Applying the game theory in analysis of budget manager-Senior Manager strategic game in budget participation and budget slack

Participation of senior managers in budgeting provides the possibility for them to use their superiority in status information asymmetry, through the process of target setting,
impact on their performance assessment. Senior Manager and Budget Management, respectively, by means of budget slack and internal control system, strive in order to maximize utility. This study aims is to find a balance point in the interests of both sides of game by using game theory, so that the senior managers and budget management are satisfied with their own interests. Hypotheses using combined data from the financial statements and management ethical attitude of 56 manufacturing company of Tehran Stock Exchange between the years of 2010 to 2014 were tested. The main hypotheses and sub-study hypotheses by using the Mann-Whitney test and the best answer were analyzed. According to the findings, in combination strategy of create the budget slack by senior management and strategy of strong internal control system by the budget management, both sides of game to achieve balance in their interests, but this combination strategy, dominant Nash equilibrium is weak.