فصلنامه قبسات
پیاپی 100 (تابستان 1400)

The criterion of religious science is the standard(s) that “essentially” distinguishes “religious science” (sacred) from “non-religious science” (secular). I believe the religiousness of science depends on the religiousness of “the five basic parameters” of science. To explain it more, I should say: sciences have three kinds of elements which “creates existence” and “creates distinction”: 1- “basic parameters”, 2. “essential distinctives”, 3. “formal-essential” coordinates.The “basic parameters of knowledge” is used for the elements which “creates existence”; these elements are as follows: “theoretical bases” (presuppositions), “subject”, “matters”, “goal”, and the “logic” of science.The essential distinctives of knowledge includes such elements as: “the kind of existence” of science and its relating propositions, “the characteristics of epistemology” of science and its relating propositions, “the value-based coordinates” of science, and “the geometry of cognition”. The essential distinctives of knowledge are a result of the basic parameters.Considering the above points, religious science “in its special meaning” is a cognitive system that all of its “basic parameters” are religious, and its constituent propositions coincide with reality as well. Using the title “religious science” for such a knowledge is a literal occurrence.

The discussion and debate on the essence of the reality of revelation and explanation of how it is received by Prophet Mohammad, has always been noticed in the history of Islam. Nowadays some people such as Abdol-Karim Sorush, greatly affected by the hermeneutical and linguistic theories of Western scholars, have created a serious difference between the ideas of past and recent scholars, doubting the linguistic essence of revelation on the one hand, and suspecting the source of revelation on the other hand. From the beginning of the formation of this idea, there has been considerable criticisms on Sorush’s ideas on the knowledge of revelation, by Howzah and University scholars; yet the basis and origin of these ideas are less discussed. This article extracts and criticizes the basis and substructure of Sorush’s views on the knowledge of revelation, which is the base of religious studies, epistemology, hermeneutics and linguistics. The main criticisms of Sorush’s view are as follows: an ambiguous and vague presentation of the theory; weakness of methodology; confusion between different discussions; a wrong comparison between Islam and other religions and sects; non-justified claims; cognitive relativism.

This article studies the relation between cyber social networks and religion and religiousness using a rational and analytic method. It tries to present and criticize some analytic views in this regard. Considering the conceptual difference between religion, religious knowledge and religiousness, it is necessary to compare their relation and study the interaction of each one of these concepts with the new phenomenon of cyber social networks according to my preferred view. We can speak of the effect of religion on the architecture and management of social networks and we can show the effect of these networks on being religious. Analyzing the effect of cyber social networks on religiousness, it is important to study the concordance or discordance of religion and social networks, as two systems and organs related to human being, in their structure, texture and foundations. It is concluded that the system and structure of social networks based on Western foundations, is not concordant with religion in terms of their structure and form, such that, if they get used to it, it has a negative and opposite effect on the society’s religiousness. We also expect to have various readings and the popularity of non-official readings of religion with the present structure of the network. On the other hand, religion can affect the design of social networks and our presence and method of activity in these networks.

“Existence” and “being” is the reality of God or one of His essential and ---attributes which its attribution to God is unanimously accepted among Muslim scholars. Yet “Mirza Mahdi Esfahani”, the founder of the school of tafkik (distinction), has rejected this attribution appealing to the special basis of “ordaining words for external realities; the equivocality of God’s attributes and the possible beings”. He has presented some reasons (ambiguity of existence, lack of having a conception for existence, God’s attributes indicates His essence, extracting existence from possible being and its essential poverty) to justify this idea. I have studied his writings to find the reasons and classify them. Analyzing these reasons, I have shown the weakness of his scientific bases and arguments. The most important problem found is that he denies that words are ordained for conceptual meanings and confuses concept and its referent; in other words, it is not possible for a word to imply an external referent without having a concept and a conceptual meaning. In addition, Isfahani’s “existence” has no concept or it is ambiguous, and he has confused the concept of God with its referent.

Religious and spiritual intellectuals of the recent decades have stressed on this point: religion does not have a good relationship with rationality and it is necessary, in this conflict, to prefer one to another. They believe servitude is the center and base of religion and it is the opposite point of rationality. They consider the new and modern world as the world of rationality and rational reflection, and believe this rationality does not come along with being religious based on servitude. Therefore, servitude encounters various rational challenges. This article studies six main challenges of religiousness and servitude from the perspective of rationality. The main rational obstacles of religious servitude are: the challenge of alienation, the challenge of lack of rational development, the challenge of non-verifiability, the challenge of non-criticizability, the challenge of not arriving at an agreement about a judge, and finally the challenge of why servitude. Investigating and explaining the essence of servitude and dividing it into mo’allal (based on cause) servitude and modallal (based on reason) servitude, I have answered these challenges and have tried to show that religious servitude, which is a modallal servitude, has been formed in a rational background; and although the modern and critical rationality is not in accordance with it, but a sound, moderate and realistic rationality considers religious servitude rational and ideal.

One of the most important matters in epistemology is the orientation and identity of sciences. Being religious or non-religious deals with this matter as well. This is true for all sciences, from philosophy, which is the most abstractive one, to functional and concrete sciences. This is also true regarding humanities, which can be attributed to religious or secular sciences and can have religious or secular identity as well. There are different factors (cognitive and non-cognitive) that give identity to these sciences including theoretical bases and foundations. One of the most important theoretical bases is the base of religious studies. Our view on religion’s identity, its range and goals, its origin and etc. have a great role in having a religious or secular humanities. The bases of religious studies is the result of philosophical religious studies or philosophy of religion. Philosophy of religion has a role, directly or indirectly, in having religious or secular humanities. This is completely visible regarding modern humanities and the present philosophy of religion. One of the conclusions of this article is this principle: philosophy of religion has orientation and it has a role in giving identity to humanities. Therefore posing the idea of orientation of sciences especially philosophy of religion, this article shows the role of this orientation in religious or secular identity of humanities, using a philosophical-analytic method.

The famous European philosopher of the new era, Spinoza, has quite elaborately spoke of God in his most important book, i.e. “Ethics”. He believes God is an essence who has infinite attributes and the nature is a mode of His infinite attributes. Therefore, according to Spinoza, essence, attribute and mode are the three main elements of reality. The most important issue in the philosophy of Spinoza is his idea on whether God transcended nature or not. In other words, is nature – which is a sum of the system of God’s modes – the same as God or not; is God – in addition to His manifestation in modes – a reality which is transcendental over them all {or not}? In the third words, does Spinoza believe in “pantheism” according to which God is the sum of nature and everything is a part of it, or he believes God has an existence that transcends the nature? Relying on the text of Spinoza’s speech, this article shows that his pantheism is rejected; it is also proved that his argument on God’s existence is the same as the Anselm existential argument; rather it is the Seddiqin argument according to which God is mere existence and therefore has a necessary existence.

The modern philosophical hermeneutics, which has appeared among a group of Western scholars regarding how to understand and interpret texts, has become a basis for some Islamic writers to tend to pluralistic interpretation of the Qur’an. They have tried to arrange and prove this idea using some definite basis and assumptions of Qur’an’s interpretation. There are some serious challenges to consider philosophical hermeneutics as a base for this view; because neither philosophical hermeneutics has the capability of being the basis and foundation for such critical and multi-dimensional view – considering it is hardly criticized – neither the pluralistic interpretation of the Qur’an is compatible with the definite bases and assumptions of Qur’an’s interpretation or can fulfill its basic purposes. Explaining the pluralistic interpretation of Qur’an and how it is based on the modern philosophical hermeneutics, this librarian research tries to criticize the basis and foundation of the pluralistic interpretation of Qur’an, using a descriptive, analytic and critical method. The outcome of this research is that not only the pluralistic interpretation of Qur’an is not in accordance with the general basis and assumptions of Qur’an’s interpretation; it is also incompatible with the accepted bases and assumptions of the owners of this view.

Some western philosophers and Christian theologians believe the God proved in philosophy is not the God explained by religion. Some other scholars believe the God of religion deserves love and worship, while the God of philosophy is only a necessary being who does not create any enthusiasm in people’s hearts. The otherness between God of religion and God of philosophy is not acceptable from Qur’an’s view and Islamic philosophy; because one of the unique characteristics of Allah in Qur’an is “non-created thing”. The necessary being of philosophy is the only being without any cause. Therefore, “non-created thing” is a unique description for Allah in Qur’an and the necessary being of philosophy. Therefore, the referent of Allah and the necessary being is the same. The reality of the second claim may be understood by focusing on the attributes of essence and attributes of action. God’s attributes of action explains the different relations between God and the creatures and humans, but the attributes of essence explains God’s essence and His perfections. Noticing God’s attributes of action and His role in the universe and human’s life, one will understand that he deserves love and worship. Further than this common knowledge, the philosophers introduce God with His perfect attributes; and the knowledge of the endless perfection and eternal beauty of God creates a rational love of God in human’s heart.

There are two main views on the explanation of the creation of the world among theologians. The mystics and a group of philosophers present the theory of “manifestation” and, based on the personal unity of being, believe God has the real existence and the world of contingency is a manifestation of the attributes of perfection hidden in God’s essence. Yet most Islamic theologians believe God created the world from nothing and nonbeing and stress on the separation and heterogeneousness of the creator and the created. The mutual prevention of the bases of theologians on the one hand, and of the philosophers and mystics on the other hand, makes it impossible to believe in both theories for the real explanation of the world. However, the theory of “creation” is posed to deny the theory of “reduction of God’s creation to mere designer” and concerns that theory. Presenting an innovation in the analysis of the concept of “nothing”, this writing offers a new reading of the theologian’s views; on this base, the theories of “creation from nonbeing” and “manifestation” have an intersection in the point of “creation not from a thing”.