Doubt in Axiomatic Knowledge

Is doubt in axioms inconsistent with their being axiomatic? Is it possible to cast doubt on the most axiomatic realities while this not being inconsistent with their being axiomatic? What makes a difference between axiomatic and theoretical propositions is their being in need or being needless of definition and reasoning. This is the key point in the return of the theoretical knowledge to axiomatic knowledge. However, extending this needlessness to needlessness in other affairs has led to emergence of difficulties in knowing axiomatic propositions as well. So, it is necessary to discuss some points, posed among scholars, about this feature and its distinction from other features of this type of science. Through this investigation, it is clarified that the immediate affirmation of axiomatic propositions, contrary to the initial assumption –which seems easy – has some conditions that causes mistakes in identifying and affirming axioms if ignored. In this article, after investigating the definition and stating the features of axiomatic propositions, we have mentioned the conditions and affairs needed by the axioms.