mohammadjavad rezaeirah

The debate of whether existence, or being, (wujud) is a synonymous term (ishtirak ma’nawi) or homonymous term (ishtirak lafzi) appears in numerous philosophical and theological works. Some believed in its homonymous term and established other theological issues on such basis. The followers of the synonymous term for existence provided reasons as proof for their belief which appear to be distorted and invalid. The title of the reasons are، the consistency of knowledge or comprehension (‘ilm) of a thing despite having doubt towards its properties (khususiat), the first imaged thing as being (wujud), non - existence (‘adam)—the opposite of being—  as a synonymous term, the accuracy (sihat) of the categorization of being, the denial of synonymous term requires its acceptance, the division of being to necessity and contingency , which necessitates difference between the two, generalization of the properties of a relational or  copulative existence (wujud rabit) and independent existence (wujud mustaqil), a singular meaning in the rhyme of poetic verse. With a precise reading and analysis, it is clear that all provided reasoning contain the fallacy of ‘Begging the Question’. With that said, none of the mentioned reasons have the ability to be used towards its claim. Although it should be noted that a negation of the reason does not require the negation of its claim. As many acclaimed scholars have said, the assertion towards the synonymous term of being, in and of itself is self - evident (badihi) or close to it, and its verity is certain. In this article, we will only be discussing reasons in proof of this claim, and not in relation to its integrity or inaccuracy of the primary claim.

The principality of existence or quiddity has been considered one of the important and influential problems in the tradition of Islamic philosophy since the time of Mīrdāmād until this day. Most philosophers have accepted the principality of existence and rejected its opposite view, and some have accepted the principality of quiddity. In this paper by examining the conceptual foundations and analysing the subject in dispute, we have reached to the conclusion that the principality of existence or quiddity is not really a philosophical problem, and the dispute between the two parties is a verbal dispute and the disputants are talking past each other. The proponents and the opponents of the principality of existence do not mean the same thing by “existence”. Similarly, the proponents and the opponents of the principality of quiddity do not mean the same thing by “quiddity”. Quiddity for the proponents of the principality of quiddity is the existent quiddity, not quiddity qua quiddity. And the existent quiddity for them is the external reality, not the quiddity which has been unified with existence. Likewise, the existence deemed fictitious by the proponents of the principality of quiddity is the general self-evident concept of existence, not existence in the sense that is the external reality which is a cause of an effect or an effect of a cause. After explaining the claim and providing proof that the dispute is verbal, some objections have been raised and answered.

The extreme dualism of soul and body in Descartes' philosophy raises the issue of the relationship between the two. One of the criticisms that opponents of dualism have made on the existence of the soul has been this issue. Gilbert Ryle also raised these issues in his book The Concept of Mind (1949), which he wrote in refuting Cartesian dualism. This issue has been raised and answered by Descartes himself and his contemporaries. But the solutions that Descartes offered to solve this problem were not convincing and finally, to solve (dissolution) this problem, he suggested not thinking about how this relationship is.By removing the gap between the soul and the body, and by using his own principles, such as the principality of existence, gradation of existence, substantial movement, etc., and also by propounding intermediaries such as steamy soul and the ideal body, Sadr al-Muti'allihīn sought an appropriate answer to this problem. In this view, the soul and the body are not separate two distinct entities; Rather, the two are levels of a single truth. Although, based on Sadra's point of view, a better answer can be given to the problem of interaction between soul and body, but this point of view also faces problems and ambiguities. It seems that philosophers, despite all their efforts, have not been able to give a proper answer to this problem, but this cannot be a reason to deny the existence of the soul.

Gilbert Ryle, in his book, The Concept of Mind (1949) discussed about denial of mind, identity of mind and mental states, through his physicalism and reductionism approaches. On a basis of Descartes’ dualism, he argued that believing in the existence of mind alongside mental states, is a category mistake that has baffled philosophers. He believed we should not relate mental states to a substance called mind, as we relate physical states to the body; Mind is but a name for a series of applied mental states and has no existence beyond words.
            Ryle’s main issue is his inaccurate understanding of mind’s inception and its connection to the body. It would appear that we can present a different explanation of substantiality of mind and its contrast with mental states by referring to Sadra’s viewpoint of mind’s inception and its connection to the body, which Ryle's problems are not directed towards. According to this information, a substance named mind exists which mental states are based upon.

In this research it has been intended to investigate the epistemological position of mystical discovery in the philosophy of Sadr al-Mutallahin and also to examine whether, based on this position, this philosophy can be used in theologico-rational proofs for the general public? This research has performed by an analytico-descriptive method and library-based technique for collecting data. The findings of the research indicate that there is disagreement among the researchers regarding the place of discovery in the methodology of transcendent wisdom; Although kashf, intuition, is not regarded as a precedent in philosophical reasoning, but the role of purity of  human soul and tenderness of human nature and kashf in understanding Sadra's deep rational teachings, makes understanding this philosophy out of the reach of the public (non-explorers or those who are not of austerely and self-purifying). Accordingly, its use in denial and proving rational-theological proofs for the general public is not effective and its extensive education is ineffective.

As generally acknowledged, the term “hyle” in Peripatetic philosophy has been derived from Aristotle’s views on matter and form or potency and act. Although this term has been defined as “matter lacking actuality and enjoying pure potency” in Islamic philosophy, a study of the works of Muslim thinkers reveals that, because of the integration of some philosophical views with gnostic ideas as well as the influence of Islamic teachings, this term has undergone different semantic changes. As a result, in some schools of philosophy, it has been consciously employed to refer to actual affairs. Below, the writers have provided eight meanings for “hyle”, which are listed in their chronological order of formulation:1. Matter lacking any kind of actuality and enjoying pure potency, as accepted by Peripatetic philosophers and equivalent to its Aristotelian concept.
2. The fourth level of being, for the Isma‘ilite, which is posterior to the soul and prior to nature.
3. Pure substantial continuity, in some of Suhrawardi’s works, which, along with accidental quantity, constitutes the truth of body.
4. Matter inclusive of all possible worlds and an otherworldly expression of simple existence in the view of some gnostics.
5. One of the modes of form in line with Mulla Sadra’s view of the unitary integration of matter and form.
6. An equivalent to possible existence or created thing’s divine aspect (Face of God) in the view of Shaykh Ihsa’ei.
7. An expansion of the Aristotelian concept of prime hyle under the title of the dark nature of essence in Tafkik (separation) School.
8. An application of the matter of world to the element of water based on the religious texts of Tafkik School of thought.