فصلنامه معرفت فلسفی
سال هفدهم شماره 1 (پیاپی 65، پاییز 1398)

The proposition “Any essentially possible being requires a cause” must be considered as the precise wording of the causality principle. This is because according to principality of quiddity, the essential possibility is the criterion for quiddity’s need of a cause, and according to the principality of existence, it is the sign for the of need of its existence to a cause. As for the attributes of the things, this principle is stated as “the accidental is caused”. This is in contrast to “the essential is not caused” which refers to the fact that the thing’s essential attributes do not require a cause. The causality principle is itself a certain statement of the special mode of the principle of “impossibility of preponderance without a preponderant” and is reduced to it. Thus, as far as self-evidence and non-self-evidence as well as provability and non-provability are concerned, it follows that principle; and as that principle is non-provable evident, so is the causality principle. From the principle of “impossibility of preponderance without a preponderant”, another principle is derived as follows: the principle of “impossibility of giving preponderance without a preponderant” which is the statement of the principle “impossibility of preponderance without a preponderant” for the free-willed agent and his volitional actions, and is non-provable evident just like it

In his theoretical philosophy, Kant claims that the Necessary Being cannot be argued negatively or positively. He puts forward this argument in his fourth antinomy under the section “transcendental dialectics” in his book entitled Critique of Pure Reason (in German Critik a der reinen Vernunft). Kant’s claim is based on some epistemological and ontological foundations, according to which he regards mathematical and physical propositions as “certain” and metaphysical ones as “non-certain” and sophistic. We believe that Islamic philosophy, Mulla Sadra’s in particular, whether in epistemological dimension or in ontological dimension, enjoys proper facilities for criticizing Kant’s philosophy in general and resolving the conflict in the fourth antinomy claimed by him in particular. In the present article, we have briefly investigated Kant’s epistemology and ontology along with the doctrines of Mulla Sadra’s philosophy, and are seeking to resolve the conflict claimed by him using the aforementioned doctrines

Belief in substantial motion in material world is one of the intellectual foundations of Mulla Sadra’s philosophy. Proving this theory by him is in the first place dependent on answering the arguments for impossibility of substantial motion, which are mainly based on some foundations put forward in transcendental philosophy. Two important and effective foundations in resolving the difficulties of substantial motion are that the motion becomes existential in Mulla Sadra’s philosophy and he believes in cutting-motion. The present study has resolved, by explaining these two foundations, the two difficulties extracted from Avicenna’s words: ‘no survival of the subject’ and ‘the necessity of actuality of infinite species between quantifiers’. This is because considering the abovementioned foundations, the category has one individual amid motion, but an extended and fluid individual as long as the time of motion, and the motion is nothing but the fluidity of this very individual. In other words, it is an extended, connected and fluid process, and since connection and continuity are the criteria for individual unity, motion is automatically a unique individual process and its unity is essential and it needs no protector of unity, not an accidental one needing the protector of unity. Similarly, although various types of essence are abstracted from different stages of fluid existence through closing up its frontiers, existence of types of actualized species is not necessitated from essences. This is because [the position of] principality is for existence and the unique existence is gradually connected, wherein types of potential limitless essences are present there, and since they are potential, limitation of infinite between two quantifiers is not realized

Philosophical predestination” states determinism in the light of philosophical issues such as “succession of wills”, the “rule of previous necessity”, and the “relation of divine will to the man’s volitional actions”. Muhaqqiq Isfahani has dealt with an analysis and evaluation of these issues with scrutiny and has proved the consistency of these philosophical issues with the agent’s free will. Through this study, it is clarified that in his thought, the criterion for an action’s being volitional is its being preceded by a will and not a will being preceded by another will, so that the succession of wills is necessary. The rule of previous necessity is not inconsistent with the agent’s free will; rather, it supports and confirms his free will. Similarly, the divine will is related to the man’s volitional actions limited by his will. In this article, Muhaqqiq Isfahani’s view regarding the philosophical predestination has been categorized, adjusted, explained and evaluated with a descriptive-analytical method

The discussion on the reality of matter is one of the important discussions in philosophy, on which many views have been presented. One of the most important views with a longstanding background is the atomism school attributed to the Greek philosopher, Democritus. In this view, the matter is composed of thousands of tiny separate particles which get together to make bigger bodies. These tiny particles, though capable of being divided in illusion or by reason, are not able to be divided in external world. This view is opposite to the views of most Muslim philosophers who consider the matter not composed of separate particles, but a substance composed of the prime matter and the physical form. They consider it something extended and essentially connected that can be divided anyway endlessly. Since many of the arguments for proving the prime matter depend on the nullification of Democritus’ theory and proving the separated divisibility in matters, Muslim philosophers have presented various arguments against that theory. In the present article, we have investigated and reviewed five arguments among the abovementioned arguments, finally considering all of them as falsified

Analysis and investigation of secondary intelligibles has been focus of attention among philosophers since long ago. Epistemology of philosophical concepts deals with an investigation of these concepts, and in the present article, we have explored the epistemology of philosophical concepts in the minds of Allama Tabataba’i and Ayatollah Mesbah. In this study, it is clarified that Allama Tabataba’i was the first philosopher who put forward the mode of abstraction of the philosophical concepts including the concept of existence and non-existence. He believes that philosophical concepts are abstracted by using intuitive knowledge. Ayatollah Mesbah, unlike Allama, does not consider intuitive knowledge and internal experience as sufficient for abstraction of each of the primary philosophical concepts; rather, he maintains in addition to that, they must be compared with one another, and one must regard a certain relation among them. In his view, Allama’s method in abstracting philosophical concepts cannot be generalized

The course of epistemological discussions, from Plato’s tripartite definition to Gettier’s cases as well as the contemporary epistemological discussions, has gradually gone beyond the importance of belief, focusing on truth and – more importantly – on justification. This is while the destiny of many discussions on those two parameters depends on the precise analysis of the nature of the belief. Therefore, the main issue in this study is investigating the nature of the belief and its different types as well as paying attention to the distinctive role of metaphysical beliefs in achieving the truth and knowledge. The philosophical background and the analytical approach of this article considers various types of human’s beliefs, a variety that emerges from different themes of the beliefs and is based on their destinations and their different functions, all of whom do not necessarily follow the truth and verity; and this does in itself speak of the variety in the action of belief in its various types. In this study, considering the compositional nature of belief composed of two dimensions (mental and emotional), we have attempted to challenge the unidirectional look of the philosophical and psychological views and, in view of the variety of metaphysical beliefs as well as the role of emotional and the existential properties of the believer in seeking the truth, to clarify the parallel importance of these two dimensions along with cognitive and mental compatibility of the system of beliefs

Throughout history of epistemology, many attacks have been launched on the theory of foundationalism. It can be certainly said that none of them was as important as the attack launched by Sellars. Indeed, by criticizing “datum” – as the basis of the empirical foundationalism – and calling it fable, Sellars ruins the basis of non-deductive beliefs for leading to knowledge. In the aftermath of Sellars’ critiques on “datum”, the foundationalists faced a crisis, and Sellars attempts to put forward novel discussions such as logical atmosphere of the reasons, psychological nominalism, and methodological behaviorism in epistemology to find a proper solution for the crisis he himself created. The most prominent result of Sellars’ attacks on the empiricists’ foundationalism is the negation of “direct awareness” of the subject. Muslim philosophers believe that negating the “direct awareness” would ruin the basis for any knowledge in the subject and would deface the basis for his access to knowledge. Investigating Sellars’ view in negation of the direct awareness and evaluating its alternative solution is among the goals of the present article