فصلنامه مطالعات بنیادین و کاربردی جهان اسلام
پیاپی 15 (بهار 1402)

History has long fueled people''s interest in predicting the future. But in ancient times, the answer to this interest was mainly based on speculation. Therefore, the attractiveness of future recognition and the mistake of speculation made the trend of wanting to know the future based on systematic thinking and the use of scientific data. This systematic thinking, now known as futures studies, has gained an important position..This position is particularly important in an age that can be called the times of repeated crises. For in this age, knowing the future can help governments reduce damage and prepare to make the best decisions. Based on this, the central question of this research is: What kind of scenario is multilateralism in the post-coronavirus system? And what strategies does the Islamic Republic of Iran have in this scenario? Findings using scenario creation and the integrated approach show that multilateralism is a desirable scenario in the post-coronavirus world and Iran, as a potential actor, needs to adopt special strategies to contribute to creating this desirable order.  Given the possibility of changes in the world after the coronavirus, which some even consider as a point dividing the world into before and after, knowledge of the future system can be very important to any government. Therefore, in this research, the authors try to show what kind of scenario multilateralism (probable, preferable and plausible) is and what strategies Iran should adopt. Based on purpose, the method of this research is basic. In terms of data, it is a combination of qualitative and quantitative approaches. The method of data collection in this research is descriptive-survey. Then, the preferable scenario is referred to elites (Delphi method). Findings showed that the coronavirus as a severe crisis will affect the main elements and components of the international system such as security, economy, geopolitics and nation-state. AND the revival of multilateralism is a preferable scenario. In the future order due to the strong interdependence and the occurrence of crises that require transnational coordinated action, the world needs to revive reformed multilateralism. But since the world order is still witnessing a strategic and normative vacuum, this approach to multilateralism should be called the desired order, which will be very difficult to achieve, if not impossible. In this desirable order, Iran needs to adopt strategies such as classification of values, consensus on the national role, focusing on soft power, taking advantage of health diplomacy and ... to help the process of more dispersed regularity and the mix of multilateralism to provide more to its interests. The future vision can help to create long-term policies, strategies and plans while aligning more closely with the current conditions. Therefore, the goal of futurology is not to know the future, but to help make better decisions with methods that make us anticipate opportunities and threats and consider how to deal with them. Perhaps the most important reason for using future research methods is to help identify things we don''t know, but we need to know in order to make smarter decisions. In this article, we tried to show how multilateralism, which has failed and declined in recent decades due to various reasons, will be like after Corona. Surveys showed that in the future order, due to strong interdependence and the occurrence of crises that require transnational coordinated action, the world needs to revive reformed multilateralism.The policies during the spread of Corona as one of the biggest global challenges have caused the revival of multilateralism to be not a choice but a desirable necessity for all governments, because this crisis created a context for understanding contradictions and discrimination. . But since the world order is still witnessing a strategic and normative void, this move towards multilateralism should be called a desirable order, which will be very difficult, if not impossible, to achieve. In this desired order, the Islamic Republic of Iran as a potential power requires the application of strategies such as leveling of values, consensus on the role of a single nation, focus on soft power and use of health diplomacy in order to form a more dispersed order. and help more multilaterally to secure their own interests.

The Arab Spring marked a new chapter in the development of the Middle East, with significant changes occurring in the socio-political structures of some Arab countries. During the Arab Spring, the long-standing tyranny in the Arab world was challenged, and the disaffected masses expressed their discontent through continuous street and revolutionary protests. The analysis of these uprisings is psychologically plausible. The dissatisfied masses of the Arab world challenged the symptomatic system of long-standing Arab tyranny, creating a symptom with change and demanding it from the sphere of power. However, these protests were not fundamental and emerged more in the form of a barren political coalition, positively demonstrating the nature of the social and all-encompassing revolution.
In this article, we want to investigate and analyze the process of political and social uprising during the Arab Spring against the authoritarian system by using Gilles Deleuze's theory. The hypothesis is that the disaffected masses in the Arab world, by expressing their desire to participate in their political and social destiny, presented a syndrome contrary to the symptomatic system of authoritarianism ruling in the Arab countries, and in the practical field, they engaged in superficial political action in the form of a political revolution to realize the desire to turn to political participation. Various researches have been conducted on the Arab Spring uprising, most of which have examined political, social and economic factors from domestic, regional and global perspectives. In this article, emphasizing the psychoanalytical analysis of this general movement in the Arab world, we want to present a different reading with the aforementioned works. Therefore, we examine the developments of the Arab Spring in the countries of Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia.
The main question of this study is: What is the process of diversity and change in North African countries due to the Arab Spring, and what is the path of the politics of desire for power? Our hypothesis is that the paranoid structure of the authoritarian system in the Arab world is the main obstacle to the establishment of democratic order in these societies. This article intends to analyze and study the evolution of the Arab Spring using the theory of Gilles Deleuze.
The movements and uprisings of the Arab Spring since 2011 led to the dominant order and the symptoms of paranoid tyranny of the involved societies, experiencing severe institutional and functional challenges. In Arab societies, signs such as closed political culture, weak participatory processes, systematic administrative corruption, sick bureaucracies, severe economic challenges had always weakened civil society and social forces. With the arrival of trends and prospects of globalization and new tools such as media and virtual networks to the societies involved, their dominant order changed. In such a way that the political arena in these countries underwent diversity and discourse transformation, or according to Deleuze's thought, the paranoid pole was drawn into strategic challenges by the activated schizo pole, whose revolutionary actions were aimed at change and desire to become. The Arab Spring movements in a new reading were revolutions in cultural necessity. A culture that suffered from tyranny, repression, corruption, inefficiency, and a revolutionary and cultural movement could lead such an authoritarian cultural order from the paranoid pole to the schizo and transformational pole. In other words, the social demands in the Arab Spring movements were based on the transition to democracy as a discursive and political development. A development that could change the politics in these countries. But these uprisings could not make the transition from authoritarianism to democracy successfully due to the lack of a single leadership, the lack of an organized ideology, the superficiality of the movements, and the lack of a structural alternative, and led to the reproduction of authority and domination in new forms. The reason for that was the rhizomatic nature of its revolutionary movement and the lack of a single organization. In general, these three strategies for change in the policy arena of the discussed countries are significant for diversity and transformation: 1. Using civil capacities and platforms to deal with challenges and threats and to create a democratic and capable civil society; 2. Dealing intelligently with threats according to their internal structure 3. Social empowerment of citizens for efficient institutional social changes.

In Syria and Yemen, the apparent power of ethnic and religious groups has led to civil war, rooted in the identity issues of these societies. Under the consensus cultural variable is the component of identity, which is one of the main factors and the foundation of the so-called Arab Spring developments. The majority of Arab societies suffer from the lack of national identity due to the plurality of ethnic and religious groups, which puts some groups in a superior political position and pushes others to the margins. Identity is at the top of the Arab developments, and other factors are placed below it. Even the difference in the process of developments in these societies is due to the identity issue. The aim of this research is to investigate the role of identity in the formation, results, and trends of recent developments in the Arab Middle East using constructivism in a descriptive and analytical way. The article's main question is, "What effect has the identity and identitarianism of ethnic and religious groups of Arab societies had on the formation and process of recent developments of these societies?" The findings indicate that the social structure of most Arab societies is very plural. Muslim groups in Arab countries are not cohesive, and there are many religious sects that fuel the religious divide of these societies. The biggest gap is between Shia and Sunni. The difference in the fundamentals of the belief principles of the various Sunni sects has led to their identity split. The Brotherhood, Salafism, and radical fundamentalism are the most effective identity discourses of the Sunni sect, which, along with the Shiites, try to spread their intellectual values and norms in Arab societies. The most prominent ethnic divide is related to the Kurdish ethnicity, which in countries such as Syria and Iraq pursue a different identity from the Arab ethnic groups due to their cultural values. Due to the lack of common norms in Arab societies, a common identity has not been formed in these countries, and we are facing a plurality of identities that are rooted in contradictions and conflicts. This is why during the Arab developments, three groups of fundamentalists, Shiites, and Kurds have become highly active in the analysis of identity action, and it is not possible to solve the crises of these societies without considering their demands.
When the political units do not pay attention to the intellectual, perceptive, normative, and identity components of the citizens, it is natural that conflicts between the government and the society will be created. This is what has been objectified in the Arab societies of the Middle East. The Arab totalitarian governments, by creating a fence around themselves, have actually limited the political and economic structure to their families and those around them and do not care about other peoples.
Therefore, what was formed in the Arab Middle East in 2011 cannot be unrelated to the ethnic-religious intellectual and normative patterns of this region. Even the trends and differences in the developments of Arab societies are not unrelated to the plural identity of these societies. The more cohesive the country is in terms of social structure, the faster the social movement ends, and we do not witness civil war or the presence of other countries in the course of the developments of these societies. A clear example of that is Egypt and Tunisia, where the overthrow of the governments resulted in relative peace in a short period of time. The lack of active ethnic-religious identities and their relatively coherent social structure caused the shortness of the transition period, low violence, and non-intervention of other countries in the course of the developments of these societies. However, identity pluralism in some societies such as Syria, Yemen, and to some extent Libya pushed the developments in another direction. In these societies, the depth of the identity difference is such that none of the parties backed down from their position, and the protests progressed towards civil war and widespread crisis. The identity and ideological war stemming from dry religious interpretations led to widespread violence in societies such as Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. The presence of active identity groups in the developments of these societies followed the reaction of transnational actors in the field of supporting identity groups close to them, which ultimately results in the prolongation of the crisis and proxy wars.

This article investigates the feasibility of Malaysia and Indonesia, as two Muslim countries in Southeast Asia, joining the Abraham Accords. Indonesia, the most populous Muslim country, is also one of the emerging economies of the world and expected to become one of the five largest economic powers in the future. Malaysia, a Muslim country with a flourishing economy, industry, and academic circles, is also among the most important Muslim countries in the world. Their location in Southeast Asia, hosting 240 million Muslims, and lying at the forefront of the geopolitical battle between the United States of America and China, adds to their importance.
On September 15, 2020, President Donald Trump, along with Benjamin Netanyahu, the prime minister of Israel, and the foreign ministers of the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, unveiled the Abraham Accords. Bahrain and the UAE became the first countries in the Persian Gulf to recognize Israel. Since then, Sudan and Morocco have also normalized their relations with Israel, and the United Arab Emirates has signed a trade agreement with Israel.
From August to December 2020, Israel normalized its relations with the four countries of the UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco. It is said that the Abraham Accords could potentially expand to include up to ten countries.
Using the descriptive-analytical method and library sources, this article seeks to determine the feasibility of Malaysia and Indonesia normalizing relations with Israel and joining the Abraham Accords. Forging a relationship with Indonesia, the most populous Muslim country, has always been of paramount importance for Israel. Before the start of the so-called Abraham peace process, there was an idea among some that establishing relations with Indonesia could be a turning point in Israel's relations with Muslim countries. If other Muslim countries witnessed the normalization of Israel's relations with the largest and most populous Muslim country, it would be possible for Jakarta to become a model for them to follow. However, it has not been possible for Israel to establish relations with Indonesia, and Jakarta is one of the 28 countries that have not officially recognized Israel. In addition, according to a BBC survey conducted in 2017, only 9% of the people in Indonesia have a positive view of the foreign policy of Israel. Even in the Pew Institute survey in 2007, Indonesia ranked first in terms of solidarity with Palestine and opposition to Israel after five Middle Eastern countries.
Regarding Malaysia, the anti-Israel sentiment among Malaysians is also high. According to a survey conducted by the Anti-Defamation League, 61% of the country's population have anti-Semitic sentiments. According to a survey conducted by the Pew Institute, only 11% of Malaysians support Israel in the conflict between Israel and Palestine, and 82% are pro-Palestine.
When analyzing the feasibility of normalizing relations between Malaysia and Indonesia, several factors must be considered. One of the influencing factors is the United States of America. Both Malaysia and Indonesia are not among the so-called revisionist governments in the international order, and they may join the Abraham Accords if they are encouraged, insisted or forced by the United States. This is especially true for Indonesia, as we have seen the efforts of the Trump and Biden administrations to have Indonesia join the Jirga of Abraham Pact member states.
Another important point that can affect the normalization of relations between Malaysia and Indonesia with Israel is Saudi Arabia's joining the Abraham Accords. Indonesia and Malaysia have warm relations with Saudi Arabia, which is the second Middle East partner of Malaysia, and relations between Indonesia and Saudi Arabia are also warm. According to the 2021 survey by Australia's Lowy Institute, Mohammed bin Salman, the crown prince of Saudi Arabia, is the most popular foreign leader in Indonesia. Therefore, it can be argued that Saudi Arabia's joining the process of normalizing relations between Muslim countries and Israel can also influence Indonesia and Malaysia and encourage them to do so.
In conclusion, while the hypothesis of this research was based on the proposition that Indonesia and Malaysia joining the Abraham Accords and normalizing relations with Israel is not likely, the findings of the research confirm this hypothesis. Due to various reasons, especially the strong anti-Israel sentiments of the people of these two countries, Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur's joining the Abraham Accords is not likely, at least in the current time frame. However, factors such as the role-playing of the United States may make the atmosphere for the normalization of Indonesia's relations with Israel more favorable than that of Malaysia.

Afghanistan is a multinational and multicultural country that has been plagued by war and insecurity for over 14 decades. One of the main reasons for the continuation of war and insecurity is the lack of attention given to the socio-cultural contexts and dimensions of insecurity. The main goal of this article is to understand the contexts and socio-cultural foundations of order and security in Afghanistan. The research method used is qualitative with a grounded theory approach. The statistical population of this research is the social and cultural affairs experts of Afghanistan, and the samples were selected using the purposeful sampling method. Qualitative interviews were conducted with 18 people until theoretical saturation was reached. The data was analyzed using open, axial, and selective coding.
The findings of the research have been deduced in the form of six main categories: lack of symbolic understanding and cultural disorder, weak and tense interactions between ethnic groups, inequalities and discrimination in the distribution of national resources, militant cultural capital, social capital focused on the tribe and tribe, and lack of formation of the public arena. The central phenomenon of this research is the imprinting of order and security in the social and cultural contexts of Afghan society. It is concluded that the basic solution to ensure order and security in this country is to dismantle the cultural and social foundations of war and insecurity.
Destructive and ruinous wars started with the invasion of Afghanistan by the former Soviet army, and these wars continue under different names and forms. After the withdrawal of the Soviet army from Afghanistan, the government supported by them did not last, and jihadist groups supported by neighboring countries and western countries came to power. These ethnic groups and parties, who did not have the necessary experience, expertise, and governance methods, got involved after about a year. The wars of Jihadi parties and ethnic armed groups also destroyed the city of Kabul and some remaining facilities from the wars of these groups with the Soviet army, and millions of people were forced to migrate (domestic-foreign). This miserable situation led to the emergence of the Taliban group. The Taliban easily removed the Mojahedin groups from power and ruled over 95% of Afghanistan for about five years. Of course, during this period, scattered wars continued in the fronts of Panjshir, Dareh Souf-Samangan, parts of Bamyan, and in Balkhab-Sarpol. With Al-Qaeda's attack on the Twin Towers of New York, the equation was changed, and after obtaining permission from the United Nations Security Council, the United States invaded the Taliban government and overthrew it in about a month. The attack of the United States of America and NATO has been one of the most important military attacks in Afghanistan. The fall of the Taliban opened a new window to war and insecurity, and the face of war changed. After 20 years, the Taliban returned to power, and this time, ISIS, the National Resistance Front, the United National Council Front, and several other fronts have promised to challenge the Taliban's rule. However, the ongoing wars and violence in this country have cultural, social, economic, and structural foundations that have been neglected in most analyses and discourses of war and insecurity. If in the past, a plan and a decision were made to end the war, it was only looked at as a problem, and the dimensions and hidden layers and flames under the ashes of the war were ignored. Therefore, it is essential to investigate the software dimensions of war, that is the cultural and social dimensions of continuous wars in Afghanistan, as this issue has not received enough attention. The main goal of this research is to analyze the software aspects of war and insecurity in Afghanistan.
The main research question is: What are the social and cultural foundations of order and security in Afghanistan? The sub-questions of this research are: What are the cultural roots of insecurity in Afghanistan? Why is the cultural and social capital of the Afghan people strengthened by disorder and insecurity? What direction do competitions and interactions of ethnic groups put the security of Afghanistan in? How do social inequalities and discrimination threaten the security of this country?

Political parties are a mechanism for enriching political life and providing a suitable environment for political procedures within the framework of democracy and consciousness. They are one of the manifestations of democracy and a reflection of political, social, and economic reality. Parties in Africa, especially in North Africa, are one of the pillars of the political process. Due to the many commonalities between Algeria and the Maghreb, including being in North Africa, neighboring France, sharing a colonial history, and even in terms of the emergence and scenarios of the parties, they have many similarities with each other. The objective of this study is to investigate the emergence and scenarios of political parties in Algeria and Morocco.
Research Methods and Questions: This descriptive-analytical study comparatively examines the emergence and scenarios of political parties in Algeria and the West. The most important questions of this study are: What are the reasons for the emergence of parties in Algeria and Morocco? What is the role of political parties in the independence of Algeria and Morocco? What are the scenarios for the emergence of political parties in Algeria and Morocco?
The historical roots of the emergence of political parties in Algeria and the Maghreb date back to the colonial era. After independence, the two political systems viewed the party system differently. In Algeria, after years of a one-party system, it ended the socialist system and established a multi-party system in 1989. Morocco also adopted a multiparty system. In order to survive the wave of the revolution known as the "Arab Spring," the Algerian and Maghreb regimes devised measures.
Algeria and Morocco share many similarities, such as being located in North Africa, having common racial, religious, and linguistic affiliations, and both being former French colonies. The historical roots of the emergence of political parties in Algeria and the Maghreb date back to the colonial era and are among the aspects of resistance and the demand for the rights of the two nations. After independence, the two political systems in Algeria and Morocco viewed the party system differently. In Algeria, after years of a one-party system, it ended the socialist system and established a multi-party system in 1989. Morocco also adopted a multiparty system. The Maghreb achieved independence in 1956, and Algeria achieved independence in 1962, but the relationship between the two countries has been tense ever since. In 1976, their diplomatic relations were severed for 12 years until 1988. Although the two neighboring countries have diplomatic relations, the level of these relationships is not the same. The Polisario Front and the issue of the Western Sahara and the export of narcotics from the Maghreb are among the main causes of the dispute between the Maghreb and Algeria.
This article comparatively examines the emergence and scenarios of political parties in Algeria and Morocco. The most important approach of this research is that the historical roots of the emergence of political parties in Algeria and the Maghreb date back to the colonial era. After independence, the two political systems viewed the party system differently. In Algeria, after years of one-party rule, it ended the socialist system and established a multi-party system in 1989. The Maghreb also adopted a multiparty system. In order to survive the wave of the revolution known as the "Arab Spring" or "Islamic Awakening," the Algerian and Maghreb regimes devised measures. The Algerian government builds political parties in the Balkans; hence, it became only the central parties and parliament to legitimize the goals and decisions of the government. In the West, too, the court weakened its parties and publicized itself. But due to concerns about the authority of parties such as Esteghlal, it has given in to the multiparty system. One of the commonalities between the parties in Algeria and the Maghreb is the growth of Islamist parties in a particular period and their weakening at the same time. The central policy of Algeria and Morocco from the emergence of political parties that could threaten national unity and sow the seeds of discrimination and racism among the people; also abuse freedom of expression; is worried. Hence, they were constantly updating the rules. The year 1996 was a decisive turning point in the process of political transformation of the two countries. It can be said that this process is the beginning of political success after the suspension of the election process. It is also the beginning of the reconstruction of institutions related to the category of political parties. On the other hand, we are witnessing political factionalism in the Maghreb, which led to a consensus and ended a long period of disagreement and the exchange of accusations and hypocrisy against each other.