نشریه غرب شناسی بنیادی
سال چهاردهم شماره 1 (پیاپی 27، بهار و تابستان 1402)

Discourse is verbal or written communication that has unity, meaning, and purpose. In linguistics, discourse refers to a unit of language that is longer than a sentence. When you analyze discourse, you examine how the language is used to construct connected and meaningful texts. One crucial thing that can’t be neglected when it comes to discourse is the context. In linguistics, there are different ways to classify contexts. Here is one such classification:Linguistic context: The relationship between the words, phrases, sentences, and paragraphs. For instance, the participants must know where they are in time and space. It affects the expressions they use and the way they are interpreted.
Situational context: The relationship between the participants, the environment, time, and place in which the discourse occurs. Situational context is usually approached through the concept of register, which focuses on the interrelationship of language and context.
Cultural context: The culture and customs of epoch in language communities in which the speakers participate. Language is closely connected to the social structure and value system of society. Therefore, it’s influenced by such factors as social role and status, sex, age, etc.

Feminist poststructuralist discourse analysis is a new and emerging theoretical perspective and methodological approach to discourse analysis studies. This approach is an approach for analyzing intertextual discourses in spoken interaction and other types of text that uses the poststructuralist principles of complexity, plurality, ambiguity, connection, recognition, diversity, textual mischief, function and transformation. The feminist point of view in the post-structuralist analysis of the discourse considers the gender distinction as the dominant discourse among competing discourses during the analysis of text types. Feminist poststructuralist analysis considers gender distinction as one of the most pervasive discourses among many cultures in terms of its organized power in distinguishing between people based on gender and sexual orientation (Baxter, 2003). This definition of FPDA is derived from the ideas of Bakhtin (1981) and poststructuralists such as Derrida (1987) and Foucault (1980). Also, this definition is inspired by the works of Walkerdin (1998) and Weeden (1997).
The principles of the method Self-reflectivity is one of the basic principles of the feminist post-structuralist approach to discourse analysis, which of course shares this principle with CA and CDA, which means that all three approaches are self-reflective regarding their expansion as "knowledge". Users of the FPDA approach should clarify their theoretical positions and specify the epistemological assumptions that are used in any discourse analysis.
Second, this approach requires self-reflectivity on the acquisition of technical vocabulary or "fundamental rhetoric". This means being aware that technical terms are not capable of describing objective realities in a non-problematic manner. Researchers constantly need to question the assumptions and knowledge that are placed in the form of "analytical terms".
Third, feminist poststructuralist analysis of the discourse requires self-awareness of the textuality of the research process and the phenomenon that every research includes a set of choices and authoring mechanisms. According to the post-structuralist perspective, all activities and searches for knowledge lead to the creation of a world and therefore, research itself is a discursive and fundamental construction.
The second basic principle is the constructive approach. The focus of feminist and poststructuralist analysis is the motivation to question things, to deconstruct the constructions and structures around us, although not in the nihilistic or relativistic sense that is sometimes stereotypically associated with deconstructionism, but in order to reveal the possibility of juxtaposition and interaction between established and new ideas.
The third basic principle in this approach is to find the focus of feminist activity. Third-wave feminism, or post-structuralist feminism, has tried to reduce and resolve the tensions and contradictions that lie in the liberating agenda of modernist feminism.

FPDA has developed an approach to data that is significantly different from conventional approaches in discourse analysis. A powerful source of data for FPDA users, apart from transcripts of conversations and written texts, is data from a range of different voices, for example, the voices of the research subjects themselves, other members of the research team, theorists in the same The author's own domain or voice. Polyphony and heteroglossia or competing voices and narratives are structures that can be useful in this context.

In this approach, various dimensions and cases have been considered for the analysis of the text, which include the Synchronic - Diachronic, Connotation and Denotation, and intertextuality.

Overall, the FPDA framework has made significant contributions to the field of sociolinguistics and communication studies. This framework provides a comprehensive insight through which to examine the complex interactions of subjects in discourse and to clarify how individuals engage in communicative strategies to maintain social harmony and navigate sensitive situations. Baxter's work has deepened our understanding of how subjects negotiate positions of power in a wide range of social contexts.
Most importantly, Baxter's research provides valuable insights into the social value of understanding the interaction of feminism and poststructuralism in discourse. In a highly diverse and interconnected world, effective communication is critical to maintaining productive and positive relationships across cultural, social, and professional boundaries. By clarifying the complexities of social relations between genders, Baxter's framework equips people with the necessary knowledge and skills to navigate different social situations with tact and respect. This understanding has the potential to contribute to more harmonious interactions, increase cooperation and reduce conflicts in various social contexts.

The aim is to study the dimensions and meanings of Bildung in Kant's theory of genius in the third critique with a descriptive and analytical method.

On the other hand, genius is designed to resolve the gap between the beautiful in art and in nature in the third review. On the other hand, the presentation of genius is considered a way to turn from aesthetics to the philosophy of fine art in this critique. When studying Kant's theory of genius, we realize that the role of imagination and aesthetic ideas under a certain concept of a product as an end in it is stronger than the direct intervention of understanding. Considering the harmony of faculties in the discussion of genius shows the harmony of imagination and understanding. The induction in the theory of genius in the metaaesthetics of the ideal of beauty in art is determined from the point of view of the creative artist. The goal related to beauty in art supports the formation and agreement of imagination and understanding. The study of ideas in the third critique shows that the idea has multiple aspects. The third aspect is found in genius: a positive, secondary presentation of an idea that is implemented through the creation of "another" nature, which here is the aesthetic ideas. The description of the connection between the aesthetic idea and morality in genius reveals that artistic beauty and morality come together. The beautiful thing in art is not less than the beautiful thing in nature, but "is a symbol of morality." In this way, the separation of two types of beauty, i.e. natural and artistic beauty, is overcome. The explanation of the socialization or grouing experience of genius consists in calling and expecting the harmony and agreement of genius faculties in another genius. In genius, without losing the exceptional and unique character of genius, he/she gives universal and general value to the agreement it produces and must be able to transfer its power and life to other powers of the audience. Taste and judgement have a disciplining role in genius and a part of education and training in human faculties. Art is the product of artistic genius, which has an educational aspect in terms of technique and style. Genius is not a teachable talent in terms of the expantion of ideas, amazing substance, metamorphosis and transformation o genius. In addition, in order to reach social results in the sense of Bildung, we can address the subject and his social role in an emerging civil society according to Kant, whose first step is taken in the face of beauty and common sense. This critique places taste in a larger context than human society. Humanity is characterized by a sense of sociability and the capacity to convey pleasure and thought. Beauty in nature and in art, a central role in fostering social connection between different people; And it is closely related to the cultivation of moral sense.

The study of the theory of genius in the third criticism based on the meanings of Bildung shows that this term was more than ideal educational perfection for Kant. According to Bildung meanings, genius has the following aspects:1) Formation of the harmony of imagination and understanding; The common sense of genius and the agreement of the audience's faculties in accordance with the faculties of genius, which is coordinated with nature. 2) Cultivating faculties, cultivating the mind, spirit of a genius and calling other geniuses, 3) Educational role of the product of genius in terms of technique and style, 4) Form; receiving the reflective form of beautiful art or the product of genius by imagination, 5) Bilde/image; Beautiful art as an image through the aesthetic idea as a mediator of cultural meanings and values, 6) education; propaedutic in cultivating  faculties of mind and moral training of the audience for higher and superior moral ability, 7) preparation for social community based on a common sense in the path of culture development rely on consensual agreement (individual faculties and people together).
This research shows that the issue of creating a work of art and the genius of a creative artist is placed in the path of Kant's anthropology.
The research suggests to focus on the harmony of faculties among all the meanings of Bildung for genius. In this case, the condition of supersensible unity of faculties comes from the unconscious substrate in the Leibnizian sense; That is, the place that maintains the relations that the subject establishes both internally and externally; A place based on free, indefinite and unconditional relationships. In this case, the formative pattern of agreement between powers in genius comes from that substrate and shows the extraordinary unity of all faculties together as a living unity. As a result, Kant's debate on genius is directed towards expressive process of individuality, individual difference and individuation; It opens up to the future philosophy and finds its own educational paths and training results.

The present article attempts to carry out a critical examination of Deleuze's perspective on time, which he presents in the form of three syntheses of time. Deleuze proposes each of these times as syntheses with the inspiration of a specific philosopher, but his overview concerns Kant's notion and definition of time. Furthermore, Hume is also the subject of Deleuze's reference in the first synthesis, which is called the passive synthesis of habit. The second synthesis, which is the active synthesis of memory pertains to Deleuze's reference to Bergson. Kant's definition of time as a pure and empty form, the concept of cut and caesura, and Nietzsche's eternal return are used to propose the third synthesis. Our purpose is to present and articulate the distinctive features and attributes of each of these three syntheses, their interrelationship, and a critical assessment of the mechanism proposed by Deleuze. As far as the authors of the article are aware, so far there is no independent research on Deleuze's syntheses of time in Persian. In addition to the works used in this article, at a global level, we can mention the works of (Roudinesco, 2008), (Hodges, 2008), (Lundy, 2017), and (Roberts, 2006). 

In order to carry out this research work, we will use Deleuze's works, specifically difference and repetition, in order to explain his ideas clearly. Therefore, we have attempted to critique and evaluate his views by utilizing descriptive-analytic methods, relying on commentators' views, and utilizing authentic sources and documents. 

The three syntheses of time are actually Deleuze's answer to the Kantian concept of time, according to which time is the condition of all internal perceptions. This means that the relationship between the subject and time is "always" conscious. Deleuze believes that the conscious active synthesis is based on a passive and unconscious synthesis. He calls this synthesis the passive synthesis of habit. Hume explains that our imagination is characterized by the expectation of two phenomena or sequences that always appear together in our experience. This definition describes imagination as a contractile power. Deleuze states that this is not a form of memory, an act of memory, or an act of understanding. Therefore, this process indicates a time synthesis. Time is created only in the primary synthesis that operates on the repetition of instants. The living present is created through the integration of independent and consecutive instants in this synthesis. According to Deleuze, the synthesis is constructive but not active. Deleuze takes the view that the second synthesis, the active synthesis of memory, is based on the passive synthesis of habit. He emphasizes the importance of distinguishing between the foundation and the ground. Therefore, habit is the foundation of time, and memory is the ground of time. Habit is the primary synthesis of time that constitutes the life of the passing present. Memory is the fundamental synthesis of time that creates the existence of the past, which in turn causes the passing of the present time.  Deleuze's account of the third synthesis of time encompasses a range of ideas from philosophy, Greek drama, and mathematics. In the third synthesis, Kant has a revolutionary role, because he considered time as a linear concept, also expressing the gap and fracture that are happened in I through the form of time as a form of auto-affection. Deleuze also refers to Oedipus' interpretation of Hölderlin, in order to clarify the effect that the pure and empty condition of time has on the subject. Hölderlin's concept of caesura is used by him to define the past and future, which are inconsistent and asymmetrical. The concept of caesura finds its mathematical expression in the concept of cut, which was developed by Dedekind, in line with the construction of a merely ideal and static concept of continuity. Deleuze proposes three rules whereby the three major innovations that Kant creates in the notion of time are classified. The first rule is Hamlet's rule that "The time is out of joint". The second rule basically says: “Until today, we considered ourselves obliged to represent the space. Today, it is time to think about time.” The third rule is also from the French poet Rimbaud who says: “I is an Other”. The dissolved "self", God's death, and Nietzsche's eternal return create a concept of time that Deleuze expresses in the synthesis of the future. 

It is important to note that Deleuze takes many different concepts from philosophers, poets, and other thinkers and combines them into an amazing concoction. If Deleuze allows such a thing, then the question will arise that, basically, Can we separate a concept and even a poem from its original context without changing its meaning? We also have to take into account the fact that the type of combination of concepts is not clear. In other words, it is unclear if what Deleuze is talking about is metaphysical, real, or something like a chemical compound. Deleuze insists that these concepts must maintain their differences from each other. If that's the situation, then one must question how, despite their differences, they can come together in the ultimate process.As a result, Deleuze deserves praise for his initiative in establishing or discovering the passive synthesis of time. This was not present in Kant. It should not be forgotten that the use of these different concepts of Deleuze is entirely dependent on a specific interpretation and reading. Changes in the meaning of one of these adapted concepts can lead to serious difficulties for Deleuze's explanation.

Hannah Arendt's views on the political and the results that flow from them are central themes that occupy an important place in contemporary political thought and have given rise to new fields in politics and ethics. In her recent approaches, Judith Butler has been influenced by Hannah Arendt's political thought for nearly two decades in some of her most important works. At the outset, one might think that Butler's influence of Foucault's ideas, especially regarding the power and importance of individual agency, as well as her tendency to analyze and examine gendered approaches, prevent her from being considered an Arendt thinker. If we consider his views on the importance of the public sphere and the analysis and study of contemporary political, economic, and social assembly, its influence on Arendt's political thought cannot be denied, especially in her recent books, the place Arendt's political thought has in creating important and influential concepts. She has referred to coordinated action, collective action, group resistance, plurality, and the space of appearance, concepts neglected in Foucault's thought. Here, Butler proposes new forms of politics and social ontology and attempts to answer the central question of what conditions we need for the possibility of action. Instead of focusing on Arendt's philosophical question, who is man and what is his capacity for action? In the context of contemporary social changes, it answers the philosophical question of who can fundamentally be considered human.

In this study, using a descriptive-analytical and comparative method, we will first describe and analyze, in two separate parts, the concept of the intersubjectivity of the political, as well as its connection with the central themes of appearance space, plurality, coordinated actions, embodied actions, and performativity in Arendt's and Butler's thought. Then, in the evaluation section, while comparing and analyzing the opinions of these two thinkers, we will see what possibilities Butler offers as a result of examining the possibility or impossibility of the political in Arendt's thought in order to rethink new forms of social identities with a deconstructive approach.

Butler cannot be presented as Arendtian thinker because, unlike Arendt, his concern in dealing with politics and conceptualization in political sphere is not to stay in the field or to call it original, but to deal with the new political, social and economic phenomena. And she considers it important to rethink political concepts from the point of view of finding a way out of the current crises. Therefore, agency cannot be reduced only to the public sphere, but its root must also be sought in the social ontology of life. Starting from these lines, her critical reading deals with issues such as the irreconcilable conflict between the public and the private, the transformation of the concept of plurality and its extension to the meaning of otherness, and the place of the embodied actor in the assembly, in order to confirm the positions of those commentators who, in their opinion, Butler used Arendt's thought against Arendt. Butler finds in Arendt’s thinking resources to read Arendt against herself, a methodology that allows Butler to correct and complement Arendt’s work. From this point of view, it is not possible to define the stratum only by its rhetoric and coordinated action. Agency and power in society has given (Arendt), but it should be considered with different performances by the body and by those whose lives are often and perhaps never with the project of accumulating new definitions of human concepts, agency and presented contemporary movements (Butler). The realization of coordinated action (Arendt) and the implementation of assemblies (Butler) requires overcoming the concept of individualism. Although change can occur at the individual level, the experience of contemporary political and social movements has shown that people change in the context of relationships, creating new structures and dismantling previous ones.

Arendt's remarks on coordinated action are limited to people acting in a coordinated way to achieve the will of the political unit. Butler extends the question of how different groups with different aspirations can act harmoniously in an all-round and comprehensive reading of the performative dimension of otherness. Contemporary politics needs more than anything else the will of the people, not an individual will, a will that can only be strengthened through the gathering of performances and the acceptance of the internal conflicts of groups. The internal conflict about the meaning of otherness in social and political life will also be particularly linked to the debates about radical democracy, social justice and identity politics.

Heidegger and Foucault, two influential thinkers of the 20th century, addressed the fundamental issues from different perspectives. In recent years, researches has been done on the relationship between Heidegger and Foucault on various topics in contemporary Western philosophy. One of the most important topics that can be the subject of the encounter is the question of "technology". Heidegger's essay The Question Concerning Technology (1954) and Foucault's book Discipline and Punish: The Birth of Prison (1975) will be the main subject for the encounter and perhaps the interaction of these two thinkers in this article. To understand technology from the perspective of these two thinkers, one must begin with being and power as the basis and background of this encounter.By examining the history of Being, Heidegger reveals different manifestations of the revelation of being. He claims that technology is a way of the revelation of being in modernity, in which beings are revealed as objects. The basis of Foucault's thinking is also the question of power. He examines the relationship between power and technology and leads us from the analysis of the relationship between technology and power to one of the forms of technology, which he calls disciplinary technology. According to Foucault, technology is a disciplinary network of power and knowledge relations that turns humans into subjects by shaping general practices and mechanisms. Therefore, Starting from two different bases (being and power), we thus arrive at the common discussion of technology and then at the parallel concepts of Gestell and discipline. By explaining the function of the Gestell, Heidegger shows how modern technology transforms nature and things into objects and standing reserve (Bestand) through a kind of challenging and discipline, revealing the methods of objectifying of things and nature. At the center of Heidegger's philosophy of technology is the idea that modern technology, "enframing" (Gestell), has changed our relationship to the world and to ourselves. He argues that modern technology is not just a tool or an instrument, but a pervasive force that shapes our entire way of being .For Heidegger, technology reveals itself as a mode that reveals or brings forth truth. It frames the world in a certain way and reduces everything to a calculable and manipulable standing reserve. This instrumental understanding of technology obscures its essence and prevents us from experiencing the world in a more authentic and meaningful way. Heidegger is of the opinion that such an understanding of technology leads to an oblivion of being, in which man is separated from his true essence and the deeper meaning of being. He calls for a reflexive attitude towards technology that enables us to establish a more authentic relationship to the world and to our own being.     Foucault's analysis of power and technology focuses on the ways in which power is exercised through disciplinary technologies in modern societies. He explores how power is exercised not only through direct coercion, but also through systems of control and normalization. Foucault introduces the concept of disciplinary power, which operates through various techniques and technologies to regulate individuals and populations. Disciplinary technologies include institutions such as prisons, schools, hospitals and factories, as well as techniques of surveillance, classification and examination. These disciplinary technologies create a network of power relations that shape and control people’s bodies, behaviors, and identities. They produce specific forms of knowledge, norms, and subjectivities, exerting power over individuals' lives and shaping their understanding of themselves and society.Foucault argues that disciplinary technologies are deeply intertwined with modern forms of knowledge and social control. They serve to enforce conformity, maintain social order and uphold dominant power structures. In his analysis, power is not only imposed from above, but is distributed throughout society and operates at different levels and through different mechanisms. On the other hand, Foucault tries to pay more attention to how subjects are made by technology than to how objects are made by technology. 

After this encounter, the final section sets out the similarities and differences between Heidegger's and Foucault's readings of technology issue, drawing on the opinions of commentators such as Sawicki, Dreyfus, Rayner, Sinnerbrink, and Lagdameo. These similar and different aspects sometimes bring the two thinkers closer and sometimes further apart, resulting from Heidegger's ontological encounter with technology as opposed to Foucault's genealogical encounter with technology. The presence of similarities, however, encourages the reader to merely trace the possible influence of Heidegger on Foucault's thinking about technology. The presence of differences can be also reduced to considering technology on two levels: ontological (Heidegger) and ontic (Foucault), but as a conclusion, this opinion is strengthened: Foucault's narrative of technology (especially disciplinary technology) is not a copy.  The repetition is rather a determined, concrete version and completion of Heidegger's analysis of technology. This shows that although two thinkers have taken different paths (being and power) in the discussion of technology, by taking up the discussion of power and technology, Foucault brings technology into complex, multi-layered relationships. By discussing the disciplinary institutions and techniques of biopolitics, he expands technology ontological dimension (in Heidegger). In this sense, technology as a way of revealing of being in modernity, which begins with Heidegger, is developed, completed, and strengthened in Foucault along the same path but in a different way (with a concrete and historical approach).

The purpose of this research is to analyze the concepts related to learning in Wittgenstein's writings and examples of famous and important metaphors that he brought in his works with the intention of objectifying the concepts. "Intermediate circle" in cognition. The method has a practical objective and a qualitative and analytical approach. According to Wittgenstein, metaphor is more than a rhetorical tool and as a connecting link, it has the ability to stimulate the enlightenment of the learner's mind towards the realization of desired learning. In Wittgenstein's works, metaphor can be recognized as a kind of possibility and framework for understanding the forms of life and a basis for an agreement in which learning takes place in practice. Metaphors create a world made of language games; arising from the forms of life in which the teacher and learner achieve mutual understanding makes learning possible. Wittgenstein's metaphors are the underlying factor of objectification of concepts, the necessary platform for educational models that promote learning in an effective way through agreement on the forms of life.

Richard Rorty considers "liberal ironism" to be the best formulation of what the West has been pursuing since the Enlightenment, a position that works out the ideals of enlightenment ethics without relying on a metaphysical worldview. According to him, alongside Dewey and Wittgenstein, Heidegger can be considered one of the most influential figures in achieving such an optimistic perspective. This pivotal role can mainly be attributed to Heidegger's intellectual efforts to depict the finitude of human beings and the contingency of their ultimate vocabularies, an awareness that can dispel any illusion that one’s most important values are eternal and immutable, hanging on something beyond time and chance. Another skill of Heidegger, according to Rorty, is his emphasis on the most elemental words through which each period of human history has its own understanding of being. In a sense, Rorty's pragmatist critique of the epistemology-centered culture of the West owes much to these aspects of Heideggerian thought. However, it seems that Heidegger sometimes overlooks all of implications of acknowledgment of finitude and contingency of final vocabularies and identifies himself as a recipient of a call from Bing that is incompatible with his own facticity; on the other hand, he occasionally has a one-sided judgment regarding the capabilities of modern understanding of Being, alongside its damages and threats: 1) Like other ironist theorists, Heidegger constantly tends towards spreading his self-creation project to others and prescribing his own special version for existence, even its political fatal consequences. He believes that the most elemental words he has discovered in re-describing the past - words like "Plato," "Aristotle," "Parmenides," "alétheia," "will to power," and similar ones - should resonate the same for anyone in contemporary Europe because it is these very words that have shaped Europe's destiny.In addition, it seems that Heidegger considers words such as "ethics," "technology," "striving for the greatest happiness of the most individuals," and similar elemental words as lacking a "constructive force" and discredited in modern understanding of being. However, a liberal ironist can still use them towards the main ideals of enlightenment, namely freedom and equality, even by removing their metaphysical halo. 2) Heidegger's strong inclination towards a kind of fatalism and a descending trajectory of human understanding of being can be considered another inconsistency in his thinking. On one hand, he believes that being is revealed solely through the passage of "understandings of being," and therefore, as soon as elemental words of each period are found, one can determine that the understanding of that period is equally revealing of being in its successive revealing and concealing, just like the pre-Socratic understanding for example. On the other hand, he places the Greeks in a better position throughout his works for their relationship with being and considers their understanding to be more primordial. Since according to Heidegger any understanding of being in any historical epoch is a gift of Being itself, it seems that this evaluation accompanied by valuation is only possible through fatalistic reasoning. If we accept Heidegger's fatalism, concepts such as "forgetfulness of being" or "neglecting being" become problems that humans have no possibility to solve. 3) According to Rorty, it is possible to interpret the concept of "primordiality" of an understanding of Being as our acknowledgment of the contingency of ourselves and our own final vocabularies, facilitating our readiness to be changed as much as possible. In other words, it makes us more cautious about false self-confidence and the illusion of control over the field of all beings and their possibilities, and strengthens our ability to be skeptical about our final vocabularies and be more sensitive to their potential falsehood. If we accept this interpretation of the concept of "primordiality," then from Rorty's perspective, Heidegger's evaluations of the possibilities of modern understanding of being have been unfair and one-sided because it cannot be denied that human beings have been increasingly eager and deliberatively receptive to alternative possibilities and radical changes in their thinking, actions, and way of life since enlightenment.