پژوهشنامه فلسفه دین (نامه حکمت)
سال بیستم شماره 2 (پیاپی 40، پاییز و زمستان 1401)

One of the controversial issues in the religious experience is the reality of the "transcendent". The "transcendent" is one of the most important positive features of religious experience, which the constructivists consider it to be born in the mind or as a human subconscious. Norman L. Geisler, as an essentialist, claims that the object of a religious experience is something real. In his book Philosophy of Religion, in proving the reality of the transcendence, he has put forward an argument which, in his own interpretation, is based on the "empirical method". This method is based on the combination of the two components of "inner need" and "external experience". In this article we explain and analyze Geisler's argument and also explore his rational and empirical foundations including: empirical method, comprehensiveness principle, necessity of verification of the existence of the transcendent, preference of empirical credibility over the logical possibility of deception, the experience of supplying the human’s real needs, uncredibility of the denial of the reality of the transcendent, the generality and reality of the religious experience, the basicness of the need for the transcendent (sense of origination and dependence), the possibility of satisfying the need for the “transcendent”, and the existential need for the "transcendent". After evaluating the the presuppositions of the argument (i.e. common nature of human beings, the similarity between physical and mental needs, the problem of transcendence in atheism, being based on induction, the transmission from general to particular, relativism in addressing religion) we finally came to the conclusion that such a belief is justified for him, because this belief originates from an inner need. Moreover, for the subject of experience, this belief is also "true", because the objectivity of the transcendent is approved.

The main issue of monotheism is how divine unity is compatible with the plurality of attributes. Hence, the question arises whether God has attributes. If God does not have attributes, then what are the revelatory attributes with which He describes Himself? If God has attributes, what is the nature of these attributes and their relation to His essence? How can one speak of the essence, attributes, and divine realm? The apophatic and analogical theologies have been formed in response to these questions, and each has led to some controversies that they have not been able to solve. Although it is possible that the separation of the truth and the metaphor according to the Muʿtazilites and in a few cases according to the Ashʿarites, can act as a temporary solution, it does not seem to be a defensible solution and requires another explanation. This descriptive-analytical study tries to express the metaphysical approach of Muʿtazilites and Ashʿarites about attributes in terms of three issues: Are attributes ontological or semantic? Are they real meanings or names and sayings? Are they divine or human? This research aims to propose a better solution by providing a new reading of Muʿtazilite approach based on the aforementioned metaphysical one. In short, although the Ashʿarites consider attributes to be entities with real and pre-linguistic meanings which God describes Himself with those, and these attributes have reached humans exclusively through revelation, investigating the Muʿtazilite approach depicts that the attributes are semantic matters which are derived from human-linguistic names and are attributed to God by humans through the reason.

The influence of non-cognitive factors, including sin, on human knowledge has become a matter of question in epistemology in recent decades. Religious and mystical texts of different cultures throughout history have emphasized that humans' existential realms are deeply interconnected. Masnavi-ye-Ma'navi is an important text that discusses the influence of sin on human knowledge. In Rumi's view, sin affects the hereafter and also our existence and rational faculties in this world. Rumi's emphasis is on the daily sins, not the original sin. According to him, sins affect knowledge by causing a person to lose mental concentration due to the sense of guilt he or she experiences after sinning. In addition, he believes that the damage done to moral virtues after sinning affects intellectual virtues and, therefore, human knowledge. While Mawlana holds that sin is effective on all types of human knowledge, both our knowledge of Divine and non-Divine realms, his emphasis is on the effect of sin on our knowledge of God and self-knowledge.

In its path to Enlightenment, Europe saw its historical self-consciousness in breaking with its Christian tradition and the concept of autonomy. In the twentieth century, however, and in the wake of unprecedented historical crises, the claim to autonomy and enlightenment was challenged; as a result, Europe’s relationship with Christianity once again became the subject of scrutiny and investigation. Broadly speaking, two currents of thought emerged in response to this question. The first, was to construe this new historical situation as an extension of the old era, and thus proceeded with a questioning of all its assumptions and foundations. The second response construed the contemporary crisis wholly anew and characterized their time with a form of understanding that is capable of providing answers to life-long questions. Noting the limitations of both responses, this paper asks whether theism and humanism can be reconciled. In light of this question, we examine the concept of Messianism in Jewish philosophical thought in order to step beyond the current dichotomy and argue for a third response according to which the relationship of modernity to tradition is not antagonistic. In fact, messianic ideas generate critical force and constructive hope for the modern transformative thought.

ʿAyn-al-Qużāt Hamadānī has paid special attention to the issue of the diversity of religions and has theorized this multiplicity by dividing religious belief into two types, real and imitative. The former is related to the main and direct teachings of the prophets and founders of religions and the latter is connected with adherents. According to him, the one true religion which results from the revelation of ultimate reality to the prophets is unique and is free of any plurality. The diversity occurs just in the beliefs of the majority of disciples owing to incorrect interpretations or different understanding of the prophets’ teachings, a fact which is sometimes inevitable. As those teachings become more distant from their main sources over time, it naturally causes disagreements and contentions. His main way to overcome this multiplicity or to accept it as an inevitable fact is first to disaccustom and abandon the imitative religion and return to the source doctrines of the prophets through intuition and revelation. It should also be admitted that it is possible to have different understandings of one single word and we should acknowledge this possibility and its requisites and welcome the diversity of religions and beliefs. This essay tries to present and explain ʿAyn-al-Qużāt’s viewpoint about the mentioned issues.

The modern and postmodern challenges regarding the meaning of life have been recognized as the root of many mental harms in contemporary human beings. Love as one of the most fundamental religious-humane concepts can significantly contribute to the resolution of such challenges. Speaking of the research question, the present study, using the descriptive-analytical method, attempts to figure out how the meaning of life based on love can be re-defined in accordance with the views of Allameh Ja'fari (as one of the recent religious thinkers). According to the research findings, the meaning of lover's life is commensurate with the beloved’s value; the more sublime the beloved is, the more sublime the lover's life will be. Virtual love and real love have different effects on the meaning of life. When it comes to the meaning of life, there is a bilateral relationship between love and "belief in God". As for the connection between love and "purpose", virtual love can not only serve as a tool for reaching the "true love", but can be recognized as the representative of its dignity and its manifestations. In addition to these components, there is a close-knit relationship between the “human existential and perfection levels" and the type and level of love. As for the relationship between love and "art", people's perceptions of the meaning of life can generate different arts. Combined with real love, any artwork can serve as a source of excellence and perfection in society.

The concept of faith and reasoning and how they are related is one of the controversial issues that humanity has been facing for a long time. Norman Malcolm, an American philosopher and one of Wittgenstein's most famous students and commentators, has a unique expression about faith and reasoning and the relationship between the two, relying on Wittgenstein's later thoughts such as language game, the form of life, etc. By presenting similarities between the philosophical understanding and the characteristics of Wittgenstein's religious thought, Malcolm intends to find a solid relationship between faith and reasoning. Malcolm has explained the types of resemblance between faith and reasoning by appealing to concepts such as the finality of explanation, religious wonder, the elimination of error, the belief in the primacy of action and the groundlessness of belief. This issue leads him to the fact that the source of faith and reasoning is one thing, and in other words, these two are connected in a baseless foundation. In this article, with a descriptive-analytical method and in a systematic manner, an attempt has been made both to achieve a correct understanding of Malcolm's thoughts about the relationship between faith and reasoning, using his works and passages, and to review the opinions and criticisms of his critics such as Peter Winch and Kai Nelson.

The science-religion relationship has been investigated more systematically since the middle of the 20th century. Many theories of different kinds were suggested in order to figure out this relation via analyzing the content and history of science and religion. The first generation of these theories presumed a constant determined essence for both science and religion. Thus, they described an inherent relationship of either conflict or coherence between them. While the second-generation theories found these essentialist views too simplistic, they articulated and categorized various possible relations between science and religion in a taxonomic manner. Still, in these theories, the cognitive and propositional dimensions of science and religion were dominant. In the 90s, by prioritizing the sociological and historical approaches in both science and religion studies, some new aspects of these studies emerged. Applied to science-religion relationship debates, these approaches criticized the former theories for denying dynamic, contextual, and non-epistemic aspects of both science and religion. As a response to the critiques, the third-generation theories were developed, in which the contextuality of science-religion relation took a focal place. In this paper, three cases of 3rd generation theories (Stenmark’s, Lee’s, and Cantor’s) are discussed. It is claimed that these recent theories have a better consonance with the relevant facts. Also, due to being grounded on the two principles of “Continuity of Human Experience” and “the Existence of Common Actors in Science and Religion”, these theories provide strong implications in favor of the possibility and importance of the science-religion interactive relationship.

The problem of evil and theodicy are acknowledged as inherent parts of the philosophy of religion. But on the other hand, some are seeking a way to put an end to this issue. Nick Trakakis is one of them, who by passing over meta theodicy and critique of theodicy, finally sees the solution in “anti-Theodicy”. Relying on the objective and practical reality of evil, in addition to the moral, methodological, and metaphysical flaws of the current theodicies, he has revised the image of personal God. According to anti-theodicy, theodicies are based on a personal God, and this is an obstacle to the compromise between the existence of evil and God's benevolence. Nevertheless, anti-theodicy has faced criticism in terms of fundamentals, methodology, and the purpose. In this research, first, the difference between anti-theodicy, meta-theodicy, and critique of theodicy is discussed and then the definition and explanation of anti-theodicy from Trakakis's perspective are explicated. In the end, some of the most important objections to this theory are proposed: taking a monopolistic attitude toward the moral basis, having cognitive weakness in common attributes, being prejudiced in dealing with the problem, ignoring the main problem, not proposing an alternative explanation of evil, and returning to the logical problem of evil.

According to the current interpretation, Wittgenstein in "Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough" takes an expressive approach to religious rituals and cultural practices. Relying on this approach, he criticizes Frazer's view. Moyal-Sharrock, relying on this interpretation, considers Wittgenstein as a proponent of a kind of cultural relativism. But cultural relativism is subject to objections from the perspective of naturalism and the theory of evolution. In this article, we will review Brian Clack's interpretation of Wittgenstein. Clack considers Wittgenstein's view of ritual practices to be compatible with naturalism and an evolutionary account of the social and cultural life of humans. We will then examine Emily Heckel's account of cultural relativism in Wittgenstein's reflections on religious rituals and cultural practices. We will show: (1) how Heckel defends that Wittgenstein is a cultural relativist in these reflections, and (2) how Heckel rejects objections of some naturalists and evolutionists to Wittgenstein's cultural relativism. Finally, we defend the position that, (a) Wittgenstein is not an epistemological cultural relativist, (b) from Wittgenstein's point of view, cultural and religious rituals are not alternatives to science, but they are present in all cultures—including modern culture—beside science, (c) Wittgenstein is a semantic relativist about cultural rituals, and (d) Wittgenstein's defense of the significance of rituals in the social life of human does not conflict with naturalistic study about human, language, and culture, and one can defend Wittgenstein's position about cultural rituals from some naturalistic point of view.

The problem of evil has been a challenging issue throughout the history of religious and philosophical thought. In the past, thinkers would rely on evil to undermine divine omnipotence, wisdom, and justice. Nowadays, however, this problem has become a shelter for atheism. The problem of evil is of two types: logical and evidential. In the logical problem of evil, the claim is that the existence of evil is not consistent with the existence of Omniscient, Omnipotent, and Omnibenevolent God, whereas, in the latter, evils are considered as evidence for undermining theism. This article, using analytical methods, studies the first problem from Avicenna's viewpoint. Since this account of the problem is rather new in Islamic culture, Avicenna did not address it explicitly. Still, perhaps one can derive his opinion from the content of his views on the attributes of God. In Avicenna's philosophy, God is a pure actuality who has the necessary causal relationship with the world and is purified from the human and bodily characteristics. According to Avicenna, God's power and will are not only concretely, but also conceptually, the same as God's knowledge. Moreover, all three of them are limited to the present world. Therefore, God’s Omniscience and Omnipotence encompass only the beings of this world, not the many possible worlds we can imagine. Also, Omnibenevolence puts its actions beyond moral judgments. Accordingly, there remains no room for the logical problem of evil in Avicenna’s system of thought.

Spinoza and Mulla Sadra, in spite of having different philosophical principles, paid special attention to the problem of immediate knowledge of God. A philosophical dialogue between them can be held, if the two following conditions are satisfied. First, the ontological features of the object of that knowledge -that play the essential role in immediate knowledge- should be identified. In this regard, infinity in Spinoza’s philosophy and lacking quiddity and being superior to the perfection in Mulla Sadra’s philosophy can be cited. Secondly, the definition of the immediate knowledge and its main feature that is relevant to the object of that knowledge should be surveyed. On one hand, Spinoza points out that the truth of this kind of knowledge and complete correspondence between that knowledge and its object are its main characteristics. On the other hand, Mulla Sadra stresses that such knowledge is confined to the existential degree of the knower. The comparison shows that Spinoza, in common with Mulla Sadra, asserts that the immediate knowledge is the most perfect one which the most perfect existent is its object. Nonetheless, the breadth and the narrowness of the meaning of the medium, along with inconsistency in Spinoza’s view and consistency in Mulla Sadra’s position on the immediate perfect knowledge of God are the matters that distinguishes Spinoza’s views from those of Mulla Sadra’s.