PRICING DECISION IN CENTRALIZED CARRIER-RETAILER CHANNEL WITH GAME THEORY APPROACH

Supplychain, carrier-retailer channel, Pricing, game theory to the price, pricing decision becomes more important. In this case, with a slight change in the price of prod-ucts or services, the customer changes his demand that impact on chain pro t. In this study, a supply chain con-sists of two exclusive transport companies and a retail company is also taken into consideration. Each mem-ber of the system will a ect price and then the pro tof chain. Transport companies have a unique feature that makes them exclusive. Companies that transport hazardous chemical material, cargo liner companies in Iran and very large cargo transport company can be examples of this situation in the problem. The trans- port company can be a trucking company, a third-party logistics provider, or a freight forwarder. The retailer sets the retail price; this speci es the demand, which in turn, is the carrying amount for the transporters. Trans-porters decide the freight rate and their pro t dependon both the freight rate and the carrying amount. Fi-nally, the transporter's freight rate is an input of the retailer's cost that in uences the retail price eventually. In this study, the transportation cost is divided into two categories: costs per unit of goods such as load, unload, and handling; the xed cost per vehicle. The xed cost includes the driver's salary, fuel charges, etc. We en-tered the cost per truck separately in transporters pro tfunction that eventually led to integer linear model. We use centralized game approach to nding the optimal price of di erent levels. In the centralized channel, de-cision makers set the retail price that maximizes the to-tal channel pro t. Coordination of three parts of sup- ply chain and centralized decision-making can improve the system-wide pro t. A new method is developed to solve the problem. After that, di erent sensitive analy- ses are illustrated for pro t function graph. The results show that in the lower level of vehicle capacity, much less pro t exists, and in lower xed cost of vehicle, even less than before. After that, di erent sensitive analysis is illustrated for pro t function graph.