A Comparative Analysis of Wittgenstein and Farabi’s Views on Language and Meaning

The meaning of the language is the main goal in linguistic inquiries. Wittgenstein had two views on language: first, he considered language as an image of the universe. That is, he considered the words not referable to sensible things as meaningless. Second, he considered the meaning of language as dependent on its function in linguistic games specific to its users. Similarly, Farabi considered language as what is in the man’s inner side and believed that the speaker’s purpose – which is used for meaning and inserted in the form of words – is the very language. In his view, meanings exist and words are contractual items among nations. This inquiry uses a descriptive-comparative approach to analyze the views of Wittgenstein and Farabi on language and meaning and show their points of difference and similarity. Farabai had two theories on words, which were consistent with Wittgenstein’s first and second views. Besides, both thinkers considered language as the main axis of philosophy and maintained that the main function of philosophy is to remove ambiguities from the language. Wittgenstein, however, would initially consider some of the propositions as meaningless, and Farabi considered meaning as existent in the universe. Wittgenstein did not accept grammar as a practical science and considered it as dependent on meaning. Farabi, however, considered grammar as an independent science in line with logics. In his view, any logic requires grammar to state its opinions and achieve the right meaning.