Hamartia’s Position in the Relationship between Tragedy Theory and Philosophy of Ethics in Aristotle

This article is explained the position of Hamartia in the relationship between the theory of tragedy (in the treatise of Poetics) and the philosophy of ethics (in the treatise of Nicomachean ethics) by Aristotle. In Nicomachean ethics, Hamartia is a selective act in which the middle ground is not observed. Poetics also deals with the characteristics of a kind of Hamartia in the sense of a kind of moral error committed by the hero of a tragedy. This research has answered the questions that, first of all, what is the relation between Hamartia and the changes of fortune that occur under the urgency of depriving the outside good for the hero of the tragedy, in Poetics and Nicomachean ethics. Secondly, in Poetics and in relation to Nicomachean ethics, how does Hamartia resolve the contradiction between the selective activity of the tragedy hero by depriving him of external goodness, and thirdly, how tragic Hamartia can, in relation to Nicomachean ethics, resolve the contradiction between different chapters of poetry (especially the chapter Thirteenth and fourteenth) about the superior type of tragedy? The conclusion of the article shows that tragic hamartia is a type of hamartia in which the hero commits a selective act in which the middle ground is not observed or refuses to do so on the verge of committing this act. But in both cases, because the action is due to a virtuous hero who has committed it in an atmosphere of urgency due to the deprivation of external goodness, or has been on the verge of committing it, although his action may take him away from the path of happiness for a while, it does not reject the principle of his virtue. This research is a qualitative research of descriptive-analytical type and has used library data for its collection of descriptions and analyses.