The Possibility of Prime Negation in Logic and Epistemology On the Basis of Foundationalism

All derivative propositions return to self-evident propositions; and sciences thus end and lead to their origin. According to this foundation, some have thought that all negations are theoretical and there is no axiomatic negation, because for them, negating attribute from the subject always necessities a middle term that proves one feature for the subject and prepares the ground for negating an attribute from the subject through that term. Thus, the axiomatic negation is not sensible without a middle term. This is, however, rejected by Avicenna and Aristotle. For them, just as the theoretical affirmation leads to axiomatic affirmations through analysis, and just as accepting an axiomatic affirmation is sensible without a middle term, the same rational reason that makes us accept axiomatic affirmations makes us accept axiomatic negations as well. Just as accepting theoretical affirmations without leading to axiomatic affirmations would necessarily result in vicious circle, accepting theoretical negation without their leading to axiomatic negations would necessarily result in vicious circle and finally a contradiction which is rejected.