Interpretation of two Arguments of the Theory of Motion in Immaterial Things

Most Muslim philosophers – including the Peripatetics, Illuminationists, and Sadrians – have rejected the possibility of change and motion in immaterial things based on their own principles. However, during the last two decades, some authorities in the field of philosophy have opposed this idea and argued for the possibility of motion and change in immaterial thing. This theory has attracted the attention of a number of academic centers, and some papers and books have been written on this subject. The proponents of this view have provided some arguments in its favor, and its opponents have rejected them. Following an analytic approach, this paper defends the theory of the existence of motion in immaterial things at two stages. Initially, the authors provide a response to the criticism targeting the main argument of this theory and defend its legitimacy; secondly, through resorting to the createdness of the soul, they present a new argument in its favor. Finally, they conclude that the mentioned theory is acceptable in the realm of rationality and reasoning and is superior to its counter-theory.