yousef nozohour

Descartes considered thought to be something of which we are directly aware. He described an idea as a mode of thinking and believed that innate ideas form a specific category of ideas that are regarded as self-evident and clear. Doubts about them can be removed through a process of rational inquiry and reflection. Furthermore, Descartes made a distinction between empirical knowledge and deductive knowledge. Deductive knowledge is founded on a chain of arguments built upon necessary knowledge. This chain of deduction ultimately leads back to the most certain element in Descartes' philosophy, which is intuition. He maintained that true knowledge must be unequivocal and free from any doubt. According to Descartes, clear and distinct ideas serve as the criteria for truth. Errors, in Descartes' view, arise when we make judgments or form beliefs based on ideas that lack complete clarity and distinction. The principle of cogito (I think, therefore I am), which Descartes expresses in his book "Meditations", is considered the most crucial certainty, intuitive, and free from bias. However, according to the authors of this article, the principle of cogito, which is the culmination of Descartes' epistemology, is purportedly based on at least four hidden and questionable prejudices: memory, language, a rationality devoid of any possibility of madness, and the hidden unconscious.

This article explores the concept of substance, attributes, and modes in Spinoza's "Ethics" by examining them through the perspectives of ancient Greek and medieval philosophers, as well as Descartes' views on substance and extension, along with their notions of God and His attributes. Wolfson's interpretation of Spinoza based on these perspectives serves as the basis for this investigation. The primary objective of this article is to critically evaluate Wolfson's interpretation of the concepts of substance, attribute, and mode as proposed by Spinoza, with a focus on their philosophical implications and coherence within Spinoza's overall framework. Spinoza's predecessors, Aristotle and Descartes, believed in the multiplicity of substances. In contrast, for Spinoza, there is only one substance—a self-sufficient being that exists independently and does not rely on others for its existence. One considers a similarity between modes in Spinoza's philosophy and accidents in Aristotle's system: It is impossible to imagine modes and accidents without substance. Despite this similarity, in the Aristotelian system, accidents characterise the substance, but in Spinoza's philosophy, the substance precedes modes; in fact, modes result necessarily from the substance. Spinoza then claims that the substance has infinite attributes, but the human mind only knows two attributes—Thought and Extension. According to him, the substance is identical to its attributes. So, the substance as thinking thinks about itself, i.e., the body. For Spinoza, individual things and Ideas are finite modes of the attributes of body and mind that follow necessarily from the substance.

In this paper, we attempt to answer this fundamental question that whether is any criterion of truth in Kant’s transcendental philosophy or not? Through analysis of “transcendental deduction”, and referring to Dieter Henrich's interpretation of the background of that term, and Robert Paul Wolff’s formation of that, we try to illustrate the significance of this part of the first critique for establishing a well-formed and compatible theory of truth in Kant’s philosophy. We claim since Kant believes that knowledge contains judgment and predication, in a word, a process of "synthesis", his theory of truth is a kind of “coherence theory of truth”, although Kant himself, in a famous passage of critique, says the definition of truth is correspondence and also we concede that his coherence theory is a peculiar one. Eventually, in favor of Robert Hanna's reading of Kant’s theory of meaning, we conclude that this theory involves a kind of scepticism, which we call “epistemological scepticism”.

Baruch Spinoza, the rationalist philosopher of the seventeenth century, devoted special attention to knowledge and epistemology. In his philosophy, knowledge has types and classes, the most valid of which is intuitive knowledge, and from this point of view, he focused on intuition, its objects, and its features. This paper, studying the types of cognition in Spinoza’s thought, attempts to explain its meaning and the object. Furthermore, the article, based on two sorts of interpretations, shows that, in the development of Spinoza’s philosophy, the object of intuition changes. This variation is caused by passing Spinoza’s thought from the division of knowledge, based on the form in the TRE, to that division, based on content in Ethics and there are serious debates among interpreters about that. In both works, Spinoza’s intuition is inferential, immediate, and irregular. Although, in TRE, its object is attribute and mode, while in Ethics, it is only mode or the essence of a particular thing. Finally, we show that the realization of intuitive knowledge guarantees credible and efficient knowledge and leads to liberty and happiness as the main purpose of Spinoza's philosophy.

This paper is going to criticize the book: Kant's Practical Philosophy from Critique to Doctrine written by Gray Banham by using a descriptive-analytic method based on writer's interpretation of this work, and it aims to indicate that although this book is a new reading of Kant's practical philosophy, it has some significant problems by itself. Some of these problems include the unclearness of the text, the selectivity of the discussions, the lack of conclusion at the end of each chapter, the excessive compression and the extension of the discussed subjects. Moreover, the author of this article will introduce the structure of the Kant's Practical Philosophy from Critique to Doctrine and explain its advantages, the most important of which include the special attention of Banham to the relation between Kant's different works and the philosophical process of Kant’s thought in the practical philosophy (from critical works to doctrinal works), and investigate those works of Kant which were less considered (specially by Iranian Kant scholars), and consider the opposition of Banham with the accepted viewpoint of most interpreters of Kant’s practical Philosophy (formalistic interpretation) and his formulating a new interpretation of it (teleological interpretation).

In Jewish thought, the human being is composed of body and soul. Maimonides while influenced by earlier scholars, Especially Aristotle and Avicenna, Believes that not only humans, but all creatures in the material world - Including animals, plants, minerals, spheres and stars - Has two distinct dimensions And are composed of matter and form; But from Spinoza's view No separation and inconsistent between body and soul; These two, are two different aspects of a single reality, Its inner is the soul an its appearance is body; It means that every being, composed of spirit and flesh. Therefore, in view of Maimonides the essence of man is composed of matter and form. Both Jewish philosophers rejected the substantial distinction of soul and body. But in explaining the relationship between the two, Maimonides believed their mutual affect and is affected of body and soul; while Spinoza Knows the relationship between them as relationship between the mind and the ideas.

On the one hand، Wittgenstein considers philosophy as a generator of mental confusion، but on the other hand، he desires philosopher as a therapist. This two-sided attitude to philosophy begins with Tractatus and then admitting the various therapeutic methods، reaches to the second period of his life. Recently، the origins of Wittgenstein''s therapeutic approach in Tractatus are neglected by most of his positivist commentators، instead، this approach have been followed in the second period of his thought، especially in Philosophical Investigations. In this essay، we have tried to clarify this obscurity and to indicate the roots of Wittgenstein''s therapeutic approach in Tractatus. Since mentioning the «symptom» or symptoms of mental confusion resulting from philosophical thinking and stage of its «diagnosis» is considered as preparations of therapy، we، by emphasizing on the therapeutic value of clarity، will survey «symptom»، «diagnosis» and finally Wittgenstein''s therapeutic approach toward philosophy in Tractatus، and then we will point out some reasons causing negligence to Tractatus therapeutic approach. In this way، we will show that Wittgenstein، from the beginning of his philosophical thinking، has believed in this approach and in Philosophical Investigations he has just declared it in the everyday language. Here، we will also unveil restriction of Wittgenstein''s therapeutic approach to philosophy.

Commentators have hitherto analyzed the interrelation between Spinozan and Hegelian concepts، especially in works where Hegel directly mentions Spinoza (such as Logic and The Lectures on History of Philosophy). The present inquiry، however، is an attempt to undertake the harder task of studying Spinozan concepts of Ethics exactly at the juncture in Hegel''s philosophy where there is no trace of Spinoza، i. e. in Phenomenology of Spirit. A survey of works written in various languages shows that there is no book or article specifically and exclusively written on this subject; in this respect، the present inquiry is innovative. After a short introduction to the reciprocity of Hegel''s works and Spinoza''s philosophy، the inquiry will bring out and examine some oppositional concepts from these two books (namely Ethics and Phenomenology of Spirit)، such as Spinozan substance/Hegelian spirit، Spinozan mechanism/Hegelian organism، and Spinozan eternity/Hegelian historicity، and finally، it will reveal how Phenomenology of Spirit sublates Spinoza''s Ethics in its Hegelian sense of sublation.