Mulla Sadra on the use of differentia as complete definition

A change in the philosophical foundations of logic requires a change in the approach to dealing with its problems, and sometimes a change in the problems themselves. One of the important issues of logic is the structure of the definition and the role of various “genus” and “differentia” in the “limit definition” and how they are arranged. According to the theory of the primacy of existence, this article rereads and explains Mūllā Ṣadrā’s view on the “limit definition” and analyzes how he deals with the views of most philosophers. An analytical study of this issue led to the conclusion that the theory of the primacy of existence and its derivatives has led to a different approach in Mūllā Ṣadrā’s philosophy in which the “last differentia” provides the true unity of composite quiddity and the former genuses and differentias in the form of simplicity and In short are included; accordingly, Mūllā Ṣadrā has explicitly stated that in “complete limit” it is not necessary to observe the order between the components of quiddity, but it is a matter of admiration. In this innovative approach, the “limit definition” of quiddity is merely the last differentia, and each of the earlier genuses and differentias in detail with multiple realizations, as most philosophers have drawn, are not part of the object and are outside its truth; as a result, the mention of previous genuses and differentias in “limit definition” is superfluous to the truth of the object.