How rival country and possibility of fight-back strategy affect the consequences of sanction regime: Case of Iran

Sanctions are considered as a foreign policy tool. Theoretical studies on sanctions have investigated different aspects of the issues. These discussed aspects include the effectiveness of the sanctions and how it affects the behavior of the target country. But the effects of the possibility of first, fight-back strategy for the target country, and second, the presence of rival countries have been discussed unlikely. Game theory is used to address these two deficiencies. Six games which differ in the number of stages, how the pay-offs are calculated, and the presence of a rival country are studied. The results show that fight back ability provides the target with the opportunity to change the sender’s calculation. It also reduces the probability of sanctions. However, the presence of a rival country neutralizes this opportunity and makes it easier for the sender country to put sanctions into force. In addition, a minimum extent of the sanctions was deduced for the sender country to enter a sanctions episode.