Analyzing the Interaction between the Central Bank and the Plan and Budget Organization (A Case Study of Iran Using Game Theory)

The central bank is working to reform the structure of the banking system to bring the banking network in line with world standards. The banking network should strive to adapt itself to the modern world in terms of technology, procedures, and operations. The main prerequisite for this is central bank independence and structural reform of the country's budget. In the current situation, the Central Bank of Iran is severely restricted in pursuing monetary policy independently and in order to stabilize prices. The approach used in this research is game theory. This study attempts to describe and make a model the new interaction that has emerged in the current situation of the Iranian economy between the central bank as a monetary authority and the program and budget organization as a financial representative using the game theory. Determines the existence or absence of equilibrium and its type, and ultimately examines whether equilibrium is in favor of economic development or anti-development. If the balance is of an anti-development type, a policy recommendation should be considered. Based on the output of the modeling, there is a stable equilibrium but does not support development. The results show that equilibrium is formed when the plan and budget organization adopts a strategy of dividing oil revenues between the budget and the fund in favor of the budget and the central bank adopts an active strategy against financial pressure. This shows the strengthening of the supervisory role and then the strengthening of the central bank's monetary policy role, so that the central bank, despite Fiscal Dominance, should play an active role in resisting financial pressures and resisting the printing of money, rather than submitting to financial decisions.