A Critique of Physicalism on the Basis of its Division into A priori and A posteriori

Both a priori and a posteriori physicalists agree with each other in holding that physicalism, as a metaphysical approach to the world, is an appropriate approach that includes the nature of mind. However, they disagree on whether certain truths are knowable a priori. Of course, both of them_ a priori physicalists and a posteriori physicalists_ maintain that the doctrine “physicalism” can only be known a posteriori. Despite such a consensus, there is no consent about how exactly the doctrine should be formulated. The author has a critique of physicalism on the basis of this dispute and its division into a priori and a posteriori. It seems that physicalism requires a priori knowledge, but on the other hand, it seems also that it is impossible. It seems that there are some a priori entailments (implications) from microphysical truths to ordinary macroscopic truths. But it will be argued that there are no a priori entailments (implications) from microphysical truths to phenomenal truths because these truths cannot be functionalized. The purpose of this article is to argue that since such entailments (implications) are necessary for physicalism to be true, physicalism would be false regarding the phenomenal consciousness.