The Analysis of Ups and Downs of the Political Relations between Atabakan-e Lor-e Kouchak and the Safavid State during the Years 907-1006 AH/ 1501-1597 AC

Although some aspects of the political relationship between the Safavid state and local governments in the history of Iran have been examined, nevertheless, the relations between the Safavid state and the local governments in Iran's western borders, especially Atabakan-e Lor-e Kouchak, have been largely ignored. Accordingly, the present paper, with a historical approach and by describing and analyzing historical sources, have studied the relations between the Safavid state and Atabakan-e Lor-e Kouchak dynasty in the light of various internal and external factors. The findings of this research indicated that the territorial position of Lor-e Kouchak, their ability to influence the central and western regions of Iran, the border and the strategic position of this family in the west of the country, and their occasional overt and covert relations with the Ottomans brought about fear for the Safavid state and raised tension between them. In the shadow of these threats, finally, after nearly a century of the appeasement policy of the Safavid government, Shah Abbas I by adopting special political and military measures about Lorestan, not only eliminated the local dynasty of Atabakan-e Lor-e kouchak but also divided the region under their control into two parts and appointed puppet rulers in both regions. In practice, he neutralized the widespread threats of the Atabkan-e Lor-e Kouchak government.  

Atabakan-e Lor-e Kouchak, known as Abbasi or Al-e-Khorshid, was established in the middle of the 6th AH/ the 12th century AC, when the centrality and authority of the Seljuk government had been lost by the war and conflict between the military rulers and the Turkish tribes. Despite the silence of historical sources and the lack of a family historiography tradition about the historical events of this local dynasty, the Atabakans for centuries were able to have the area between the Zagros Mountains and the areas reaching the Diyala Plain and the city of Baghdad under their control and authority. By taking advantage of the region's mountains, effective war strategies, local influence and legitimacy, and political strategies such as declaring obedience to central government and political marriages, the local dynasty was able to maintain and continue its rule. Shah Ismail I, after his coronation in 1501 AC, on the way to consolidating and dominating Iran, eliminated many local powerful rulers or forced them to accept obedience to the Safavid government. The small Atabakan-e Lor family was one of the local dynasties who declared obedience and subordination to the Shah of Iran. As they were not considered a political and religious rival for the central government anymore, the Safavid government agreed with their obedience and thus their rule continued over Lorestan. From then until the killing of the last khan belonging to the Atabakan-e Lor-e Kouchak dynasty by Shah Abbas, their relations underwent many ups and downs. In addition to factors such as changes in the political strategies of the Safavid state, such as centralism, the tendency of the Lor rulers to internal independence and not being in absolute obedience to the Safavid state (that was well-precedented among Lor rulers in relation to previous governments), long-lasting wars and conflicts of the Safavids with the Ottomans, and the Ottomans deployment in the west of Lor-e Kouchak’s territory (after dominating over Baghdad) added to the complexity of the relations between Atabakan-e Lor-e Kouchak and the Safavid government. Lorestan had become part of the front line of the Ottoman-Safavid conflict and played an important role for both sides in providing security and control over the western and southwestern regions of Iran and Iraq. The Ottoman government would gain access to the heart of the territories of Iran and the capitals of the Safavid state, namely Isfahan and Qazvin, by passing through this region (in the shadow of a secret or overt agreement with the local government). The Safavid government also made it possible, through control of Lorestan, to monitor Mesopotamia and the important city of Baghdad or threaten them when necessary. The present paper attempted to examine the political relations between the Safavid government and the Atabakan-e Lor-e Kouchak in light of all these internal and external factors. Various works have been written about the history of the Atabakan and their political relations. However, these studies do not have a comprehensive generality about the political ties of this family with the Safavid government. Therefore, in these studies, the significant characteristics and points of these relationships and the contexts in which these relationships took place are not highlighted. The writings of researchers such as Izadpanah, Khodgoo, and Saki (while being valuable in the public context of Lorestan studies), on the political relations of Atabakan-e-Lor, are mainly rewriting the words of historians such as Mostofi, Badlisi, and Iskanderbeig and lack a new analytical approach. There are three essential articles on the political relations between Atabakan and the Safavid state: first, Shahram Yousefi Far’s research with the title of Atabakan-e Lorestan on the political history of Atabakan-e Lor, which contains more analysis and details. Salehi and Akbari's paper entitled Shahverdi Khan's governorship of Lorestan and the centralism of the Safavid government which deals with the political relations between Shahverdi Khan and Shah Abbas; however, it focuses more on the issue of centralism and its role in their relations. Third, the paper by Rohhollah Bahrami entitled Atabakan-e-Khorshidi and Safavid Government deals with events analysis and reports by historians on relations between these two dynasties. In general, all three articles lack a detailed analysis of the political, economic, and military significance of Lorestan for the Safavid government and the new strategic position of that land in the political-defense plans of this government; therefore, they generally ignore the background and context of the formation of the ups and downs of these relations. Therefore, the present article tried to provide a more objective and understandable analysis of the developments by highlighting crucial internal and external factors of the ups and downs of the relations between the Safavid government and Atabakan-e Lor-e Kouchak.  

Therefore, in the present article, with a historical approach, description, and analysis of historical sources, an attempt has been made to address the new strategic position of Lorestan and the role of the external factors in the approaches and strategies of historical actors in light of the ups and downs of the relations between the Safavid government and Atabakan-e Lor-e Kouchak. Thus, factors such as the proximity of Lorestan province to the Ottoman government and the intermediary and strategic role of this region between Mesopotamia and the western, southwestern, and central territories of the Safavid state have been highlighted.  

The relationship between local governments and central governments in the history of Iran was organized based on a set of mutual obligations and expectations. On the one hand, local dynasties fulfilled a set of political, financial, and military obligations in relation to the central states. On the other hand, it was expected that the central governments, while declaring the legitimacy of the local government, would not interfere in the internal affairs of the states and provinces. Nevertheless, the nature of the power structure and policies of the central governments, as well as the type of political tendencies of the local dynasties, caused these relations to fluctuate. There are few historical reports of a conflict between Atabakan-e Lor-e Kouchak and the pre-Safavid rulers and their tendency towards some form of independence. After the rise of the Safavid state, until the middle of the tenth century AH, the relations between Atabakan-e Lor-e Kouchak and the Safavid state revolved around the old circle of the above-mentioned mutual obligations and expectations. The effects of the above-mentioned factors in the relations between the two continued until the second half of the tenth century AH. Reports indicate the presence of the Khan of Lor in the campaigns of the Safavid government and the presentation of gifts to the Safavid Shah. However, in this historical period, the Ottoman government's domination over Baghdad and the alignment of Lor-e Kouchak's political geography with the political borders of the Ottoman government changed the type of mutual relations between the Atbakan-e Lor-e Kouchak family and the Safavid state. These new demarcations gave the Lorestan region a strategic position, enabling the Lorestan rulers, given the previous relative independence, economic self-sufficiency, and mountainous and impassability of the region, to maintain greater internal power and independence and gain maximum political and economic benefits. The Safavid government, considering the strategic position of Lorestan and the threat that could be perceived from this area, tried to use tools and tactics such as intimidation or granting political concessions to this local family to keep them away from the Ottomans. As a result, each of the historical actors involved in this period (Safavids, Ottoman, and Lorestan rulers) sought to make the most of it and avoid dangers to the extent possible. It seems that this external factor has played a major role in the central government’s distrust in the Lor rulers and in pursuing the policy of overthrowing this old and rooted family of Atabakan-e Lor-e Kouchak by the Safavid government. Therefore, the previously-mentioned situation, inadvertently caused the overthrow of the old and rooted family of Atabakn-e Lor-e Kouchak and provided the grounds for the fundamental changes in the political geography of Lor-e-Kouchak and divide it into two regions of Pishkouh and Poshtkouh.