Revision of the Reality of Pleasure in Avicenna’s and Sadra’s Ethical Thoughts

The reality of pleasure and its existential role and value in Avicenna’s ethical thought is an acquired, falsifiable and at the same time achievable issue. Any pleasure results and is understood from its own special power, and there is a distinct relationship between types and examples of pleasure by influencing and being influenced in self faculties. Having criticized and nullified Avicenna’s self faculties and replaced the theory of skeptic and differential ranks of the self in the human existence ranks, Mulla Sadra dealt with the reality of pleasure and its existential role. The reality of pleasure in transcendental theosophy is presential in addition to being existential, and does not lend itself to sensory violation and comparative fallacy. The highest pleasure from the perspective of nobleness in transcendental theosophy pertains to intellectual pleasures, and on the basis of by-compulsion agency of intellect in Sadra’s study of self, infra-intellectual pleasures bear ethical values. The purpose of the present study is to give rational solutions on the basis of Sadra’s study of self in order to ethically manage and interact with effective perceptions such as pleasure in life.