A Look on the Truth of Acquired Knowledge

The Philosophers’ opinions on the truth of the acquired knowledge can be divided into two types: some regard it to be the presence of the quiddity of ‘external known’ in the minds; and consequently, the acquired knowledge is reserved for the quiddities. This group has resolved the issue of correspondence of the knowledge with the known using this view. In contrast, other (earlier) philosophers consider the acquired knowledge as the instance and ghost of the external known. The issue of the ‘mode of the knowledge suggesting the known’ has produced these discussions. According to the former view, knowledge of the mental quiddity can be knowledge of the external quiddity; but the view related to the ghost considers suggestion of the suggested as an essential element of knowledge, and regards no need for a relationship and some sort of unity between the knowledge and the known. Here, the discussion of the relationship between the knowledge and the knower is posed, about which there are two basic views: some believe in the existential unity between the knower and the knowledge; and in contrast, the earlier philosophers have depicted a concrete relationship between the knower and the knowledge. In this article, the arguments presented by the adherents of the aforementioned views have been investigated; and finally the views of those who believe that the knowledge is a ghost and that there is a unity between the knowledge and the knower have been defended. According to that view, the acquired knowledge is the very existence of the knower, which is suggestive of the known.