نشریه حکمت سینوی
پیاپی 68 (پاییز و زمستان 1401)

In both of his logical books, Qisṭās al-afkār</em> and its self-commentary Sharḥ al-Qisṭās</em>, Shams al-Dīn Samarqandī presents two versions of mixed ḥaqīqī-khārijī syllogisms. In previous papers, we discussed these two versions and demonstrated that both contain numerous errors. As a result, neither version provides a correct and comprehensive analysis of mixed ḥaqīqī-khārijī syllogisms. In this paper, we aim to present the accurate conclusions of mixed syllogisms. By adhering to the principles accepted by Arabic logicians, including Samarqandī, our version should be beyond objection and can be considered a wholly correct interpretation of mixed ḥaqīqī-khārijī syllogisms. We will examine the khārijī-ḥaqīqī and ḥaqīqī-khārijī mixes separately within each of the four traditional figures of syllogism. We will determine the sterile and productive mood-mixes on a case-by-case basis and elucidate the true conclusions of each productive mood-mix individually. The systematic study of counterexamples for the sterile mood-mixes will be deferred to future research.

Due to its crucial role in acquiring knowledge, sense perception and its philosophical foundations have consistently been among the major topics in the history of philosophy. Avicenna, as a peripatetic (Aristotelian) Muslim philosopher, dedicated special attention to this problem. He advocated the unity of the soul despite the separation and multiplicity of the soul’s functional powers, leading him to posit an interaction or correlation between sensory and intellectual faculties. In the modern era, characterized by an emphasis on reason (intellect) and a perceived separation between reason and experience, Leibniz took a different approach. Drawing on his extensive knowledge of scholastic and ancient philosophers, he sought to reconcile elements of both old and new philosophies in forming his metaphysics. He based his metaphysical framework on select principles from Aristotelian logic but developed a unique theory regarding the unity of sensory and rational faculties. This paper aims to examine and compare these two philosophical viewpoints. Both philosophers held that it is impossible to fully grasp the truth of sensible objects, as knowledge is limited to understanding the properties and accidents of objects rather than their true nature. However, they diverged in their philosophical thinking, rooted in their respective worldviews and their stances on unity and plurality. Consequently, they both acknowledged the necessity of sense perception and the experimental method in acquiring knowledge, while simultaneously emphasizing the importance of reason and rational methods.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the emergence of the concept of the ‘political man’ in Avicenna’s political thought. We seek to understand how Avicenna approached politics and the role of humanity in public life. Avicenna’s ideal city is constructed upon the foundation of key concepts such as tradition, justice, law, and public consensus, all of which are intricately connected to the supreme world. According to Avicenna, the ideal city serves as the manifestation of supreme knowledge, with the political man playing a dynamic and constructive role within it. Avicenna lived during a time of crisis in the Caliphate, which prompted him to engage deeply with political philosophy. At this juncture, Iranians were in revolt, distanced from the Caliphate, and actively seeking a political alternative. This historical context should be viewed as both a theoretical and practical endeavor. This paper delves into Avicenna’s contribution to this significant political event. In Avicenna’s philosophy, concepts like politics, the city, and the political man, like many others, are comprehensible and recognizable within the framework of the Prophet’s Revelation. Thus, this paper explores the formation of the city, the emergence of its structures, the actions of its rulers, and the role and political presence of its citizens from Avicenna’s perspective.

According to Ibn Sina, knowledge occurs when the perceiver acquires the intellectual form of the perceived object. The perception of the material depends on the abstraction of these intellectual forms. Perception, based on the degree to which the perceptual form is abstracted from its material components, is divided into sensory, imaginary, and intellectual categories. Ibn Sina views the human soul as inherently intellectual, with its primary function being the acquisition of intellectual knowledge. Other types of perception are considered material and exist within the soul only through its connection to the body. Reasoning has a close connection with the active intellect (al-ʿaql al-faʿʿāl</em>), which serves as the catalyst for the emergence of intellectual forms and the intellectualization of the perceiver. In current interpretations of Ibn Sina's work, abstraction is deemed a necessary condition for intellectual knowledge, and it plays an essential role in the process of acquiring intellectual knowledge. Nevertheless, there are instances in his work where intellectual knowledge is achieved without abstraction, solely through a connection (ittiṣāl) to the active intellect.

Rajab Ali Tabrizi is considered the third systematic philosopher in the Isfahan School of Philosophy, following in the footsteps of Mirdamad and MollaSadra. He founded a New-Peripatetic school by offering a fresh interpretation of key Peripatetic ideas and reevaluating their terminology. Tabrizi engaged deeply with the pressing philosophical issues of his time, particularly the crucial matter of ‘the relationship between existence and quiddity.’ He challenged the viewpoints of MollaSadra and Mirdamad, relying on his unique understanding of ‘quiddity qua quiddity’ and ‘descriptive existence.’ Tabrizi rejected the notion of considering any pair of existence and quiddity as unoriginal, advocating for the generation of quiddity in the presentation of existence. According to his perspective, this approach resulted in the concrete combination of things from both existence and quiddity. Given that this idea has not been sufficiently elucidated in the limited contemporary research on the subject, this article aims to clarify the ambiguities surrounding Tabrizi’s theory. We do this by exploring the philosophical roots of Tabrizi’s perspective within the context of Avicenna’s philosophy and conducting a detailed analysis of the foundational principles underpinning his views on this contentious issue. To achieve this goal, we will address questions that arise, such as the relationship between the principle of subordination and the external presentation of existence on the quiddity. Additionally, we will explore the use of ‘principal and subsidiary’ instead of ‘original and unoriginal’ terminology by Tabrizi’s students. Finally, the research will conclude by aligning the general, specific, and special meanings of the complementary concepts of ‘originality’ and ‘unoriginality’ with Tabrizi’s stance on existence and quiddity.

Avicenna is renowned as a rational philosopher, often regarded as the leader of peripatetic scholars. In addition to his philosophical acclaim, he was a skilled physician. Moreover, he held noteworthy views in mysticism and theology. This research aims to delve into his theological perspectives using a descriptive-analytical approach, which involves investigating his writings and the views of his contemporaries. It becomes evident that Avicenna’s extensive body of work, his reputation as a peripatetic philosopher, and his strongly rationalistic approach, which extends beyond the confines of religion, pose challenges when examining his inter-religious and theological views. Despite his unwavering commitment to his philosophical methodology and propositions, Avicenna did adopt certain conspicuous theological positions and religious approaches that extend beyond his philosophical thinking. This research seeks to explore the various dimensions of these theological and religious views comprehensively. It approaches Avicenna as a devoted Muslim philosopher, shedding light on this intriguing aspect of his intellectual legacy.

In Avicenna’s epistemological framework, knowledge is attainable solely through rational intuition, not mystical intuition. Avicenna emphasized intellectual knowledge and the connection to the active intellect, grounded in theoretical reason and rational intuition, as the ultimate aim of knowledge and happiness. However, Mulla Sadra posited that certain transcendent truths surpass the grasp of theoretical reason, necessitating intuition and innate knowledge beyond the bounds of reason. Scholars who advocate for Avicenna’s mystical tendencies can be divided into two groups: the first group, including traditionalists like Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Henry Corbin, and Gholamhossein Ebrahimi Dinani, consider Avicenna a pioneer of mystical thought within the Islamic philosophy tradition, following the footsteps of earlier Islamic, Iranian, and Eastern mystics. The second group comprises recent researchers who argue that Avicenna’s philosophy exhibits dual aspects. By examining his epistemological system and philosophical psychology, they seek to distinguish between the mystical and peripatetic facets of Avicenna's thought. In the upcoming discussion, we will compare Avicenna’s and Mulla Sadra’s perspectives on intuitive knowledge. It will become apparent that neither the claims of the first group nor those of the second group can be substantiated. Even if Avicenna mentioned mysticism in his works, his views consistently emanated from a rational perspective, and he remained firmly rooted in his peripatetic style throughout his philosophical journey.

The essence of cinema lies in its moving pictures, with the visual aspect holding particular significance. However, the human mind plays a distinct role in both the creation and perception of films. This is why some cinema theorists refer to it as ‘the art of the mind.’ By evoking the viewer's feelings and emotions, a film engages with their mind. Avicenna's perspective highlights that the perception of partial meanings triggers emotional responses in the audience, a function attributed to the estimative faculty within the human soul. In Avicenna's philosophical framework, the soul comprises various faculties, each contributing to the perception of films or the creation of cinematic scenes according to their specific functions. One such influential faculty is the imagination. Nevertheless, Avicenna's psychological insights underscore the vital role of the Estimative Faculty in the perception of films. The estimative faculty, as one of the soul's most crucial faculties, plays a significant role in both the creation and comprehension of films. Its functions include perceiving partial meanings and cognitive errors. As a result, the estimative faculty often prevails over other mental faculties when an audience engages with a film. This article investigates the role of the Estimative Faculty in perceiving partial meanings, cognitive errors, imitation of inner emotions, and rendering partial judgments within the context of cinema. To illustrate the impact of this faculty, we offer a focused analysis of the horror genre and the school of expressionism in this regard.

Happiness is a fundamental topic in practical philosophy, captivating the minds of philosophers, from the ancient Greeks to the contemporary philosophers. Throughout history, philosophers have explored this concept from various philosophical perspectives. One of the most influential theories of happiness was developed by Aristotle in his renowned work, Nicomachean Ethics</em>. His theory had a profound impact on subsequent philosophers, including Muslim philosophers like Avicenna, who was heavily influenced by Aristotle’s ideas on happiness. Aristotle believed that human happiness is attained through a rational life enriched with moral virtues. Similarly, Avicenna regarded intellectual pleasure as the highest form of good and happiness and emphasized achieving happiness through reaching the level of acquired intellect and striving for likeness with the active intellect, and maintaining control of reason over bodily desires. In this paper, we employ a comparative approach to examine and analyze Aristotle and Avicenna’s theories of happiness. We aim to highlight both the similarities and differences in their perspectives, while also employing a critical perspective to identify weaknesses and shortcomings within each theory.

The concept of life is a contentious interdisciplinary issue that has intrigued scholars, with philosophers offering their perspectives. Avicenna is one of the first philosophers who delved into the fundamental problem of defining life in his works. Tawara as one of the few scholars who have paid attention to this matter in Avicenna’s philosophy, without considering the fundamental problem of the definition of life, has come to this conclusion that Avicenna initially defines life as nutrition and growth and as a result classifies plants as living beings. But, in the course of his intellectual evolution, by presenting another definition of life, identifying it with perception and voluntary movement, he deviates from this viewpoint and excludes plants from the living beings. Using conceptual and textual analysis, we critique Tawara's view on three fronts: an incomplete reading of Avicenna's texts, neglecting the fundamental problem of the definition of life, and the absence of historical evolution in Avicenna's perspective on life. Upon a broader examination of Avicenna's philosophical works, it becomes evident that Avicenna doesn’t propose just two definitions for life, as Tawara suggests. Instead, he presents five distinct definitions in his works. These definitions don't represent an evolutionary process but rather highlight the persistent challenge Avicenna faced throughout his intellectual journey in defining life.

Metempsychosis is the concept of the transmigration of a human or animal soul into another human, animal, plant, or even an inanimate object. The theory of metempsychosis poses a challenge to the belief in resurrection (Maʿād), making it necessary to reject metempsychosis before proving Maʿād. Avicenna presents two arguments against metempsychosis. The first argument, found in numerous works, rejects metempsychosis on the grounds that it requires the union of two souls within a single body. Avicenna alludes to the second argument in his Al-Isharat wa al-Tanbihat</em> but postpones its full explanation to another unspecified work. Nasir al-Din al-Tusi, Fakhr al-Din Razi, and Qutb al-Din Razi have proposed different interpretations of this second argument. The variations in interpretation revolve around the number of implications Avicenna expressed for this modus ponendo and his reasons for rejecting them. Among these interpretations, only Qutb al-Din Razi's aligns more closely with Avicenna's original words. In the other two interpretations, there are either deficiencies or excesses compared to Avicenna's work.

Human nature is inherently inclined towards seeking stable pleasures and alleviating pain and suffering. Many of our desires are rooted in these fundamental drives. In this study, we aim to elucidate and compare the perspectives of Islamic philosophers, particularly Avicenna and Allameh Tabatabai, about the pleasure and pain. We will begin by outlining their respective views on pleasure and suffering and subsequently identify both their commonalities and differences on these subjects. Taking a descriptive-comparative approach to their philosophies, we find that both philosophers regard pleasure and suffering as forms of perception, forming a crucial basis for their categorizations. However, they differ in their interpretations, with Avicenna considering pleasure and suffering as psychological qualities that are incidental to the soul, while Allameh Tabatabai views them as inherent aspects of the soul itself, or existential properties. Furthermore, distinctions emerge in their classifications, manifestations, and the ways of opposition between pleasure and pain.