فصلنامه تاریخ فلسفه
سال سیزدهم شماره 4 (پیاپی 52، بهار 1402)

Empedocles’ philosophy is conceived as the campaign of a number of hostile forces that are continually in conflict with each other. The traditional view of, for example, ancient dualists is that sometimes strife and sometimes love gain victory in the Empedoclean world. Orthodox thinkers and revisionists did their best to contradict each other. one group believed that these two forces are repulsive, and the other believed that they are attractive. In this paper, it has been tried to reconstruct the internal logic of Empedocles’ poetry in a new way by dealing with the concept of vortex (δίνղ), which both methods of interpretation have ignored. In line with this purpose, in addition to examining the literary logic of the poetry itself, the authors have dealt with the background and consequences of his thoughts before and after him while taking the Aristotelean background of his philosophy into account. Therefore, they initially focus on the point that, in order to understand the nature of motion in Empedocles’ view, one must distance oneself from Aristotelean philosophy. Then they explain the nature of this kind of motion, and finally conclude that vortex is in fact a function that preserves the integration of the one and the plural. This is the same idea that Greek philosophy studied in different ways and considered it as the eternal and pre-eternal motion of the world, the survival of which depends on such a motion. Empedocles highlighted this point by posing the concept of δίνղ.

Death as one of the most definite and certain events in human life has always attracted the attention of numerous thinkers. Modern philosophers have shown special attention to it particularly in their discussion of the meaning of life. Abul-ḥassan al-‘Āmirī is one of the thinkers in the Islamic tradition whose view of death is of great historical significance. ‘Āmirī mainly pays attention to death while focusing on sensory soul and defines death as the annihilation and separation of sensory soul from the body. He considers sensory soul as the link between the soul (as an immaterial thing) and body (as a material thing) that is annihilated along with the body at the time of death. However, the rational soul is not destroyed. It can be said that ‘Āmirī had a medical approach to the problem of death and was influenced by religious texts at the same time. From the philosophical and religious aspect, ‘Āmirī rejected the M‘utazilites’ view of death and used the term nuz’ (dying) in order to provide a more profound concept and understanding of death. He also presents some arguments for the immortality of the soul and, at the same time, benefits from the concept of “vision” and its different types for a better perception of death. He believes that fear of death is one of the obstacles to a deep understanding of death and maintains that the attention to the necessary joys of life and luminous world and a change of view of death are critical for a more accurate encounter with this issue. One of the weak points of ‘Āmirī’s discussion of death could be lack of a focus on different types of death, particularly voluntary death.

Fārābī, the renowned Iranian philosopher, is one of the central figures of Peripatetic philosophy in the world of Islam. The collection of his thoughts travelled beyond Islamic borders to Asian, Europe and Africa posthumously and influenced the scientific fields of Jewish, Christian, and other non-Islamic lands. The thoughts of Fārābī and two other prominent figures of this school of philosophy, Ibn Sīnā and Ibn Rushd, exercised an undeniable impact on the development of the higher scientific centers of Europe of the 13-15 centuries (AD). In fact, without considering their role in the formation of the first European universities, especially the university of Paris and the process of establishing the faculty of philosophy during the conflict between the two faculties of theology and art, one cannot attain a true knowledge of the reasons behind the development and expansion of the first European universities. Relying on valid historical documents and reports, this paper explains this influential process and, at the same time, portrays one of the routes of the transfer of Muslims’ culture and philosophical thoughts to Europe and the quality of the formation of the institution of university during that time.

Time is one of the most important features of the world of matter, and the knowledge of which has always attracted the attention of philosophers. The simplicity of perception of time and the difficulty of its explanation have resulted in some disagreements among philosophers concerning its definition. Islamic philosophers are no exception in this regard, and the roots of their disagreements go back to Plato’s and Aristotle’s different definitions of time. Plato defined time as a self-subsistent and essentially independent substance that is a differentiated form of the world of Ideas. In Aristotle’s view, time represents the number of motion from its priority and posteriority aspects, which cannot be gathered with each other. While acknowledging the difference between these two definitions, Islamic philosophers have usually chosen one of these definitions and tried to respond to the suspicions about their selected definition and reject the arguments in favor of the opposing one. Some philosophers such as Ibn Rushd, Ibn Sīnā, and Suhrawardī adopted Aristotle’s definition, while Zakarīyyā Rāzī and Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī advocated Plato’s definition. Nevertheless, no effort as to demonstrating the contrast between Aristotelean and Platonic definitions of time is justified because both philosophers believe that although time is different from motion, their existences are inseparable from each other. In other words, the perception of one depends on the perception of the other. accordingly, the present paper, while clarifying Plato’s view, initially intends to explain that it is not in contrast to Aristotle’s view and, secondly, aims to demonstrate the effects of their view on those of Muslim philosophers.

The history of philosophy in China has always possessed some ethical and political roots since the time of its emergence and in the process of its evolution and development. One of the common features of all Chinese political philosophers, in spite of all their theoretical differences, is their belief in the dependence of the value of government and rulership on its moral and ethical status and prestige. In this way, they tried to access moral principles in order to obligate the Chinese to conform to an Ideal government. Accordingly, while acknowledging the linguistic and semantic ambiguities of authorities’ different theories, the present study investigated the problem of the nature of political ethics and its relationship with government in Chinese political philosophy (with an emphasis on ancient China) following a comparative method. Here, the author proposes the hypothesis that, despite some shared general viewpoints, there are various approaches to the whatness and quality of political ethics and its relationship with government and its duties and moral-political responsibilities. The differences between approaches can be studied in relation to ontology, epistemology, and anthropology, on the one hand, and in relation to the relationship between ethics and politics, nature of government, and legitimacy and duties of government, on the other hand. For example, regarding the problem of the nature of government, Laozi, Yang Zǐ, and Tsung Zǐ, who are Taoists, criticize the government and consider it a kind of unnecessary evil that has no function except for increasing the complexity and adversity of affairs. Therefore, they vote for a minority government, advocate the absence of a dominant central government, and prescribe a conformity between Man’s political conformity with a decentralized government. By contrast, Confucius, Mensius, Tung Chung-su, Han Fei Zǐ, and Chu His consider the government to be a necessary good with major ethical-political duties.

The present study provides a description and analysis of the historical development of the notion of Aristotelean-Platonic agape (love) in the philosophical thoughts of Fārābī and Khwājah Nasīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī. Following a historical method, the author deals with the reasons behind this development in addition to describing it. The discussion of friendship (agape) in Aristotle’s philosophy is propounded in his Nichomachean Ethics, where some traces of Platonic notion are also observable. This discussion was transformed in Islamic Philosophy in certain respects, including the variety of the beloved (and the most beloved), individualistic or socialist aspect, and selfishness or selflessness aspect. Regarding the variety of the beloved, the discussion has moved from virtue-based friendship (agape) to the love of the Wise (God). As to its range, one can observe a change of dialog form social-political friendship to agape as an internal characteristic with individual and social effects. Moreover, it has moved beyond selfishness and selflessness and, in conformity with the principle of congruence, reached the love from Him (Godly). The influential views of such thinkers as Plotinus; the role of religion, culture, and gnosis, and the ideas of Ibn Sīnā, Ibn Miskawayh, and Suhrawardī are of great importance in explaining this development. The particular philosophical and Kalāmī principles of Fārābī and Ṭūsī as well as some of their ethical views are the most important factors in the interpretation of the underlying reasons of the mentioned development.

The present paper deals with a comparative study of the views of Plotinus and Ibn Sīnā regarding evil. In spite of the existing differences concerning this problem in their philosophies, there are also some similarities, and Ibn Sīnā is influenced by Plotinus with respect to his response to the problem of evil. Among the similarities between them in this area, one can refer to the self-evident nature of the existence of evil, exclusivity of the realization of evil to the world of matter and the impossibility of its realization in the immaterial world, and the non-existence nature of evil and good nature of all beings based on a general view of the world. However, unlike Plotinus, Ibn Sīnā does not consider matter as being essentially evil and non-existential. Rather, he maintains that matter is a correlative, analogical, and existential thing. Plotinus views the relationship between good and evil of the type of opposition, while Ibn Sīnā sees it as a non-existential and habitual one. Moreover, according to Plotinus, matter or the same essentially evil thing is created from the particular spirit. Nevertheless, Ibn Sīnā argues that the essential possibility of the Active intellect causes the emanation of matter, and its otherness necessity aspect results in the emanation of form, on which evil sometimes occurs to.