Analytic Philosophy and the Charge of Anti-Historicity

According to some philosophers, not heeding historicity is one of the characteristics of analytic philosophy in comparison to other philosophical schools. That is why analytic philosophers are always being accused of ignoring historicity and blamed for this charge. Continental and traditionalist philosophers are unanimous in this regard. However, the question is whether the critics of analytic philosophy can support this accusation with sufficient and convincing arguments, or whether not taking heed of history is a baseless claim rooted in an incorrect perception and insufficient knowledge of this philosophical movement. This paper is intended to explain the critic’s claims, arguments, and proofs as to historical ignorance in analytic philosophy, on the one hand, and to describe the attention and accuracy invested in analytic philosophers’ view of history of philosophy and their arguments. The authors emphasize that, firstly, one must distinguish between essential, instrumental, and weak types of historicity. Analytic philosophers might reject essential historicity but accept a kind of weak historicity. Secondly, an emphasis on the distinction of the history of philosophical problems from history of philosophy should not be understood in the sense of anti-historicity or equating the past and presence.