The effect of political institutions on economic growth b through exchange rate misalignment (game theory approach)

The most important effect of the political institution on the economic institution is in respecting or not the market system, which can ultimately strengthen or weaken the economic growth. In oil countries, abundant rent of oil income for government shapes the economic incentives of the political institution in such a way that provides special interests through public resources. While in the free market, the pursuit of private interests will lead to public welfare. Such a different approach in some oil countries provides the context of limiting and continuous interfering in the market mechanism, so it leads to a decrease in economic growth. Due to the importance of determining the real exchange rate in achieving the desired economic growth, in this article attempt to investigate the impact of political institutions on economic growth in an oil country. The game theory method used to substantiate the presented concepts. In this regard, the different motivations of the policy makers (as political institutions) of the oil countries in determining the exchange rate investigated. The reaction of entrepreneurs to this policy in choosing the level of investment considered as an indicator of economic growth. Based on the results, ellits in motivation of maximizing government revenue determine the optimal exchange rate. Assuming economic competition, they tend to misalign exchange rate in order to weaken competitors. Adding the assumption of political competition will lead to higher exchange rate misalignment and further weaken economic growth.