A Critical Study of the Theory of Mind-Body Identity in the Philosophy of Mind

Explaining what is meant by the theory of mind-body identity, the present article studies certain arguments behind it. The first argument refers to Smart’s theory. Relying on William of Ockham’s view that if it is possible for a phenomenon to be explained physically, it should not be interpreted through metaphysical concepts, Smart claims that nowadays all mental states such as love, hate, and knowledge are physically explicable; therefore, we should not resort to the immaterial soul to justify them. Criticizing this theory, the authors indicate that in addition to rational invalidity of William of Ockham’s principle, human experimental knowledge has not been capable of presenting a convincing interpretation of mental states in spite of all scientific progress. The article further refers to Davidson’s argument for identity theory, mentioning its weak points. The article concludes that proponents of the theory of soul-body identity do not have authentic and valid arguments for it.