Managerial Risk Taking Incentives, Corporate Social Responsibility and Firm Risk

We examine if and how corporate social responsibility (CSR) affects the relation between risk taking incentives of CEO compensation (i.e. vega of CEO compensation) and measures of firm risk. This research has been carried out using annual data of companies accepted in Tehran Stock Exchange during the period of 2011-2017.For testing of research hypotheses, multivariate linear regression has been used based on panel data. Empirical results show that vega has a positive and significant effect on firm risk only in low CSR firms that attempt to maximize only investing stakeholders’ interests. In high CSR firms, that attempt to balance the interests of both investing and non-investing stakeholders, vega has no effect on firm risk.We examine if and how corporate social responsibility (CSR) affects the relation between risk taking incentives of CEO compensation (i.e. vega of CEO compensation) and measures of firm risk. social responsibility (CSR) affects the relation between risk taking incentives of CEO compensation (i.e. vega of CEO compensation) and measures of firm risk