A Critique of Foundationalism

Foundationalism is one of the theories proposed concerning the structure of justification and knowledge. This theory, as well as alternative ones have faced many objections. Some of these objections have questioned the foundational structure of justification, in general, and tried to rule out basic beliefs or to promote a symmetrical structure for justified beliefs. The others just criticize certain versions of this theory and deny some of the main claims of foundationalism such as non-doxastic justification of basic beliefs, their infallibility and the inference of basic beliefs from phenomenal ones. In order to explore these objections and respond to them, this paper is in three parts: the first part deals with objections of beliefs that are claimed to be justified as non-inferential. In the second part we try to explicate objections raised in connection with the non-doxastic justification of basic beliefs and the third part specifically deals with the criticisms of classical foundationalism. We conclude that despite many objections, this theory still is the most reasonable theory concerning the structure of justification and knowledge.