مجله پژوهش های فقهی
سال نوزدهم شماره 3 (پاییز 1402)

The Art. 709 of IPC defines damigha as ''rapture of brain sac''. According to the law, the blood money for damigha, whether by injury or damage, is equivalent to ''a blood money for ma'muma plus to arsh of brain sac rapture''. Ma'muma is realized by the entrance of the crime tool into the skull that reaches just close to the brain sac but before it; here, the blood money is one-third of a full blood money. Now, if the brain sac is torn without any injury, which means the realization of damigha, then, there seems to be a legal problem in the legislation of art. 709 on the necessity of proving a ma'muma blood money as well as an arsh of brain sac rapture; because the principle of the proportionality of crime and punishment behooves the arsh of a brain sac rapture, not adding the ma'muma to it unless it is said that the addition of ma'muma to brain sac arsh is a tradition which makes it necessary to be followed under the title of determined blood money. Using a descriptive-analytic method of research, this study aims at proving that the legislation of damigha neither follows the principle of the proportionality of crime and punishment nor does it exist in the traditions as a crime with determined blood money. The elimination of the term damigha from law and leaving it to the laws related to undermined blood money crimes is the result of the present research.

The statutes governing the relationship between the lessor and lessee concerning protecting the rights of lessees of commercial properties remain silent in their presupposition of dissipation and detriment. Whereas the legislature has failed to delineate the right to conduct business, trade, and goodwill in the event of loss suffered by a business entity due to accidents or waste caused by the fault of a landlord or third party, henceforth, concerning the aforementioned matter, the prosecutors are not confronted with the principle of the unity of judicial procedure. In order to fill the gap in the legislative-judicial system of Iran, establishing the institution of "real representation" makes it possible to protect property rights in the case of its loss through transferring the rights to the replaced property. The purpose of the ensuing article is to elucidate the legal stance of the real representative entity in safeguarding the rights of the lessee. This article employs a descriptive-analytical methodology that relies on the examination of documents and library data. According to the findings of this study, representation in Iranian law has been established based on personal representation. However instances of real representation can be found in certain jurisprudential and legal documents such as lease agreements, mortgages, endowments, insurances, and the like. The present article undertakes an analysis of the feasibility of achieving real representation in the lessor-lessee relationship. The two fundamental prerequisites for the real representative entity, which safeguards the rights of lessees in the event of commercial premises loss or destruction, as well as contract dissolution, are "the presence of a legitimate right that is subject to decay" and "the ability to transfer the right to the replaced property". These conditions apply to both contractual and legal (compulsory) forms. The aforementioned measure serves to impede the termination of the lease agreement and its resultant consequence, namely, the expulsion of the lessee from the commercial premises.

Keeping the soul healthy has been one of the ancient goals of mankind along history, and its necessity has also been emphasized in religion. One of the ancient therapeutic methods approved by Shari'a is hijāma (cupping). In addition to encouraging cupping, some of its rulings have been stated in many traditions which jurists and hadith commentators disagree on their clarification in detail. Using a descriptive-analytical method, this article has investigated the position of cupping therapy and the quality of the cupping therapist (hājim)’s guarantee. In addition, it analyzed jurisprudential views in these two areas. To solve the problem of incapability of two opposed groups of narrations, in which some condemn cupping while others encourage it, it is concluded that the reason for the condemnation is the possibility of blood getting on the cloth and body of the cupping therapist and the health conditions of the past, so that, like other professions, it is basically permitted (mubāh). Regarding the hājim’s guarantee, if his mistake causes injury to life or limb, it is obligatory to pay the blood money (dīyi). If it is intentional, retribution (qisās) is the basic ruling, and in the case where it is not possible to match the retribution, or in case of the request of the mahjūm (person who was cupped) or his legal avenger of blood, the payment of blood money is obligatory.

The economy section of the constitution of Islamic Republic of Iran requires that the system of banking, as the heart of economy of the country, be changed.  Therefore, the law of "interest-free banking operation" was passed in 1983 and as for the law it gained a new form by mobilizing and allocating resources. It is hoped that establishment of a correct banking and monetary system can cause proper economy growth, removal of poverty and unemployment, curbing inflation, booming capital market, and decreasing money market. And it can show a successful pattern of interest-free economy measures in the modern world. A less complicated evaluation of the performance of the banking system indicates that unfortunately it could not practically achieve the expected aims stipulated in the law. What is the problem? Whether the executive regulations are not in harmony with the law, or the sample contracts based on regulations are not in agreement with the law or other laws are not in harmony with this law. After good studies and researches, a complementary plan is proposed by the honorable representatives of the tenth Islamic Parliament to replace it. Can this plan remove its possible shortcomings and complete its advantages? The considered supervisory authority can resolve problems. The Present article discusses the above-mentioned matters. In addition, this issue has been delayed for a while. Now that the plan is to be passed, it sounds that a number of shortcomings are removed and by the prevision of the supervisory authority and the new capabilities, the problem is removed which will be discussed in another time.

Today, in many contracts, the contractual obligee seeks help of a third party to fulfill all or part of his obligation. The question that is raised here is that when the obligee to the contract seeks help of another person to fulfill the obligation, what is the responsibility of the obligee to the initial contract as a result of the claim of damage by a third party? As a basic rule, the claim of damage by a third party will not create responsibility for the obligee unless the responsibility is explicitly or implicitly stipulated on the obligee. A part of this article reviews the narrative of Zorarah and Abi Basir regarding the issue. By taking the criteria from this narrative, it can be concluded that the contractual obligee is responsible for the damage sustained by the first obligee caused by the third party due to the implied condition of guaranteeing the damage.

It has been proved that artificial insemination of a woman with her husband's sperm during their lifetime is permissible in accordance with the Shari'a. However, is it also permissible for a woman to be artificially inseminated with her husband's sperm after his death? The answer to this question is based on determining the scope of the marriage; in other words, is the scope of marriage specific to the time of the couple's life and with the death of one, the marriage bond is terminated, or continues after death? Insemination is not allowed if the marriage bond is dissolved and it is allowed if it remains. This issue has not been discussed independently in jurisprudential books, but the ruling can be obtained from the narrations included in chapters such as taghsil and takfin of the wife. Using a descriptive-analytical method, this research studies the ijtihad of arguments and critique of opinions. The study finds that the evidence for the survival of the marital bond after the death of one of the spouses is stronger, so there is no problem in artificial insemination of the wife with the sperm of her deceased husband, unless based on the evidences that necessitate precaution of fruj and i'raz, it is ruled that the permission should not be generalized. Meanwhile, the requirement of the principle in the above-mentioned assumption, is the absence of a marital relationship and the presumed continuity of the marriage bond is also canceled.