A critical analysis of Ryle's view on the problem of the interaction of the soul and the body and its relationship with the denial of the soul, based on the principles of al-Hikma al-muta'aliya

The extreme dualism of soul and body in Descartes' philosophy raises the issue of the relationship between the two. One of the criticisms that opponents of dualism have made on the existence of the soul has been this issue. Gilbert Ryle also raised these issues in his book The Concept of Mind (1949), which he wrote in refuting Cartesian dualism. This issue has been raised and answered by Descartes himself and his contemporaries. But the solutions that Descartes offered to solve this problem were not convincing and finally, to solve (dissolution) this problem, he suggested not thinking about how this relationship is.By removing the gap between the soul and the body, and by using his own principles, such as the principality of existence, gradation of existence, substantial movement, etc., and also by propounding intermediaries such as steamy soul and the ideal body, Sadr al-Muti'allihīn sought an appropriate answer to this problem. In this view, the soul and the body are not separate two distinct entities; Rather, the two are levels of a single truth. Although, based on Sadra's point of view, a better answer can be given to the problem of interaction between soul and body, but this point of view also faces problems and ambiguities. It seems that philosophers, despite all their efforts, have not been able to give a proper answer to this problem, but this cannot be a reason to deny the existence of the soul.