نشریه حکمت سینوی
پیاپی 66 (پاییز و زمستان 1400)

In some of his important works, Avicenna has considered the nature of cognition as receiving the "known form". The expression of "known form" contains fundamental ambiguity and is formulated in the form of two main rival views in Islamic philosophy; the first is what can be called as "Essential identity of Cognitive form and External Known-Theory of Cognition" and the second as "Phantasm (Shabah) theory of cognition".  By focusing on Avicenna' own works, it is not easy to judge these two rival theories. The problems here are raised mainly from two sources: firstly from incompatibility and inconsistency of Avicenna's declarations in his different works and secondly from non-acceptable logical consequences of each theory, at least at the first encounter. Because it's impossible to examine the pro and cons of both theories at one paper. So, here I focus just on the evidence of first theory: Essential identity of Cognitive form and External Known-Theory of Cognition and based on the two evidence of textual and meta textual, we have shown there are important evidences in Avicenna's works collection that indicate he does not mean the word of "form (Surat)" in the expression of "the known form (Surat al-Modrak)" such as the meaning of "phantasm" in literal sense; but as he states in Ishȃrȃt, his means is "the real of entity (Ḥaqiqat al She'y) "  or "what is in virtue of which everything is entity that is"; not the phantasm.

In Avicenna’s thought, one of the most important features of experimental propositions which, whereby they are classified among the principles of demonstration, is their attribution with certainty and he has emphasized its certainty in several expressions. However there are a few statements from Avicenna in which- in a way the absolute certainty of experience is denied. This research, using the method of text-oriented analytic interpretation and critical analysis, explicates how the method of experience, according to Avicenna’s own theoretical and practical foundations, cannot yield certainty. Theoretically, two minimum and maximum reasons demonstrated for this. Based on minimal reason the method of experience brings about pure certainty only in the case of useful constant observation. But in the maximum reason even in the manner of permanent occurrence can't be lead to certainty because due to the experience-based on sensations which according to Avicenna’s final analysis are pseudo-certainty, any kind of experience will be pseudo-certainty. This result is not in conflict with Avicenna’s innovational doctrine about the experience-based propositions, according to which these propositions are based on a demonstration propter quid, because he has already explained in his logical works that a demonstration propter quid which its minor premise is not perpetual cannot yield certainty. In addition, assuming possibility of obtaining certainty in the process of experience, in practice, is very difficult to exactly determine and discover the essential cause, whereby reaching the certainty will be very hard and rare.

As a semi-Peripatetist semi-illuminationist philosopher, Nasīr al-Dīn al-Tūsī (1200-1273 AC/ 597-672 AH) was well acquainted with Suhrawardī's philosophical thoughts (hikmah al-ishraq) such as idea of intuition and his illumination science; so that some scholars have called him a pure illuminationist. Nevertheless, the influence of Suhrawardī's theory on the issues of perception and cognition is not seen in his works. In other words, Al-Tūsī does not accept illuminative-based knowledge of presence ('ilm hudurī) emphasizing that the acquired knowledge agent is something other than himself. On the other hand, unlike Avicenna's approach (980-1036 AC / 370-428 AH), and also other peripatetic philosophers, in explaining the theory of Absār, Tūsī considers the theory of "radius departure" (khurūj al-shu'ā'), as an autonomous theory. He also introduces rational perceptions through the process of "Impresion" (Inṭibā') rather than "abstraction" (tajrīd). In this article, by examining the various logical and philosophical works of Nasīr al-Dīn al-Tūsī, we try to show that in the matter of knowledge and perception, Tūsī has not been an imitating philosopher, either imitating Peripatetic philosophers, or illuminatist ones. Rather, he has taken a new approach in this field. Therefore, his point of view can be examined from two aspects: First, the negative aspect, in which Tūsī denies the "knowledge of presence (al-'ilm al-huzurī)." The second is the affirmative aspect, which expresses the theory of the impression (intibā') of rational perceptions.

The institution as a social reality and the source of coherence in common actions between members of society, in addition to being the subject of sociological and economic studies, has also been the subject of ontological analysis by some contemporary philosophers. Farabi, as a thinker who cares about society in his philosophical analyzes, is a philosopher who, by presenting his own theory in field of "public images" has been able to re-read the foundations and grounds for discussing ontological analysis of institution and answering the question of why the actions of people in the society are shared. This study seeks to explain the relationship between Farabi's theory of "public image" and its accessories, as well as examining the concept of "institution" as a social reality. According to Farabi's view institutions are the same public images that imitate the natural needs or sacred intellects in tangible forms, using them as a prelude to behavior and consequently creating new credential.

Farabi's Kiitab Alhoroof is the first direct philosophical encounter of a Muslim thinker with Greek philosophical thought. Discussions on the analysis of the concepts of "existence-existent" and " Essence " as the main elements of Aristotle's philosophical thought are among the most important parts of this book. Farabi's purpose in writing this book is to lay the groundwork for a fundamental understanding of Greek philosophical thought in the Islamic world. He begins the discussion with the linguistic analysis of "existent" as a non-derivative word (first example) in Arabic and proposes three meanings (“Categories” and “Truthful” and “Individual external thing by essence) for "existent." He combines three meanings into two meanings and focuses on the third meaning (Individual external thing by essence). Al-Farabi tries to offer a way to justify the multiplicity of beings in the universe by proposing categories for the third meaning of "existence" and "essence" as identifiers of external and mental beings, while emphasizing the external union of "existence" and "essence"; Accordance to the author's view, this way is incoherent without assuming the discussion of the "metaphysical distinction of existence from essence"; Farabi's argument on dividing the existence into rich and poor and designing the concept of (Individual mental thing by essence)  in contrast to the concept of "no existence" does not seem understandable except by assuming the metaphysical distinction of existence and essence. His plan paves the way for designing the rules of ontological distinction of "existence" from "essence" are prepared by Ibn Sina.

In his works, Kriegel criticizes a common viewpoint in the philosophy of mind upon which there is no direct relationship between consciousness and self-consciousness. He knows the problem of this view in that its proponents have not been able to make distinction between different kinds of self-consciousness. Kriegel, after making distinction between four different kinds of self-consciousness, refers to this point that there is a kind of self-consciousness which is prior to every other kind of self-consciousness. This kind of self-consciousness, called intransitive state self-consciousness, accompanies all other kinds of consciousness. Indeed, intransitive state self- consciousness is a kind of self-consciousness that is implicitly along with a conscious mental state and it is the root of first-person view. Kriegel’s viewpoint has a long background in the history of western philosophy inasmuch as its roots can be traced back to Aristotle’s philosophy. According to Aristotle, conscious being attains self-consciousness through or implicitly with being conscious of something else. Avicenna criticizes this Aristotelian viewpoint in his works and along with dividing self-consciousness into two different kinds: self-awareness and awareness of awareness emphasizes this point that first kind of self-consciousness is the very essence of conscious being and is the same as its specific existence. Accordingly, it is not separated from the conscious being and it is not depended on the presence of other beings and being conscious of them. So, it is prior to every other kind of consciousness. This Avicenna’s criticism although is principally directed at Aristotle, it equally aims the Kriegel’s viewpoint.

Earthly love is one of the psychic qualities that human beings experience in their lives. A descriptive analytical study of Avicenna' views shows that earthly or erotic love is basically a kind of mental illness that sometimes leads to physical illnesses. This kind of love is the result of the domination of mental thoughts and imaginations over human beings.  The beloved of earthly love may be any material object, including inanimate objects, plants, animals, and human beings; of course the most important example of such interest is the love of human to another human being. Avicenna's strategies for treating the disease of earthly love are: receiving the lover to the beloved, attracting the lover to the attention of another beloved, and strengthening the physical and material powers of the lover. In contemporary psychology, lustful love can be synchronized with the Avicenna's view about earthly love.

Farabi is a philosopher who, for the first time, by taking a rational interpretation of revelation, took prophecy out of the form of a purely theological issue and included it in philosophical discussions. He, by using the argumentative method, proved generalities about the position of the Prophet, how he related to the unseen world and the characteristics of the Prophet. He did not need to go into detail to express the general laws of prophecy, and necessary did not use well-known religious words to express his views; Rather he substituted a noun for them and constructed  imagination. The question in this study is how prophecy is presented in Farabi's works and also what does this new image have to do with the prophecy? In other words, what image did he present of the prophet and prophecy in his philosophy? One of the results of this study after proving the claim that there is no independent subject under the title of prophecy and also not using the word of  "Prophet" (except in the first process of forming image) as well as by using Farabi's explanation of relevant, is that Farabi mentions the first chief as the recipient of revelation and taking advantage of commonalities between the definitions made of the first chief and prophet, directs the mind of the audience towards the subject of prophecy. According to his view, the first chief in the utopia corresponds to the Prophet with the condition of absolutely and the similarity between the Prophet and the first chief is confirmed and the challenge of lowering the state of Prophet to that of philosopher disappears in Farabi's view.

In this article, we have examined and analyzed Avicenna's view of composition in material objects under the theory of Hylomorphism. First, we showed that the issue of composition of material objects according to existing definitions has logical and metaphysical problems regarding the presence of material components in the composition. Then, we proposed a new idea of true composition, but this new idea is not corresponding with Avicenna's other principles, so it would be flawed in this view. In the second step, by reconstructing Sabzevari's argument, we have shown that the concrete composition (considered by Avicenna) is more acceptable because it does not face any logical problems compared to the union composition. In the third step, we examined the true composition based on the condition of the material components and the formal components. At this stage, six possible and different options were presented about the metaphysical condition of matter and form, and we answered two issues with their design: A) which option is closer to Avicenna's view? B) Which option is more acceptable? Finally, in forth section, we showed from another angle that the analysis of composition from Avicenna's point of view is not also possible through instantiation of the relation of solution or belonging. But this Avicenna' statement can't be an answer to the issue of composition because it is not informative and is a kind of similarity.

Today, there is no doubt that organizations are one of the most important social institutions that play a major role in the development of societies. Organizational role-playing in meeting the needs of communities is conditional on the existence of capable and effective managers. Although in the past, organizations did not exist like today, but even in the old social complexes and institutions, the role of individual as manager or leaders who could draw the roadmap and establish justice among the people of the society was an undeniable necessity. Among the Islamic philosophers, Avicenna has pointed out in his numerous works to the importance of community and participation of individuals to achieve goals such as the happiness and well-being of all members of society, as well as the necessity for just and managerial person to lead and manage of people. Since, he always sought to integrate Greek and Islamic thought, many of his thoughts on topics such as the need for an organizational institution, how to manage the organization, the characteristics of wise leader and manager, and such issues are in line with the theories of Western philosophers such as Plato. In this study, we by collecting data through the library method, we intend to point out some of the theories and ideas of Western philosophers about the need for an ethical manager and leader, as well as how to manage organizations wisely, analyze Avicenna's views in this regard. This research is an interdisciplinary study in the field of applied philosophy.

Subsequent to Aristotle, the principle of ‘Ittifaqi (coincidence) is not been permanent nor major', is used by Avicenna in order to solve the problem of induction. The first subject in this study is the question about the meaning and content of this principle from Avicenna’s perspective.        Since the word of “ittifaq” has been used in five meanings, it should be specified which meaning of this word is exactly according to Avicenna' view to elucidate the content of the above principle. Looking thorough works of Avicenna, Sheik-Al-Raees, reveals that “Ittifaq” in the meaning of fortune or any other three meanings (the lack of an agentive cause, the lack of an ultimate cause, and the lack of a causal relationship) has not been his intension but he means it “the presence of an opponent”. Thus, Avicenna argued that a coincidental phenomenon is not considered in relation to its intrinsic cause. A coincidental phenomenon is something that has an intrinsic cause and purpose, and such matters are not general or permanent”. Anything that is evaluated concerning its intrinsic cause is permanent and major. Thus, it should be argued that Avicenna considers permanency and majority as a criterion that indicates a thing acts according to its nature and essence. This study introduces the principle of causality and its requirements (necessity and the congruence of causes and effects), the principle of “a thing will not exist until its existence becomes necessary”, and the principle of “an unnatural phenomenon does not last”.

The language of birds and its cryptic aspects has been attracted among large number of philosophers from the earliest times. Avicenna was the first person who wrote a treatise on birds in the Islamic period. After him, scholars and thinkers used the language of birds as a means of expressing mystical, political and social idea. It can be mentioned Ghazzali and Najm Razi among these philosophers. Joseph Campbell has studied the role of this issue in the formation of the hero’s character by considering the archetype of the hero journey; it’s including three stages of departure, realization and return. In this study, with the descriptive-analytical method, we attempt to determine the similarities and differences between the works of these three Iranian philosophers based on the Campbell's model. According to the studies in the present article, all three treatises are similar in separation and accession stage; Of course, the details of these stages are also different in these treatises. After that, the path of each story separated in the return stage and, this issue has created differences in the structure and text of these three works that it can be said these differences are derived from the philosophical, mystical and social author’s point of view. Remarkable point is that the journey stages of the in Avicenna's treatise are more complete than of the other two authors.