Analyzing the Conflict of Allocating Environmental Water Share Among Rival Governmental Organizations

Since allocating water to satisfy environmental water share can cause a conflict among governmental organizations supplying water, withdrawing water, and protecting the ecosystem, recognizing and analyzing such situations is paramount significance and can avoid encountering serious conflicts. In this research, we analyzed the actions of involved organizations which are either using or supplying water from Ilam’s dam to find the equilibria and the possible outcomes of the conflict.

We used Graph Model for Conflict Resolution to study the actions and strategies of rival organizations managing water allocation and involving in water conflict. The involved organizations are determined based on uses of Ilam’s dam. To define the strategies, all the measures and decisions of these organizations have been studied since 2005. In addition, the effect of drought years on the players’ actions is taken into account. Finally, we compared the status-quo with the results of the base line strategy of the model.

Equilibria results suggest that in states 27 and 32 the Jihad Agriculture Organization and the Water and Wastewater Companyare interested in withdrawing more water to achieve their goals. As a result, the Department of Environment will complain against them to protect ecosystem and provide the required environmental water share. In this case, the Regional Water Authority and the Governorship can play a dominant role in accomplishing to the stable outcomes. Furthermore, it is shown that the status-quo is not stable.

Analyzing this conflict indicates that all players have enough power to change the game's output. Therefore, their goals and measures can effectively change the equilibria and the future of the conflict