A Study of Quine׳s View Concerning Predicative Existence

If we say: "Pegasus exists" we would suffer from tautology, and if we say " Pegasus does not exist", we have made a self-contradictory proposition, since the word "Pegasus" refers to something in the external world. Attempting to eliminate this difficulty, following other analytical philosophers, and believing that existential propositions are the same type as those of identity, Quine has philosophically denied the peculiarity of existence, and has logically denied the capability of existence to be predicate. Thus he has regarded the maximum function of existence as playing the role of quantifier. Although denying predicative existence has originated from Hume and Kant, it has reached its zenith with Quine and other analytical philosophers. Presenting Mulla Sadra׳s view as a yardstick on distinguishing "subsistence of a thing" in simple whethernesses, from "subsistence of a thing for another thing" in composite whethernesses, we clearly come to the conclusion that Quine׳s attempt is abortive. Furthermore, discussion of predicative existence is a philosophical and logical one rather than a logico -linguistic one, as held by Quine and his followers. His argument is questionable since he imagines whethernesses, including simple and composite ones, signify subsistence of a thing for another thing. In addition, identity is ambiguous in his theory, since identity presupposes existence itself.