The strategy of the periphery of the Zionist regime and the balance of threat with Iran (studying the impact of the Islamic Revolution in changing the strategy of the periphery)

During the Pahlavi era, Iran and Israel formulated the framework for strategic cooperation within the framework of the doctrine of the periphery. But in 1978, with the interruption of the Zionist regime's relations with Iran, the Israeli national security strategy and peripheral doctrine were under the influence of the threat of the Islamic Revolution. The present article, considering the changes that took place, including the occurrence of the Islamic Revolution and the beginning of the Middle East Peace Process in the 1990s, raised the fundamental question of what the goals of relations between Israel and Iran in the pre-revolutionary and post-revolution stages were based on the doctrine of the periphery. Is it Islamic? In answer to this question, based on the threatening variables against Israel, the government implemented a peripheral alliance aimed at balancing threats against Arab governments in cooperation with Iran. But after the fall of the Shah's regime, Israel pursued a peripheral alliance strategy in the form of a traditional discourse to confront the Islamic Revolution, in the framework of its presence in major strategic areas of the world, influencing US decision-making, accountability, and nuclear monopoly. The idea of innovation in this research is to use the theoretical balance of threat, with a descriptive and analytical approach to explaining Israel's perception of threats and unity with heterogeneous identities. The findings of the author explain that Israel's goals and relationships are the product of building power and solving security challenges based on threats that were propagandistic and non-existent in the Israeli psychological environment. In other words, the mental and perceptual environment has directly provided Israel with a perception of the threat.