Lewisian Four-Dimensionalism and the Problem of Change

Four-dimensionalism (as opposed to three-dimensionalism) is a view in contemporary metaphysics according to which ordinary objects are identified as four-dimensional entities continue to exist through time by having distinct temporal parts at different times. This theory may be presented in various form and one major variant of it is known as space-time worm-theory or perdurantism, which is proposed by David Lewis.  This view takes the referent of the objects to be the four-dimensional sums of temporal parts. Lewis maintains that four-dimensionalism is the only tenable solution to the so-called problem of temporary intrinsic and can be well defended against different possible objections. Putting the main emphasis on this problem, the present paper aims to evaluate Lewisian version of four-dimensionalism. To do so, after introducing this problem, Lewisian temporal part-based solution to the problem will be stated and examined. We conclude that besides its problems in providing a viable solution to the problem of intrinsic change and the problem of change in general, four-dimensionalism proposed by Lewis renders a counterintuitive account of persistence and non-standard and unfamiliar notions of change and instantiation and fails to preserve the sense of unity which is crucial to the concept of being an object.