A Critique Transcendent Philosophy -Based of Value of Cognition in David Hume's View

It is important to delve into and criticize David Hume's view on "the value of cognition", which assess reliability to epistemic claims. Referring to the works and research projects done on the views of Hume who is thought by modern empiricists to be the founder of modern empiricism, the present paper comes to the conclusion that, taking into consideration the three principles of skepticism, meaningfulness in conceptions and causality, Hume is a fundamentalist philosopher in terms of "the value of cognition" and he believes in the theory of compatibility but not in the sense of compatibility between thought and reality, but compatibility "between thought and phenomenological impression"; that is, any cognition which reaches phenomenological impression is truly dealt with according to the criteria of "sensational impressions" and "memory". Hume has a problem with the affirmation of propositions, which, according to him, are related to actual relation in the future. These propositions are based on causality. This Hume's epistemic approach to epistemology (except the relationship between conceptions) leads to epistemological idealism which is one of the theoretical foundations of the relativity of religious knowledge. Using an analytical-descriptive method, the present paper criticizes Hume's view about "the value of cognition" in the light of transcendent philosophy.