Self-evidence and Acquisition (IktisÁb) in the  Form of Thought'

The division of knowledge into evident and acquired and the need for the acquired to end up in evident are among the current discussions in logic. The idea of knowledge as being evident and acquired is sometimes predicated of the ‘matter’ of knowledge or its ‘form’. The former is defined as a sort of knowledge whose acquisition needs no thought whereas the latter as a kind of knowledge whose acquisition is in need of thought and contemplation. Though there is some difference of opinion among logicians in regard with acquired conception and the instances of evident propositions, there is no disagreement among them on the definitions of evident and acquired knowledge. Though they have touched on the idea of being evident and acquired in treating the ‘form’ of thought, they have presented no clear cut standards in this area. They have given no explanation for the criterion for distinguishing evident from acquired in regard to the ‘form’ of perceptive knowledge, i.e. definition and description, though they have interpreted the idea that an argument (reasoning) is evident or acquired in ‘form’ as to know whether or not the conclusion is clear. The writer here studies the meaning of evident and acquired in the ‘forms of thought’ and particularly in those of reasoning and comes to the conclusion that ‘being acquired’ does not give any sense in the form of thought and reasoning. According to him, all forms of thought and reasoning are self-evident.