of rival theories and reciting and explaining the Qur'an the chosen theory. By studying the relative interactions of the world of plurality with the world of unity, several studies have been conducted, including: the article "The possibility of personal unity of existence in transcendent wisdom" by Hossein Suzanchi; The article "A method and in proving the content of the personal unity of existence" written by Vahid Vahed Javan et al .; Article "Unity and plurality of existence in transcendent wisdom and mysticism" by Seyyed Hamid Reza Hassani; The article "Reflections on the Evidence of Personal Unity of Existence" written by Mohammad Ali Mohiti Ardakan and Mohammad Fanaei Eshkevari. Although these articles have somehow dealt with the relationship between the world of unity and the world of plurality and the analysis of the personal unity of existence, they have never targeted the basic and documented reading of the Qur'an, which is the mission of this research.

Material:

The present research is a research, theoretical and its method is descriptive-analytical. The research approach is also qualitative; Qualitative research requires identifying sources related to the research topic, studying texts, understanding the meaning of the text and extracting the desired content from these sources, establishing a relationship between the content and describing and analyzing them, and discussing and concluding the collected information.

Based on research and referring to the Holy Quran, it was found that the relationship between the world of plurality and the world of unity is of the type of relationship "was" and "appearance" or the relationship of "truth of existence" and "manifestation of existence" called "personal unity of existence" Is summarized. There are many verses to prove this mystical approach in relation to the world of plurality and the world of unity. With the mystical analysis of the relevant verses, the strategic statement "Existence is unique in the Almighty and the world of possibilities is its manifestations, manifestations and events" was extracted, which can be the basis for further research on the system of Qur'anic mysticism.

In mystical ontology, how the world of plurality relates to the world of unity is one of the main axes. The relationship between the world of unity and the world of plurality has long been the subject of controversy among philosophers and sages. Different views are presented in this regard. What has been considered most of all is the theory of the personal unity of existence in these proportions. Mystics try to develop this theory with rational and intuitive analysis and base it on other scientific theories. Based on research and referring to the Holy Quran, it was found that the relationship between the world of plurality and the world of unity is of the type of relationship "was" and "appearance" or the relationship of "truth of existence" and "manifestation of existence".

Banu Amin, who is a follower of MullaSadra's School of philosophy, has differences with her predecessors in some positions, such as the forces of the human Self, “Intellects Theory”, etc. Regarding the Intellects Theory, while criticizing the previous theories, she proposes the Theory of the Muhammadiyah's Spirit. The main question of the present research is the critical review of his encounter with the Intellects Theory and the evaluation of the Muhammadiyah's Spirit Theory. In his opinions, the Incorporeal of the First Intellect emphasized and she considers the First Intellect to have a delicate substance. Banu Amin answers the eight problems surrounding the Intellects Theory. Two problems are about the Incorporeal and Being of the intellect, five problems are about the corporeality of the intellect, and one problem is about the longitudinal order and the number of the Intellects. On the one hand, she considers rational reasons for Incorporeal of Intellects to be acceptable. On the other hand, she believes that considering the narrative evidences and the flaws of the rule of “Alvahed”, the corporeality of intellects not rejected in general. Therefore, in the end, she considers the corporeality of Intellects to be permissible and as the alternative Theory uses the Theory of Muhammadiyah's Spirit to explain the relationship between one and many. Sometimes she considers the Muhammadiyah's Spirit to be equivalent to the First Intellect, and sometimes considering the First Intellect to be corporeal and the Muhammadiyah's Spirit to be Incorporeal, she considers them to be differencing from each other. Therefore, Banu Amin criticizes the Theories that existed about Intellects until her time, and accepts and proves some parts of both Theories of Corporeal and Incorporeal of Intellects, and rejects some parts, and finally, expresses a new Theory about Intellects. In addition, in this regard even provides a new definition for the substance. Banu Amin is close to the mystics in the Muhammadiyah's Spirit Theory. Muhammadiyah's Spirit is the first issued from whom the First Intellect is issue, and the same characteristics that the philosophers have listed for the First Intellect; she counts for the Muhammadiyah's Spirit. Relying on narrative reasons and their preference and discussion from different points of view has created this new Theory in the opinions of Banu Amin. The present research method is analytical-critical.

Shams al-Dīn Samarqandī has authored two logical books Qisṭās al-afkār and its self-commentary Sharḥ al-Qisṭās, both of which have two versions on ḥaqīqī and khārijī propositions, which seem to be due to the change of Samarkandi's logical opinions about ḥaqīqī and khārijī propositions. In the first versions of both the books, the relations between the propositions are mere implication (ʿumūm wa khuṣūṣ muṭlaq), but in the second version, the relations change to denial of implication (ʿumūm wa khuṣūṣ min wajhin). Also, in the first version, Samarqandī presents a universal rule (ḍābiṭ) for taking conclusions from mixed syllogisms composed of ḥaqīqī and khārijī propositions. Indeed, the second version can be seen as correcting the first version. In this paper, we shall show that even though Samarqandī’s attempt corrected some faults in the first version, it leaves some others uncorrected. In addition, there are new objections to the second version which would not been forwarded to the first version. Therefore, none of the first and second versions provides a correct and complete analysis of the mixing of the categorical khārijī, ḥaqīqī and mental propositions.

A scrutiny of Fārābī’s works reveals that one of his major concerns and a key philosophical problem in his view was God as the origin of other existing entities as well as His attributes and His relation with the world of being. As a founder of Islamic philosophy, in his efforts to establish the intellectual system of Islamic philosophy, Fārābī not only takes the study of God as a metaphysical problem, but also considers it as a key central problem in metaphysics. Indeed, in most of his works, he defines metaphysics in terms of God (the First Existent: al-mawjūd al-awwal) as the study of the First Existent and the study of other existents in that they are caused by the First Existent. Accordingly, in Fārābī’s view, the First Existent is an entity on which other existents depend in their existence, and in fact, other existents deserve to be studied in metaphysics just in virtue of their relation to it. For this reason, it is the most significant and central issue in the study of Fārābī to research into the First Existent and its attributes as well as its relation with other existents. A scrutiny of Fārābī’s view of the First Existent will give us an understanding of the main metaphysical problem in his philosophy, which is crucial to an understanding of other problems of metaphysics as well as the entire system of his intellectual doctrines. Additionally, a major offshoot of this is a more accurate understanding of the relation between Fārābī’s theology (study of God) and Avicenna’s theology, which results in an enhanced study of Avicenna’s philosophy. Accordingly, the main problem tackled in this article is an analysis of Fārābī’s view of God and His attributes.In this way, the article is chiefly concerned with a study of God as the First Existent and His attributes from Fārābī’s perspective. However, since Fārābī’s theological studies largely appear in his Ārāʾ ahl al-madīnat al-fāḍila (Opinions of the citizens of the virtuous city) and al-Siyāsat al-madaniyya (Urban politics), this article focuses on these two works, although it also reviews the rest of Fārābī’s works when they involve a reference to the problem at hand. It is necessary to note that this article overviews and analyzes Fārābī’s views in terms of his own intellectual context and only draws on the jargons prevalent in the works that are attributed to him beyond any reasonable doubt.

In many parts of his works, Fārābī discusses theological issues, but a large part of his theological studies appears in two of his works: Ārāʾ ahl al-madīnat al-fāḍila (Opinions of the citizens of the virtuous city) and al-Siyāsat al-madaniyya (Urban politics). The jargons Fārābī uses to refer to God include the “First” (awwal), the “First Existent,” and the “First Cause” (al-sabab al-awwal). Unlike Avicenna, he does not believe that God is the essentially necessary existent. Fārābī ascribes several names and attributes to the First Existent, in particular its being immemorial and the most perfect. These attributes encompass other divine attributes. Indeed, other attributes ultimately refer to these two. Fārābī explains that although multiple names and attributes apply to the First Existent, this does not add up to the multiplicity of the First Existent, because it includes all those attributes in its essential unity. In Fārābī’s view, when common names are predicated of the First Existent and other existents, they are not predicated by way of univocity (or a common meaning: al-ishtirāk al-maʿnawī). Moreover, because of a resemblance and relation between the First Existent and other existents, the predication is not by way of equivocity (or a vebal commonality: al-ishtirāk al-lafẓī) either. It is indeed a different variety of predication by which common names are predicated of the First Existent and other existents not as univocal, but by virtue of a sort of relation and resemblance and in terms of priority and posterity. This resemblance or relation between the attributes of the First Existent and those of other existents provides us with some kind of knowledge about the First Existent, by which we apply positive attributes to it.Fārābī explains the relation between the First Existent and other existents in terms of the theory of emanation (fayḍ). While he was influenced by neo-Platonic philosophers, particularly Plotinus, and despite his ample influence on Avicenna, there are significant ways in which Fārābī can be distinguished from them to the extent that the theories of emanation put forward by each had better be treated as three separate views. Fārābī’s theory is distinguished from Plotinus’s mainly by his introduction of heavenly spheres into the flow of emanation, the multiplicity and number of intellects, and the possibility of human knowledge of the First Existent and the First Existent’s knowledge of other existents. Furthermore, his theory is discriminated from Avicenna’s by his rejection of accommodating essential necessity and essential possibility in his theory of emanation. Since Fārābī did not even consider the principle of essential necessity and possibility, he does not account for emanation in terms of essential and non-essential necessity or possibility. Although Avicenna was influenced by Fārābī’s theory of emanation, his view is far away from Fārābī’s because he explains emanation in terms of necessity and possibility. It should be noted, however, that Avicenna’s theory is so dominant that, at first sight, it seems impossible to be able to explain emanation without the key elements of necessity and possibility. The main contribution of the present research is the study of Fārābī’s authentic views of God based on the works that are attributed to him beyond any reasonable doubt, and without any mixture with dubious works attributed to him. Accordingly, it turns out that, despite his great influence on Avicenna, Fārābī’s view diverges from Avicenna’s on many key issues such that it seems that they present two distinct intellectual frameworks.

Fārābī believes that God is the origin of all existents, hence His appellation as the First, the First Existent, and the First Cause. In Fārābī’s view, the First Existent is not only an entity on which other existents depend in their existence, but also an entity in relation to which they deserve to be studied in metaphysics. A scrutiny of the First Existent and its attributes as well as its relation to other existents is a major research question in the study of Fārābī’s philosophy. Since there are doubts about the attribution of some works to Fārābī, and those works provide a distinct intellectual framework relative to his definitive works, this article aims to derive and overview Fārābī’s authentic views. According to definitive works by Fārābī, God is not a necessary existent, and the theory of emanation he puts forward as an explanation of the relation between the First Existent and other existents is not based on essential necessity and possibility. For this reason, his view of God is fundamentally different from that of his successor Avicenna.

Mulla Sadra differentiates between "action" and "intentional action". He considers the intentional action as an action, which is caused by second-order consciousness of the purpose of the action (Mulla Sadra 1981, 2/223). His interpretation of this second-order consciousness is "awareness of purpose" (Mulla Sadra undated, 69). According to him, the voluntary Agent is different from the intentional Agent. An intentional Agent is an Agent who not only intends to perform the action, but also has second-order consciousness of the purpose of the action (Mulla Sadra, 1354, 134); That is, he knows what he is doing and what purpose he is trying to achieve. This second-order consciousness leads to the transformation of action into intentional action and the feeling of free will. It seems that this ability is specific to the human soul and the faculties that is specific to this soul. The basic issue of this research is the analysis of the role of "practical reason" as a consciousness-creating factor in this process - that is, the process of converting a "voitional act" into an "intentional action" - in Mulla Sadra's philosophy. For this purpose, by searching in the works of Mulla Sadra, the authors try to evaluate the functions of "practical reason" in the process of issuing action and reveal its position as an "consciousness-creating factor" among the principles of action.

Methods and Material:

The research method of this paper is descriptive-analytical method. In this way, by referring to the different works of Mulla Sadra, the authors try to provide a complete description of his opinions. Then, by analyzing his opinions based on logical requirements, it is tried to discover the functions of practical reason in the process of intentional action in Mulla Sadra's philosophy.

The element of "second-order consciousness", which is the condition for turning a voluntary action into an "intentional action", is one of the characteristics of the human soul, and animals lack such an element (Mulla sadra 1981, 6/312). In other words, animal souls have perception through their faculties; but they don't have second-order consciousness to their faculties and their perceptions; but the human soul has the ability to aware of the "self" and "its faculties” as a part of its perception (Mulla sadra 1981, 6/251). This feature is achieved by "reason faculty" for this soul (Mulla sadra 1363, 133-132). It seems that practical reason with three functions transforms voitional act into intentional action and brings second-order consciousness to a person.The first function of practical reason is the positive function. According to Mulla Sadra, the only faculty that creates particular mental forms is not the “imaginal faculty”; Rather, the practical reason has also the ability to create them (Mulla sadra 1363, 516-516). According to him, the affirmation of benefits is done in the imaginary level by the imaginal faculty and in the rational level by the practical reason (Mulla sadra 1382, 2/1037). The rational level here does not mean general mental forms, because MullaSadra points out that decision of doing an action always require partial mental forms (Mulla sadra 1363, 516) and he states also that practical reason is the ability to perceive practical mental forms (Mulla sadra 1360, 200).The second function of "practical reason" refers to the judgment about the practical mental forms that the imaginal faculty has acknowledged their usefulness. In his sensory and imaginary encounters with the real world, a person creates images of action. When the imaginal faculty creates a practical image in the imagination and decides to issue it based on nature of body; practical reason evaluates its acceptance, and it judges the goodness and badness of that partial practical judgment based on general normative patterns (Mulla sadra 1354, 261). The third function of "practical reason" in the process of issuing an intentional action is managing the imaginary passions of a person towards performing an action. This role-playing actually occurs at a time when the imaginal faculty orders the performance of action A and in this way, arouses the lust or anger of a person to do it. This function is different from the previous function; because the practical reason in the previous function used to make judgments about the decision of the imaginal faculty; But in this function, practical reason manage lust or anger which is the result of the decision of the imaginal faculty. Mulla Sadra referred to this function as "caring" (Mulla sadra 1981, 3/419).

In transcendental wisdom, the Reason is a self-aware power; this means that it can rationalize itself and achieve second-order self-consciousness. The Reason rationalizes not only itself, but also other perceptive and practical powers. Rationalizing here is not the understanding of the general mental form, but the acquisition of second-order consciousness.According to Mulla Sadra, "intentional action" is different from "voluntary action" because "intentional action" is an action that is the result of the will along with the "second-order consciousness of the agent" for the purpose of the action. According to the this explanation, the element of "second-order consciousness" is an element that is obtained by adding "practical reason" to the principles of action;Therefore, "intentional action" is a voluntary action in which "practical reason" plays a role in its process. Practical reason with three different functions brings second-order consciousness to the human soul: imagining particular and practical mental forms, acknowledging its usefulness and managing perceptual and motivational other faculties.

 The perennial problem of evil, which includes a set of problems, was generally formulated in three ways: (1) the logical problem of evil (logical inconsistency of God’s existence and attributes with the existence of evil), (2) the evidential problem of evil (evil as evidence against the rationality of theism), and (3) the existential problem of evil (the inconsistency between religious beliefs and one’s lived experiences). The main apologetics provided in contemporary Islamic philosophy in reply to the logical problem of evil include (i) evil as illusory, (ii) evil as nonexistent, (iii) evil as relative, (iv) the necessary of there being an existing entity whose good outweighs its evil (or the necessity of little evil to perceive the good), (v) matter as the origin of evils, (vi) the necessity of evil for the realization of the good, (vii) the necessity of evil for perceiving the good, (viii) evil as what results from an atomistic view of the world, (ix) evil as existing only from the human perspective, and (x) evil as existing as a result of human free will. From the perspective of modern philosophy of religion, discourse criticisms were raised against the traditional apologetics and theodicies, which include Islamic philosophy as well. The criticisms include the following: (a) with respect to the proponent of the apologetics and theodicy: theoretical, subjective, and non-historical, (b) with respect to the nature of evils: abstract, essentialist, observer-related, and second-order, (c) with respect to the language of the apologetics and theodicy: non-tragic, (d) with respect to the practice of apologetics and theodicy: looking for professionalization and systematization. The present research considers the replies to the problem of evil offered by ʿAllama Tabatabaʾi and Ayatollah Motahhari, and analyzes and asses the above criticisms.

Method of the Research: 

The present research adopts a descriptive-analytic and critical method to consider the replies to the problem of evil offered in contemporary Islamic philosophy (ʿAllama Tabatabaʾi and Ayatollah Motahhari) as well as criticisms raised against them. It then deals with an analysis and elucidation of discourse criticisms of their replies from the perspective of modern philosophy of religion. Finally, it evaluates their criticisms and the extent to which they apply to the replies provided by ʿAllama Tabatabaʾi and Ayatollah Motahhari. Moreover, it offers suggestions and solutions to revise or supplement their apologetics.

Islamic apologetics, particularly those of ʿAllama Tabatabaʾi and Ayatollah Motahhari, tend to adopt a subjective-theoretical approach. However, if we say that apologetics have practical commitments or approaches as well, then a particular approach will follow from such an interaction between theory and practice (theoretical and practical reason), which in addition to dealing with theoretical problems, will address the versions that are more specifically focused on practical concerns and solutions to the practical problems of evil. Moreover, the apologetics provided by Tabatabaʾi and Motahhari are subjective and are often focused on eliminating the feeling of evil in the subject’s mind. In this way, social and objective categorizations of the object will be warded off. Furthermore, their apologetics are non-historical, which might undermine their efficiency and might not deploy any social or political act. Evil is something non-conceptual, non-absolute, varied, and situation-dependent. For this reason, we need to think of providing practical, objective, and historical apologetics.Allama Tabatabaʾi’s and Ayatollah Motahhari’s apologetics tend to be abstract and conceptual, rather than objective. They justify the evils not individually, but abstractly. That is, they do not engage much with objective evils and the realities of evil in time and place and its victims or agents. In this perspective, evil is no longer a problem that needs a solution. Moreover, their apologetics make a universal, static, and common essence for evil. However, evil is indeed situation-dependent, temporal, spatial, and highly varied. It thus seems that apologetics overcome the concept or ghost of evil, rather than the real evil. Further, apologetics are often observer-relative; that is, the ways in which theologians encountered the narratives of suffering and pains come down to the theological question(s) they give importance to. Such pictures, positions, and perspective demarcate the boundary and form a logical space within which people seek their replies. In addition, proponents of the apologetics use a second-order language, in the sense that they theorize about evils, and evil is described by philosophers and theologians, while the narratives and language of victims are first-order languages that can serve as models and might be inspiring, and in fact, effective novel replies may come out of their narratives. For this reason, we need to create a discourse that can collapse the prevalent discourse and be concrete, objective, non-essentialist, and non-absolute.The apologetics offered by ʿAllama Tabatabaʾi and Ayatollah Motahhari avoid the tragic emotional language and are solely focused on eliminating logical inconsistencies. Apologetics can reply to the subjective and emotional problem of evil and at the same time sympathize, give consolations, and give meaning to the suffering so that they might not only be concerned with solving the theological and philosophical problem of evil, but also be concerned with solving the human problem of evil.The apologetics or theodicy of ʿAllama Tabatabaʾi and Ayatollah Motahhari tend to be a profession, chiefly focused on providing an intellectual system consistent with other elements of theology or philosophy. With mere focus on professionalization and systematization of apologetics and making theories about evil consistent with other philosophical and theological sections, apologetics might turn into a purely theoretical exercise and deviate from its goal of providing an answer to the person in pain and solving the problem of evil for the object. Furthermore, it hinders creative unproblematic answers, or those with a practical, objective, historical, concrete, structural, victim-centered, first-order, and tragic approach. Apologetics can have more liberal discourses with respect to philosophical and theological systems.

 An overview of the replies offered by ʿAllama Tabatabaʾi and Ayatollah Motahhari, and a consideration of the above criticisms, require a reform, supplementation, invention, and presentation of new varieties of apologetics in Islamic philosophy, which particularly takes account of the practical dimension of evil as well. In that case, apologetics will be more responsive, more efficient, and more virtuous, and will face fewer criticisms and objections. On the other hand, apologetics should be consistent and compatible with the data from the religious tradition on which the apologetics is based and with the data about the world. Accordingly, in formulating and constructing theories, it is illuminating to consider the data from the transmitted tradition, reason, and experience at the same time.