A Case Study of the Relationship between Ikhwānal-Moslemin and the Militaries from 1952 to 2014

The purpose of the present study is the analytical review of military-civil relations in the Middle East with an emphasis on the relationship between Ikhwān al-Moslemin and the Militaries in Egypt. In this regard, different models of military-civil association in the Middle East as well as its relevant theories, characteristics of the deep state in Egypt and the governmental model considered by the group of Ikhwān, the relationship between the army and Ikhwān within three stages: before revolution, during the government, and after the coup were reviewed. Moreover, this article answers to the following questions: Why Ikhwāni government collapsed and how could the army overthrow the civil government? Is the collapse of Ikwān related to the intellectual inefficiency of this group or the insufficient potential of its elites for governance? The method of study was descriptive-analytic and the results showed that due to the penetration of the army in Egyptian society, mass media propaganda against Ilkhwān and …, this group could not sustain its political power. After the revolution, this group did not make any effort to change the government to its desired model and also the theories of Ikhwāni Islamic state were neglected by Morsi and his fellows.