A Bargaining Game Model for Estimating Efficiency of the Multi-stage Network with Fixed Cost Allocation and its Applications

Data envelopment analysis is taken widespread into consideration in the various science to evaluate the relative efficiency of decision making units that have a multi-stage network structure. In this paper, a bargaining game model is extended to evaluate the efficiency of decision making units with a multi-stage network structure. Moreover, each stage of network data envelopment analysis (DEAN) is considered as a game player. Accordingly, the allocated fixed cost is divided among all the stages such that the best allocation is made to the best stage. With a newer idea, the intermediate stage in the data envelopment analysis of three-stage networks is considered as a common player in the bargaining game, so that the stage plays a significant role in maximizing the performance of network. Next, an alternative approach to allocating a common fixed cost in a multi-stage network based on the bargaining game is proposed. Finally, as direct apllication of the performance of the proposed models some examples are given.