نشریه هستی و شناخت (نامه مفید)
سال نهم شماره 1 (پیاپی 17، بهار و تابستان 1401)

According to the “No Miracle argument” (NM), science’s predictive and explanatory success would be a miracle if the unobservable entities postulated by them did not exist; that is, if successful scientific theories were not approximately true descriptions of the world. On the contrary, according to “the Pessimistic Meta-Induction argument” (PMI), there is no relation between the success of a theory and its truth. To justify PMI, Larry Laudan provides a long list of past successful and yet false theories, which have been abandoned today. In this paper, first, the two arguments of NM and PMI are explained briefly. Then, it will be shown that the essential realists’ solutions to PMI cannot rebut this argument decisively. The paper concludes that the common problem of all these solutions is their non-referential approach, i.e., they do not demonstrate that the central terms of many past successful and yet false theories are still somehow referential.

This article reports the first part of extensive research on the ‎nature of God's agency. The two main questions of this research are:‎‎(1) Is God a moral agent?‎‎(2) If so, is divine morality the same as human morality or does it differ from human morality, either wholly or ‎partially?‎Regarding the first question, the author examines three rival theories: ‎‎"God as an autocratic‎ agent", "God as a pragmatic agent" and "God as ‎a moral agent". In this research, the idea of God as a moral agent will ‎be argued for, and the other two conceptions of the nature of divine ‎agency will be argued against. Regarding the second question, the ‎author defends the theory that divine morality and human morality ‎have no difference in terms of their “normative content”, although ‎they have considerable differences in other respects.‎The first part of this research, presented in this article, after stating ‎the preliminaries, deals with the theory of “God as an autocratic ‎agent” and critically examines some of the arguments made or that ‎could be made in favor of this conception of the nature of God. The ‎second and third parts of this research, which will be published as ‎separate articles in forthcoming issues of this journal, will elaborate ‎on the other two conceptions of the nature of divine agency.

In the nineteenth century and early twentieth century, some scholars in the West, influenced by the Enlightenment worldview, believed that the cause of each incident could be found in nature. They took into consideration the existing primitive religions to find mundane origin of religion. They also discovered that some matters such as Animism, Fetishism, Manichaeism, Totemism have been common principles among the existing primitive religions and each of them knew one of these matters as the beginning and origin of religion, but because of their specific worldview, intentionally or unintentionally, ignored this idea that belief in one God is more than anything else a common belief among primitive peoples, so the origin and beginning of the religion may be monotheism. This theory was presented at that time by christian pastor, Wilhelm Schmidt, but was ignored by others. The results of research that Western anthropologists have gained from these religions can provide a lot of evidence in favor of Schmidt's theory.

In many works of ancient and contemporary logicians, there is no clear distinction between logic and epistemology, and this causes them to mix up the rules of one with the other. In this paper, I will deal with Gholamreza Zakyani and specially Mortaza Hajhosseini, among contemporary thinkers in Iran. Gholamreza Zakyani claims that contradictory propositions do not yield any results. In this article, we show that this claim is actually a confusion between logic and epistemology. On the other hand, Mortaza Hajhosseini has developed non-standard logical systems based on specific philosophical foundations in the second edition of his book Two Non-Classical Logic Systems, A New Outlook on Elements of Logic. In our opinion, he imposes epistemic principles on logic. Some of the explicit or implicit theoretical foundations of his logical systems are: 1. Contradiction only entails contradiction. 2. A logical theorem only comes from a logical theorem. 3. Knowledge cannot be had of a contradiction. 4. Knowledge of theorems is independent of knowledge of other propositions. 5. Logical theorems are the most superior propositions and since the result depends on the inferior premises, a logical theorem cannot be inferred from other propositions. 4. The contradiction is the most inferior proposition and since the result depends on the inferior premises, contradictory premises can yield only a contradictory result.

Freedom is the most important problems in the history of philosophy. individual freedom became a central and challenging problem with the advent of modernity, Because the absolute freedom of the individual brings a plurality that challenges the necessity of the system.The claim is that by defining individual freedom in terms of self-determination in Hegel's philosophy, individual freedom can be preserved in a way which to be in harmony with necessity of the system. In this regard, we first discuss the theory of self-determination and by analyzing its points and implications, we try to prove that based on this theory, the individual is not expropriated for the benefit of the system. Then, we show that people can participate in the system's existence, in its maintenance, in how it is formulated, and in the transformation of the system. The result is that by the theory of freedom in terms of self-determination, the tension between the freedom of the individual and the necessity of the system is answered through of rationality in the dialectical method based on the mutual dependence of the freedom of the individual with the necessity of the system, and on this basis, the freedom of the individual is not completely but to a considerable extent against necessity The system is maintained.

Some American pragmatic thinkers, along with global efforts to establish peace, sought to create global understanding at the philosophical level. In addition to comparing philosophies, they also discussed the philosophy of comparative philosophy or comparative methodology. William Hocking was the pioneer. He was the first He addressed comparative religion; emphasis on natural religion, universal religion and the recognition of religious diversity and pluralism, opposition to the globalization of a religion, emphasis on changing the approach of religious missionaries from exclusivity to pluralism were the most important issues that he mentioned under the aforementioned title.The impossibility of achieving a universal standard caused Hocking to turn from comparative religion to comparative philosophy.His philosophical tendency, which was a mixture of pragmatism and idealism and, in his own words,non-materialistic realism, caused him to have no prejudices about philosophical traditions and To believe in the fundamental common reality of all philosophical traditions.Emphasis on the possibility and fruitfulness of comparative philosophy,opposition to the centralism of Western thought,opening the door for interaction and dialogue with other religious and philosophical traditions,completing philosophical traditions through adaptation and emergence.Gradual stronger and more comprehensive philosophical insight as world philosophy is one of the goals and functions of comparative studies from his point of view.

Sadr al-Mutalahin Shirazi has a special approach to understanding the Qur'an as a sacred text and a source of revelation.He considers meditation in the verses of the Quran to be related to meditation in the universe and introduces the Quran as a light through which the truths of things can be observed. He believes that most of the commentators who paid attention to the external and linguistic aspects of the Qur'an, neglected to pay attention to the meanings and content of the verses.And he considers interpretation in the interpretation of the Qur'an as a necessary matter and considers the field of understanding the meanings of the Qur'an to be a research of people of understanding and contemplation.In this article, while examining the principles and foundations of understanding the Qur'an in Mulla Sadra's thought, we have tried to discuss the necessity of interpretation and the way it was applied by Mulla Sadra in the interpretation of the verses of the Qur'an.

One of the important and key issues in the discussion of practical philosophy is to identify its place in the classification of sciences because it provides a broad and clear picture of the position of this science. In view of the special role that Farabi has in showing the identity, method and function of practical philosophy through its scientific investigation, the present article describes the classification system of sciences and the place of practical philosophy in this system and the relationship of this philosophy with its branches in Farabi's view and in this regard, by examining his writings, tries to prove the existence of these three ideas in Farabi's works: 1. Practical philosophy is a deductive knowledge and is different from non- deductive and purely practical sciences (crafts and techniques and types of art). 2. Practical philosophy is an argumentative deductive science and it is different from non-philosophical deductive sciences that do not use the method of argumentation, i.e. polemics, sophistry, rhetoric and poetry. 3. Practical philosophy has two components: ethics and politics and what is meant by ethics is not the knowledge that examines only individual ethics, but it is the knowledge that examines human ethics in all areas of human voluntary life, and what is meant by politics is also the community knowledge, including small and home communities.

One of the central questions in philosophy of perception concerns the relationship between science of perception and perceptual experience. In this paper, my aim isn’t to answer the question, rather to track it in the recent debate in philosophy of perception: Disjunctivism versus Intentionalism. In particular, I study the question in the context of the discussions between McDowell and Burge, as the two representatives of those rival theories. McDowell defends the epistemological disjunctivism. At the opposite, Burge argues that disjunctivism is incompatible with the foundation of natural sciences. McDowell replies that scientific individuation and epistemological individuation are different, but not incompatible. Science is fundamentally not about perceptual experience; rather it explains the conditions under which perceptual experience is possible. Burge, rejecting the view, states that McDowell would like to isolate philosophy from empirical knowledge. Detailed study of the discussions reveals that the confrontation, at least at its core, concerns the topic which is beyond the scope of just building a theory for perceptual experience. It seems that the two belong to the two fundamentally different philosophical traditions or theoretical frameworks. At the end, it seems plausible to conclude that we cannot choose between one of those rival theories in philosophy of perception, unless we, in advance, determine the role of naturalism in philosophy.

The principle of agency is the ontological foundation of Masha's philosophy and it seems that the interpretation of Sinavi's agential causation is in the existential relationship between all supreme principles and subaltern beings, such as the ontological relationship between the burden of transcendence and the system of creation and the existential relationship between the single human sou l. And its powers have been the influence of passage. The causality based on the causality between the causes and causal factors completely excludes the substantive relationship and the plurality of isolation between these objective facts and proves the doubt and existential difference between them. Of course, according to the macro-ontological rules of agency, it is necessary to have non-alien variables of cause and effect, and it makes supreme principles non-alien and non-alien from their causes and gives relational existence to the causes. In this way, the personal unity of the existence of the cause and the multiplicity of the quality of the effect cannot be proven in Sinavi's wisdom, but a kind of constructive unity, meaning the unity of existence and the existing multiplicity, can be found in some of the ontological topics such as theology and anthropology of him and his co-thinkers.

Javadi Amoli considers rationality in religion to mean the disciplined use of the rational-philosophical method in it and considers it to have inherent validity. Sidan also emphasizes the rationality of religious knowledge, but he does not consider it permissible to use the rational-philosophical method in it.It seems that the rationality of religious knowledge and its criteria from Sidan's point of view do not have the necessary alignment and overlapping in the top and bottom of his topics. The adoption of natural or explicit reason as a criterion has ambiguity and brevity in what it is.From the ontological and epistemological point of view, such an intellect will not have a real relationship with religious knowledge.Because reasoning in religion has no meaning other than using valid logical reasoning and definite proof.As a result, the claim of rationality in religion by ignoring such a method is self-defeating. Such an approach will cause disruption in the understanding of the book and tradition and its explanation to others.In this article, we will explain what rationality is - its existential and cognitive connection with religious knowledge and the criterion of its rationality in a comparative manner from the perspective of each of the two sides, and we will express the problems arising from the foundations of the separation view in each part.

Enlightenment philosophy, particularly Hobbes's ideas concerning government and society, serves as the foundation for numerous subsequent debates within the fields of social sciences. Hobbes' perspective on humanity and his portrayal of both the natural and civilized states represent fundamental pillars in modern political thought. He characterizes humanity as a "human wolf," and posits that the formation of a civilized state through the social contract arises out of necessity, primarily driven by concerns related to security and collective interests, which will be comprehensively examined in the present study. Society does not inherently emerge as an inevitable condition for group existence; it constitutes a conscious regulation of the inherently bellicose state among humans, prone to eruption at any moment. A majority of individuals relinquish their power to an individual or group, aiming to unify these disparate wills into a singular will. This article intends to delve into the transformative shift from classical ethics grounded in the concept of the "good" to modern social ethics rooted in the notion of public interests. It will include a brief overview of the Enlightenment period, encompassing figures. Finally, it redefines the relationship between individuals of the Enlightenment era and the state and society, elucidating the ethical policies within this framework and their integration into the philosophical system of the Enlightenment era.