Normativeization in Jürgen Habermas's discourse ethics

Jürgen Habermas is one of the constructivists who believes that moral facts do not have an independent existence and sees them as the result of discourse in an ideal situation. Of course, in his view, it is not that moral matters are arbitrary and that anyone can say anything, but that a moral proposition is true when we agree on moral norms in idealistic terms and in relation to action. We can also justify moral matters according to those ideal conditions of discourse and communicative action. The present study tries to explain, analyze and critique Habermas' theory of discourse ethics in the form of a model of moral constructivism. In this case, he first states the nature and conditions of the realization of the ethics of rational discourse in Habermas' view, and then examines the necessary rules for the participants in the moral discourse. Finally, he presents a critique of this model of moral constructivism, which is in the form of discourse ethics.