فصلنامه تاریخ فلسفه
سال چهاردهم شماره 1 (پیاپی 53، تابستان 1402)

The discussion of the meaning and existence of philosophy in the East is considered to be an introduction to any exchange of thought and agreement between the East and the West. Ritchie, the Christian missionary, wrote a book entitled Confucius: The Chinese Philosopher and introduced his thoughts to the West for the first time. Later and under his influence, Leibniz and Christian Wolf not only acknowledged the certain existence of philosophy in the East, particularly in China, but also believed that it could be used to remove the existing problems in Western philosophy and theology. However, Kant initiated a racist approach in this regard that dealt with other philosophies from a higher position and questioned the very essence of philosophy in the East altogether. This Europe-centered view entered a new era in the West with Hegel, whose view of eastern philosophy was humiliating and hierarchical. Unlike him, Deussen, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Husserl, Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and many other Western thinkers benefitted from the vast philosophy of the East. Generally speaking, it can be said that denying or doubting the legitimacy of Eastern philosophy on the part of some Westerners lacks logical support and is mainly rooted in their nationalist feelings. The reaction of Eastern thinkers in this regard is also noteworthy. Some of them complain that Western philosophers do not appreciate Eastern philosophy as much as it truly deserves and do not use it in order to solve the crises that contemporary Man encounters. However, some others, in line with Westerners but with a different motive, refuse to apply the word philosophy to their ancient legacy in order to protect its originality and safeguard against its mixture with Western philosophy.

Philosophers have presented different views about the whatness and truth of the soul based on dualism (immateriality of the soul based on the pre-eternity and origination of the soul before the existence of the body or along with it) or monism (corporeal origination of the soul). Mullā Ṣadrā believes that the soul is corporeally originated. The principles of the Transcendent Philosophy, including the trans-substantial motion, the principiality and gradedness of being, and the corporeal origination of the soul, have made it possible to demonstrate corporeal resurrection. Aristotle also believes that the origination of the soul is corporeal. However, the extent to which Mullā Ṣadrā is influenced by Aristotle’s ideas in this regard has never been studied so far. This paper is intended to explain the Aristotelean roots of Mullā Ṣadrā’s discussion of corporeal origination following a comparative-analytic method. The findings of this study indicate that in defining the soul as a “natural and organic body” and, following it, considering the soul as a formal substance and a primary perfection of the body, as well as believing in the unitary synthesis of the body and the soul and the unity of the faculties of the soul, all indicating the corporeal origination of the soul, Mullā Ṣadrā is under the influence of Aristotle. Nevertheless, Aristotle’s approach suffers from some ambiguity because of the existing implicitness in some of his words and not referring to an explicit standpoint regarding the principiality of existence or quiddity, presence of motion in substance, and gradedness of existence.

Generally speaking, Kant’s academic life is divided into two pre-critical and post-critical periods. Some researchers have explored the historical development and evolution of his philosophical thoughts and divided the critical period into two parts as well. An explanation of Kant’s view of the problem of evil, given the difference in the subtle view that is witnessed in his works published in the early and late critical period, portrays the process of the formation of his philosophical structure in this regard. Related studies in this field reveal his gradual distance from the theoretical knowledge of God and, thus, his theological response to the problem of evil, which reached its culmination towards the end of the critical period. The principle of “freedom”, which is one of the postulates of ethics in Kant’s critical thoughts, is the axis of the justification of moral evil in his works, particularly during the later critical period. Following a descriptive-analytic method, the present study investigates Kant’s view of the problem of evil during two critical periods. In the early critical period, he confirmed the theory of the “best possible world”, while equating the concept of “perfection” with the concept of “reality” therein. However, in the late critical period, he moves away from the common definition of “evil and good” and presents a new response to the dilemma of evil through denying the legitimacy of philosophical theodicies. During the critical period, Kant viewed evil as an essential feature of Man and denied the traditional and Stoic interpretation of the temporal and rational origins of evil in human nature.

The Qajar Period is of great significance in contemporary history of Iran from different aspects, particularly cultural and scientific ones. On the one hand, during this period Islamic philosophy and wisdom came to fruition in the new capital city with the establishment of Tehran’s philosophical school, and the beginning of cultural change and rationalism in this city resulted in its scientific and cultural flourishing. On the other hand, this period marked the commencement of cultural relationships with modern Europe and introduction of modern Western philosophy to Iran through the translation of educational and political texts and books. However, this event was not taken seriously by either masters and researchers of Islamic philosophy or intellectuals and did not lead to a serious philosophical challenge during this period. Using a descriptive-analytic method entailing library research and document analysis, this study investigates two main approaches to modern Western Philosophy, modernist and kalami, in Qajar Period. The focus of this paper is on the encounter of masters of Islamic philosophy with modern Western philosophy. The findings indicate the lack of a serious attention to this philosophy in the traditional field of Islamic philosophy, particularly in Tehran School and lack of any interaction with it on the part of philosophers, teachers, and researchers engaged in Islamic philosophy. Here, while criticizing this encounter and investigating its various cultural, social, and epistemological reasons, the author suggests a dialog and interaction with modern philosophy instead of banishing and ignoring it.

Since the coinage of the term “comparative philosophy” several views have been propounded concerning its whatness, principles, and function. Some thinkers emphasize the end of comparative philosophy, and some others insist on its significance and necessity. There are still others who advocate the beginning of some basic changes in this school from Europe-centeredness to interaction and dialog with others. However, the word “end” has different meanings the investigation of which could lead to three main meanings and referents for it: 1) essential impossibility: the followers of this theory believe that comparative philosophy suffers from an important defect called “impossibility in essence” because of its internal problems and shortages and should not have been formed at all; 2) appearance of all possibilities and actualization of all potencies and abilities, which emphasizes the principle of progress and perfection; 3) end of the past and a new beginning. Following an analytic-descriptive method and relying on Steven Burik’s viewpoint, the present study investigates and evaluates the theory of the end of comparative philosophy based on these three meanings. Apparently, what opponents of comparative philosophy emphasize is end in the first sense because they believe that this kind of philosophy has become “Europe-centered” and cannot enter any dialog or interaction with other scientific traditions and systems. Accordingly, it conceptually enjoys a kind of essential impossibility. Nevertheless, unlike the opponents, Burik believes that comparative philosophy is necessary for stopping the East’s isolation and the growth of Europe-centeredness. Through adopting a critical approach to the “previous comparative philosophy” because of its Europe-centeredness, he pays attention to the “future comparative philosophy”, which bears two responsibilities: 1) maintaining various methods of thinking and 2) facilitating the relationship between these methods without reducing one to another.

Imagination is one of the human perceptive faculties that is shared with animals. This concept, which has been transferred from Greek philosophy to Muslims’ philosophical tradition, has always been a very important problem with various functions in the self-knowledge of Muslim philosophers from Fārābī to Mullā Ṣadrā. It has even been used in responding to some kalāmī inquiries. Since the very beginning, Muslim philosophers have continuously devoted some of their studies to the investigation and explanation of the whatness and howness of the concept of imagination. However, this concept has not remained immune against change and has developed a distinct meaning in each philosophical system. In the history of Islamic philosophy, the three-fold schools of philosophy (Peripatetic philosophy, Illuminationist philosophy, and the Transcendent Philosophy) have each adopted a particular and different approach to this problem. The present study intends to examine the theories of some great figures of Islamic philosophy regarding the whatness of the faculty of imagination and reveal the existing differences among them. The findings indicate that philosophers’ views of the concept of imagination have not been fixed and similar in the course of history, and each has presented a specific and innovative explanation of this concept in conformity with their own philosophical system. For example, Fārābī considered this faculty to be a material component of the soul, while Mullā Ṣadrā changed it into the world of Ideas. This study was conducted following a descriptive-comparative method using library resources.

Aristotle’s theory of moral responsibility, as a pioneer theory of ethics of virtue, presents a new approach to responsibility because of its particular attention to moral conduct. Aquinas, a follower of Aristotle, has provided a new interpretation of moral responsibility with an emphasis on character and a focus on completely voluntary human acts and the role of apriori reflection on act. In the views of these two philosophers, moral agent is an agent who possesses knowledge, personality vice, and the ability to perform completely voluntary acts. Accordingly, children and animals are never subjected to moral evaluations because they lack such moral capacities and characters. Aristotle and Aquinas believe that the realm of moral agents, in addition to evil and virtuous people, includes restrained and non-restrained ones. Following a descriptive-analytic method, the present paper investigates the conditions under which the acts of moral agents are subjected to ethical evaluations in the views of Aristotle and Aquinas. Based on the findings of this study, those acts that become the subjects of moral responsibility must be done voluntarily based on the moral character of the agent as a non-accidental stimulus for act, even if they do not originate in deliberation and are not based on prior decision making. This is because sudden acts also originate in certain sources and function as clear references for moral evaluations.