نشریه جاویدان خرد
سال ششم شماره 2 (پیاپی 11، تابستان 1388)

The words 'irfån and marifat (both meaning 'knowledge' and 'gnosis', but the former also meaning the science and practice of mysticism) come from a single root, and this suggests the evident importance of the position of marifat (in the sense of gnosis) in the perspective of 'irfån (the science of mysticism). The great mystical works are witness to this connection, including especially the Mathnavi of Mawlavi (Jalål al-Dìn Rĩmì).If we were to say that the Mathnavi is a book about marifat (gnosis) it would not be an exaggeration: the various types of marifat, or to put it another way, the various levels of marifat, are among the most important topics of the Mathnavi. In this article we will consider an example of this: the story of the elephant in the dark room. Furthermore, in this story we will only be considering the concept of 'perspective' (nazargåh). By this means we will attempt, to the extent possible, to answer this fundamental question, "Is 'perspective' in this story a subjective phenomenon in the current meaning of the term, or an example of some other reality?"

This paper consists of third part. In the first part talk about the history of writing, contents and interpretations of Bhagavad Gita. in this part is attempted to introduce a short explanation of the way of interpretation of Gita interpreters about knowledge and its relation with action. in the second part discuss the history and background of the knowledge. in this part talk about the importance of knowledge eschatology in the most religions except Carvaka and say that knowledge is the way that liberate the human from slavery and emancipate it to ultimate salvation. in the third part of this paper talk about what is knowledge, knowledge according to Gunas, and the picture of knowledge in Gita and its relation with action. in this part introduce two picture of knowledge: 1.True knowledge that based on intuition and can help the human towards God. this kind of knowledge is merit to know and human can through it distinguish the difference between porousha and prakriti. this kind of knowledge obtains through modesty and service to others. and related with Yoga wisdom. 2.Exoteric knowledge that based on hesitation and doubt. this kind of knowledge has benefit not in this world, and the other world. those man that have this kind of knowledge are confused in narrow of wanderings thought and repeat the exoteric words. And just are busy to words of Vedas. this group don’t destroy the blaze of selfishness and always are in suffering. in the present paper after the study of the history of discussion and characteristics of the every knowledge is attempted to answer to the basic questions about what is knowledge, true knowledge and its relation with action.

In his verse “last night our pir (sheikh) left the mosque and came into the tavern; Oh, companions of the mystic Path (ĥariqat)! What can we do after this?” Ĕāfiĭ of Shiraz remembers a pir who was not primarily tavern-frequenter but a man of the Path and mosque, who now suddenly became a tavern-frequenter. Whom Ĕāfiĭ meant by this “our pir”? Was he an historical and real figure, or Ĕāfiĭ created him just in his imagination? Some of Ĕāfiĭ’s commentators, ancient and modern, say that this pir is “Sheikh Ģan'ān” (in 'Aĥĥār’s Bird Parliament), but for some reasons it can not be accepted. In following essay, according to the verses of pre-Ĕāfiĭ poets, especially 'Aĥĥār, it has been demonstrated that “our pir” in Ĕāfiĭ is Ĕossein b. Manģĩr al-Ĕallāj.

inconsistency of the statements of al-Ghazålì about several different subjects, among which is the definition of 'reason' ('aql) and its significance and function in allowing human to gain knowledge, makes doing research about his writings all the more difficult.Sometimes he limits reason to simply its discursive aspect, and sometimes he also brings it into the domain of faith. At times his trust in reason is very weak or limited, and at other times it is as if he imparts it with a significant role in all domains.Exerting effort in order to determine the perspective which al-Ghazålì possesses in relation to this source of knowledge and arranging his views has a significant impact in structured research about his works. It seems that al-Ghazålì's use of the term 'reason' can be considered according to three general aspects: the human soul, the discursive level of the soul, and the whole human level of knowledge. In this article we have undertaken the task of searching for these three general aspects in the works of al-Ghazålì and of trying to help to clarify his opinion in this relation.

The place of al-Ghazålì in Islamic Philosophy is seemingly well known. Many think that he opposed philosophy and prevented it from future development. The fact that his book, The Refutation of the Philosophers (tahåfut al-falåsifah) contains theological discussions and legal rulings which indicate the attribution of infidelity (zandaqah) and innovation (bidah) to the views of the philosophers cannot be doubted. However, many jurists before al-Ghazålì had considered philosophy and logic to be infidelity, and so if it was prohibition and the attribution of infidelity which stopped the progress of philosophy, al-Fåråbì and Ibn Sìnå should also have been stopped by the attribution of infidelity to logic and the claim that the science of grammar (naĕw) adequately replaces it.

In the tradition of the Abrahamic religions, mystical texts can be investigated using various metaphysical approaches. One of the most important and successful of these approaches in new metaphysics is the apophatic approach. In the present article we have undertaken an examination of one of the fundamental contents of apophatic metaphysics, namely the relationship between God and the soul, as well as two dialectical relationships which are subsidiary to this topic, namely the dialectic of transcendence and immanence and the dialectic of ascent and inner-being, in the works of one Muslim mystic, Mawlana (Jalal al-Din Rumi), and one Christian, Meister Eckhart. The examination of each of these topics has been conducted with reference to the ontology of apophatic metaphysics.

In order to defend miracles, bodily resurrection and the temporal origination (ĕudĩth) of the world, al-Ghazålì uses two firstly, the negation of any necessary relation between cause and effect, and secondly, the preservation of the causal chain by means of interpreting 'necessity' as 'truth in possible worlds'. This article analyzes and discusses these two methods.

Two refutations which were written within a short space of time from one another in the sixth Islamic century, one on the basis of Asharite theology and the other on Mutazilite theology, criticize those views of the philosophers which are related to religious doctrines, each using a particular approach. These two refutations differ from each other fundamental ways with regard to the motive of their authors, their method of critiquing philosophical issues, their content and the degree of their influence. In this article the author has compared the two mentioned texts on the basis of this fourfold difference.