نشریه اندیشه فلسفی
پیاپی 12 (پاییز 1402)

Theologians believe that the creatures exist based on the activity of the oneness god. But before that, we can ask “Why are creatures possible?”. Brian Leftow has criticized the traditional responses that maintain possible objects are possible due to knowledge of god. God knows the apple, so the apple is possible. It is not a satisfactory response for Leftow, because the essence of God does not need this possibility. Whether the apple is possible or not, God is the God. Also, it seems that the possibility of any creature is necessary. Leftow maintains that this necessity is not written in the essence of God but instead depends on God’s thinking and voluntary creation in his mind. God is the author not just of created reality, but of its vocabulary. This paper explains Leftow’s theory and then criticizes its idea depending on the perfect being theology that Leftow has accepted.

According to Some Ṣadrian researchers, Suhrawardī confuses philosophical secondary intelligibles with logical ones and rejects the idea that philosophical concepts are attributes of external objects. The main supporting evidence for this claim could be divided into two categories; A) Suhrawardī’s assertions that philosophical attributes are mental, and B) his assertions that the mind ascribes philosophical attributes to external beings. But first, the evidence is not sufficient to prove their claim, and second, there is clear evidence against it. Ṣadrā himself accuses Surawardī of confusing the two types of intelligibles in another way. He reads one of Surawardī’s statements as claiming that logical attributes like “particularity” are attributes of objective beings. This objection is also unfounded since Suhrawardī employs “particularity” in a different sense referring to a philosophical concept in that context. Therefore, Suhrawardī does not confuse the two types of secondary intelligibles, in either of the two mentioned senses.

The aporia of causal necessity can be defined by looking at the dilemma of (1) the permanent, logical, and metaphysical concomitance of necessity and causation, or (2) the negation of one without the negation of the other, and in fact, the denial of the permanent concomitance of necessity and causation. This Aristotelian doctrine that everything has a cause cannot necessarily be a logical and philosophical result of determinism, the negation of the possibility of the future, and the collapse of potentiality into actuality. Necessity is the description of the causality that occurred in the context of the current reality of the present and the past, not the causality that occurs in the future. It is possible not to consider this meaning of necessity as requiring determinism and the principle of causality. In fact, the operator and the logical and metaphysical modality of causality is the actual reality of necessity, which is not always coextensive with determinism. By ignoring the final cause, Democritus reduces all the actions of nature to necessity. The reductionism resulting from the denial of the teleology of the world is a characteristic feature of Democritean mechanical necessitism.

The issue of "Bildung" has been considered more than anyone else in Hegel's philosophical thought. He has focused more on this issue in the Phenomenology of the Spirit and Elements of the Philosophy of Right books, and the Nuremberg Speeches. In this article, two central points in Hegel's thought have been emphasized: a) the necessity of distinguishing between different types of "theological-ethical", "natural-anthropological", "political" Bildung, and finally the Hegelian "cultural-historical" Bildung; And then removing the accusation from the Hegelian system, about trying to remove God and the theological view from the Bildung concept; b) Proving that, according to Hegel, the process of education includes "nature", "individual" and "human society" at the same time, and contrary to popular opinion, it will not be limited to the human individual. Therefore, when discussing awareness, freedom, alienation, and the like, he actually explains the formation of education in these three fields.

What is called language? In the history of Western philosophy, we have different answers to this question. However, according to Wittgenstein and Gadamer, these different answers are basically similar, and both criticize this basic approach. Gadamer refers to the history of Western philosophy as the history of forgetfulness of language. But he regards Augustine as an exception in this history; for Gadamer, Augustine has appreciated the central status of language and the vital relation between language and thought through his idea of the inner word. However, Wittgenstein introduces Augustine as the main agent of the basic approach of Western philosophy to language, raising his criticisms of this basic approach by objecting to Augustine's claims. In this article, I review these two different interpretations and think about the possibility of making an affinity and compromise between Gadamer's narration of Augustine's idea of the inner word and Wittgenstein's philosophy of language.