فصلنامه مطالعات بنیادین و کاربردی جهان اسلام
پیاپی 18 (زمستان 1402)

Geopolitical genomes are geographical phenomena related to independent political units with sovereignty or the same countries that require strategic thinking for their internal and external policies. These genetic codes, unique to each country, enable the prediction of foreign policy analysis and the actions of actors at national, regional, and global levels.
Since Iran and Saudi Arabia are the two main and influential players in the Southwest Asia region, knowing their geopolitical genomes is very important for the analysis of their foreign policy and geopolitical codes.
The current research aims to identify the influential genomes of the two countries in order to find out how they influence in shaping their foreign policy and explain the role of these genomes in the most important areas of conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia.
The research hypothesis suggests that the distinct geopolitical genomes of Iran and Saudi Arabia serve as the foundation for conflicts between the two countries at the regional level, especially impacting the national spaces of Syria, Yemen, and Bahrain.
 The research hypothesis suggests that the distinct geopolitical genomes of Iran and Saudi Arabia serve as the foundation for conflicts between the two countries at the regional level, especially impacting the national spaces of Syria, Yemen, and Bahrain.
The research methodology employed is descriptive-analytical and relies on information and library sources. The results of this study indicate a direct relationship between the genomes of the two countries and the escalation of competition and conflicts between Iran and Saudi Arabia.

After the United States and its allies' attack on Afghanistan, the Republic government replaced the Islamic Emirate of the Taliban. One of the gifts of the Democratic Republic to Afghanistan was holding elections with the presence of eligible women and men as voters and election candidates. Based on this, the fourth presidential election in Afghanistan in 2019 was held amidst the confrontation between the central government and the Taliban in peace talks in Doha and war in various parts of the country. Approximately ten million eligible voters had registered to vote. The elections, which had been delayed for several months, were finally held in September 2019. The low voter turnout quickly made headlines. Only about two million six hundred thousand people, or just twenty percent of eligible voters, had turned up to the polls. This lack of enthusiasm signaled a major shift in Afghanistan's political situation. Given that elections are one of the most important symbols of democracy, the behavior of Afghan voters sounded an important alarm for the central government and, consequently, the survival of democracy. An alarm that no one paid attention to, and less than two years later, its result was evident with the fall of the republic and the return of the Taliban.
In this regard, the research question has been raised as to how the grounds for the collapse of the republican system in Afghanistan were formed in the behavior of voters in the 2019 presidential elections? The research method is qualitative with a descriptive-analytical approach. The data has been collected from library and internet sources. The theoretical basis of this research is also based on the views and opinions of Robert Dahl, Inglehart, and Pippa Nouris in the field of voting behavior.
Robert Dahl's theory, based on the principle of cost-benefit calculation, denies the approach of sociability and emphasizes the importance of rational choice. Overall, this approach seeks to demonstrate a direct relationship between citizens' inclination to vote and their benefit from participating in elections.
Inglehart's theory focuses on changing the values of generations. He believes that over time and with changes in the international climate, the desires and thoughts of generations change. These changes are reflected in the social and political behavior of individuals.
Finally, this research has sought the help of the Pippa Nouris views, which has proposed a model for examining political participation and, consequently, voting behavior, which is one of the most comprehensive theoretical models in the field of elections to date. The popularity and acceptance of this model is due to the use of three groups of macro, meso, and micro theories. With such characteristics, it is possible to examine the voting behavior of citizens at different levels.
The research findings indicate that a set of factors has influenced the voting behavior of the people of Afghanistan. These factors not only illustrate the people's disillusionment with the 2019 elections but also reflect a general sense of hopelessness and distance from the republican system among the people. This hopelessness ultimately led to the fall of the republic to the Taliban less than two years later.
 
These factors and backgrounds included the following:First, "political and economic inequalities and imbalances" resulting from the monopolization of power by the Pashtun ethnic group.
Second, "undermining the religious identity of the people" resulting from the Western democratic system's governance, which incited bias and religious sentiment among the people of Afghanistan, ultimately paving the way for the acceptance of the Taliban.
The third factor was the "negative effects of the engineering of the 2014 presidential elections." The engineering of these elections dealt a heavy blow to the framework of democracy imposed on Afghanistan, the consequences and effects of which were evident five years later with the people's lack of enthusiasm for the fourth presidential elections.
In the lead-up to the 2019 elections in Afghanistan, the legitimacy and acceptance of the republican system had reached its lowest point.
Fourth, "the failure to achieve peace and national tranquility" after the US invasion of Afghanistan, which, with the continuation of military confrontation between the US and the Taliban, was never realized, and the security of Afghanistan was severely undermined.
Fifth, "Deepening ethnic divides" as a result of the Pashtun-centric policies of Afghan presidents (Hamid Karzai and Ashraf Ghani) intensified ethnic nationalism and division, impacting societal cohesion and unity. In reality, on the brink of the 2019 elections, democracy in Afghanistan brought about systematic and modern ethnic biases, fostering increased division and significantly diminishing political participation.
Sixth, "Multiplicity and weakness of parties." The emerging parties in Afghanistan were predominantly ethnocentric and focused on individual interests. In the 2019 elections, rather than uniting society to find the best presidential option, parties engaged in political maneuvering, leading to division along ethnic and religious lines.
Seventh, "Exclusion of women from political participation." Despite efforts during the republican system to uphold women's rights, an anti-women culture hindered active female engagement. Women's involvement in political and social spheres was notably low on the eve of the 2019 presidential elections.
Eighth, "Emergence of a new generation." Educated and well-informed, the new generation perceived the current Afghan government as ineffective and untrustworthy, prompting a boycott of electoral participation.

The lack of enthusiasm for the 2019 fourth presidential elections in Afghanistan served as an initial indication, signaling reduced legitimacy and acceptance of the republican system amongst Afghan citizens.
In this regard, the actions of the central government, opposition groups to the republican system, and the interventions of foreign countries were three crucial elements contributing to the diminishing desire for political participation among the Afghan people. Over the past two decades, the central government, through the monopolization of power within a specific ethnic group and the marginalization of other ethnicities, fostered a cold war scenario among various groups, political parties, and ethnic factions both against the central government and the favored ethnic group. Concurrently, the Taliban and ISIS, serving as the primary opposition forces to the central government, gained significant influence and power in Afghanistan.
The shift from military confrontation to soft negotiations with the Taliban, coupled with the government's unaccountable concessions to this group, further demoralized the populace regarding the republic and democracy. This led to political and social distrust towards the democratic system. By the time of the 2019 elections, democracy lacked a solid track record among the citizens. The voting behavior showcased that the downfall of democracy or the republican system in 2021 was not unforeseen. Issues like poverty, corruption, insecurity, and inequality had peaked prior to the 2019 elections. These problems exacerbated post-elections, resulting in the central government losing its primary asset - public trust.
 
The election results and the voting tendencies of the Afghan people underscored that democracy cannot be imposed without substantial foundations in place. There was a disenchantment with Western democracy, with the populace anticipating a new political structure following the elections and the Doha peace accord. However, less than two years after the elections, Afghanistan found itself back under the same autocratic Taliban rule from a quarter of a century ago.

Foreign policy can be considered as a set of goals, plans, and actions aimed at safeguarding a country’s survival and enhancing its position in the international system. However, the concept of survival extends beyond mere physical existence; it encompasses other critical factors such as economic development, political security, and social stability. The key question is: What factors influence a country’s foreign policy decisions and how do these policies manifest themselves?
There are generally different approaches to answering this question. The first approach is related to structural realists, who assert that the factors influencing foreign policy are rooted in the macro levels and structures of the international system. In contrast to this view, another group of theories—regardless of the role of structural components—believes that internal factors within countries play a more decisive role in shaping foreign policy than structural factors. Finally, some other theories, instead of strictly separating the influence of structural (exogenous) and internal factors, emphasize the interaction between these two groups of factors and the impact of the structure through internal (endogenous) level factors.
Influential factors operate at two levels within the international system and geopolitics, ultimately shaping a country’s foreign policy. At the innermost layer, decision-makers play a pivotal role. Much of this layer operates through the constitutional mechanisms of countries. Notably, the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran contains several principles and clauses that delineate the goals and priorities of its foreign policy.
 
Clause C of the second constitutional principle emphasizes the rejection of tyranny, oppression, and domination—a critical indicator within Iran’s system. Substantively, the constitution outlines rules governing the government, addressing the relationship between the government and the people. It emphasizes comprehensive public supervision over government affairs and regulates crucial matters within the political society. From the constitution’s content, we deduce its complete supremacy over all subjects, authorities, and laws. Given that this law establishes qualifications, it inherently surpasses all institutions and authorities listed therein. Consequently, no authority or institution should act contrary to the Constitution, as doing so would compromise its competence.
Foreign policy consists of four principles (principles 152 to 155). Even though foreign policy measures fall under the duties of the executive branch, their importance warrants an independent chapter. The constitution unequivocally rejects any form of hegemony in foreign policy, emphasizing the preservation of all-round independence and territorial integrity. It prioritizes defending the rights of all Muslims and maintaining non-commitment to hegemonic powers, promoting mutual peaceful relations. Additionally, the constitution designates non-belligerent countries as a crucial foreign policy goal. To this end, it prohibits any contract that would result in foreign domination over natural and economic resources or other national affairs.
 
Furthermore, within this chapter, the Islamic Republic of Iran upholds the ideal of human happiness across the global human society. It recognizes independence, freedom, and the rule of truth and justice as fundamental rights for all people worldwide. Despite avoiding interference in the internal affairs of other nations, Iran actively supports the rights-seeking struggles of the oppressed against arrogance wherever they occur.
Accordingly, fundamentalization is one of the most effective approaches in shaping and advancing the movement to safeguard the fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens against governmental authority. This issue has garnered significant attention within the realm of public law. One of the primary functions of public law is precisely to protect citizens’ rights and freedoms from government intervention.
 
Basicization, as defined and operationalized, involves elevating the value and status of laws and regulations—commonly referred to as “normal norms”—to align with the principles and validity of the constitution. Essentially, basicization grants these normal norms the same value and legal standing as constitutional norms. This process occurs through judicial proceedings and the application of legal interpretation tools.
The foundation and keyword of the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran originate from Islamic beliefs and values, verses, narrations, valuable views of Imam Rahal (RA), and the leaders of the system. These principles align with the Constitution and emphasize preserving human dignity, realizing happiness, and promoting human well-being within the global community under the umbrella of peace. The foreign policy encompasses interactions with the world, security considerations, human freedom, and equality. It also underscores maintaining independence while rejecting domination.
 
Given the significance of this subject, the constitution of each country outlines and elucidates the foundational principles and strategic directions of foreign policy. Consequently, a clear vision and roadmap are established for various nations in this regard.
In the end, it should be pointed out that the Islamic Republic of Iran has made all efforts to secure national interests, prosperity, and security within the turbulent international system. This endeavor is pursued with a hopeful approach, aiming to achieve the lofty goals of the Islamic Revolution—a vision derived from the profound teachings of Imam Rahal (peace be upon him). The country’s foreign policy aligns with the deep insights of the great leader of the Islamic Revolution, Imam Khamenei Dam Zaleh Al-Ali.
“In this direction, the diplomatic system warmly welcomes the companionship, participation, and critical perspectives of society’s elites. Their collaboration contributes to achieving the country’s foreign policy objectives within a broad and consensus-based framework. The foreign policy apparatus remains committed to addressing issues closely tied to national interests and security at both macro and national levels. It actively seeks to prevent internal political disputes from encroaching upon foreign policy matters and emphasizes the importance of diplomacy in navigating these complex challenges.”
In particular, the provisions contained in the principles of the constitution have had a significant impact. Over the past four decades, different governments have employed various strategies to achieve the constitution’s stated goals, particularly in securing and guaranteeing national interests, including national security. They have embraced a comprehensive approach.
 
However, an important consideration for future researchers is to what extent the Islamic Republic of Iran’s system exemplifies the goal of promoting human happiness within the global human society—a society of which Iran is undeniably a part. Is this achievement fully realized? Reflecting on this matter may even prompt a reevaluation of certain constitutional principles related to Iran’s foreign policy.

Living in today's societies is impossible without mutual communication with others, and meeting all kinds of individual needs forces people to interact with one another. These interactions create expectations among the parties involved, which can be defined and explained through social trust.
Most of the research conducted on the phenomenon of social trust has shown a decrease in social trust at the community level. For example, in the analysis of the trend of interpersonal trust in two surveys (the first wave of the 2000 Iranian Values and Attitudes National Survey and the 2017 National Report on the Social, Cultural, and Moral Status of the Iranian Society), it was found that trust in family members in 2017 compared to 2000 has increased, but trust in family and relatives is less, and trust in friends has decreased drastically. Also, in the analysis of the generalized trust trend based on the first wave of the national survey of values and attitudes of Iranians that was conducted in 2000 and the second wave of the national survey of social capital that was conducted in 2014, the level of trust in doctors, teachers, university professors, The judgment of journalists, clerics, and law enforcement officials has decreased, which is a serious decrease in trust in teachers, university professors, and doctors. Also, in the second wave of the national survey of the values and attitudes of Iranians (2003), in response to the question of how reliable you think people are in general (evaluation of the general trend of social trust), 28.8% said that people are less are reliable, 56.9% average and 14.3% have evaluated people as very reliable. Also, in the second wave of the national social capital measurement survey (2014), 35.6% believed that people are little or very little trustworthy. 47.1% moderate and 17.3% have evaluated the reliability of people as high and very high. As you can see, people's trustworthiness has decreased.
Therefore, it is necessary to continuously monitor and evaluate the state of the phenomenon of social trust at different levels. This will allow for the assessment of the necessity and feasibility of reviewing the plans and the methods of implementing them formulated by the authorities, to prevent the emergence of a crisis of distrust in society that could potentially lead to social collapse.
The formation of trust and related theories can be divided into three levels: macro, medium, and micro. At each of these levels, various theories have been presented, each offering a distinct perspective on the social phenomenon of trust.
Trust at the macro level, as a characteristic of social relations or a characteristic of a social system, such as the performance of institutions, especially government institutions, democracy, the performance of the judicial system in ensuring equal implementation of the law for all people, accountability and transparency in affairs, the equal distribution of justice, and in general, is conceptualized as a collective characteristic.
Trust at the intellectual level is presented as a personal characteristic and emphasis is placed on personal feelings, emotions, and values, in the investigation of trust, personal variables such as; Honesty, truthfulness, faithfulness to promises, cooperative tendencies, altruism, frankness, network of personal interactions, etc. are taken into consideration.
Between micro and macro theories of trust, theorists like Giddens reject reductionism in the study of the concept of trust. Instead, they analyze trust by combining micro-level and macro-level analyses, considering both the processes of construction and action.
The purpose of this research is to compile scenarios on the possible, probable, and desirable futures of social trust among 1404 residents of Tehran. The research methodology combines quantitative and qualitative approaches, including a review of sources, analysis of documents, exploratory interviews, environmental surveys, and expert Delphi sessions. Eleven key drivers were identified: 1- Perception of power 2- Perception of corruption 3- Social participation 4- Perception of justice 5- Change in shared moral values 6- Life satisfaction 7- Social harm 8- Religiosity 9- Sense of security 10- Altruism 11- Growth and development of technology and communication innovations.
Through cross-matrix analysis, the relationships and mutual influences among these drivers were examined. The most impactful driver in direct relationships was life satisfaction, while the perception of justice had the most significant direct impact. In indirect relationships, the perception of justice emerged as the most influential driver, with the perception of government performance being the most effective in indirect relationships.
Utilizing scenario wizard software and the transition balance matrix analysis technique, seven key drivers were further identified for scenario formulation: perception of justice, social harm, social participation, perception of corruption, perception of government performance, life satisfaction, and change in shared values.
In the output of the scenario wizard software to determine the possible, probable, and desirable scenarios of the future of social trust, 288 possible scenarios were reported from the combination of the possible states of the descriptors of the drivers. Of these, there were two scenarios with compatibility and internal harmony. In the first scenario called "Hell; Chah Weil," the future of the social trust situation at all levels (institutional trust, generalized trust, and interpersonal trust) has experienced a sharp downward trend, and distrust will increase dramatically. This scenario depicts a future of social trust in which various dimensions of social trust will have a downward trend in terms of institutional trust, generalized trust, interpersonal trust, and institutional trust.
In the ideal image of the future state of social trust, the second scenario—called ‘Utopia: Behesht’—presents a contrasting perspective. Unlike the first scenario, social trust in all three levels will experience an upward trend and be highly favorable.
According to the findings of current research and the higher probability of the first scenario (probable scenario), based on expert opinions, some suggested strategies to realize the second scenario (optimal scenario) include: stabilizing democracy, ensuring equal implementation of the law for all people, reforming or abolishing corrupt laws, and facilitating the free flow of information.

The initiator of the politicization of water in most of the previously mentioned and the most profound findings is that water has become one of the important and influential factors in a region. It has been a key factor contributing to tension and conflicts between countries in the past and present, and it will continue to impact grazing policies in the future.
One of the characteristics of arid and semi-arid regions is the problem of water, its fragile ecosystems. That is, the pressures caused by dam construction, along with factors such as climate change and global warming, have increased this fragility.
Previously, some experts in the field of geopolitics claimed that in the future, water will replace oil as a rare and expensive commodity and will be the main focus of disputes and compromises in the coming decade. This claim has now been demonstrated following the large-scale implementation of the Southeast Anatolia Project (GAP) in Turkey. We see this trend in the Middle East, especially in the countries that are along the path of the aforementioned water flow.
Today, the Middle East is witnessing a relative shift in the source of power from oil to water on one hand and mismanagement of its inter-basin governance on the other hand. This shift, coupled with the scarcity of this resource and global climate changes, has led Turkey to cede control over its water resources due to the implementation of the GAP megaproject. Turkey uses this as a bargaining chip to advance its developmental policies in the region, particularly in countries that rely on the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates, while simultaneously disregarding the repeated pleas of its neighbors (Iran, Syria, and Iraq) concerning water rights.
In addition, this plan has diminished the water resources flowing out of Turkey, resulting in detrimental consequences for the ecosystems of countries along the path of these water resources. It has led to environmental, economic, and social damages.
Therefore, according to the assertion of the Turkish government, which is grounded in the implementation of the GAP plan for sustainable economic development, this matter has been analyzed within the framework of the Copenhagen School of Security Studies. The conclusion is reached that while Turkey's hydraulic initiatives seem to offer water security across various sectors, the downside, from Copenhagen's perspective, is the creation of new security challenges for other stakeholders. The continued pursuit of Turkey's hydraulic strategy, regardless of the dimensions and the political, social, economic, and environmental impacts of this plan, is poised to have far-reaching and irreversible consequences.
And this vital resource has been turned into a means to gain political power and influence in Turkey. The reverse of the claim has been proven: the GAP project is in line with human-centered development and sustainable economic growth. However, it has been aimed at creating economic power, advancing political goals, and achieving blue hegemony. This process leads to multilateral damages with wide consequences in the countries affected by this project.
It is attempting to leverage its water resources against the oil resources of the Persian Gulf countries by defining and implementing numerous water projects through a hydraulic mission strategy. However, this approach disregards the environmental, social, economic, and political dimensions and consequences.
In such a way that the hydrological system of the two rivers, Tigris and Euphrates, which constitutes the vital artery of West Asia, has been disturbed. This process, from Copenhagen’s point of view, has created a potential basis and capacity for conflict and threats in the region. By reducing the amount of water input in the downstream section, it has caused environmental crises. Meanwhile, the effects of the environmental assessment reveal that the GAP project does not align with the internal governance of the countries and has extra-regional effects.
Therefore, on the one hand, making water security dependent on water resources outside the country effectively ties a part of national security to the region. The absence of management structures for joint exploitation and water governance has transformed it into a factor that contributes to crises between countries. In this context, it is possible to highlight the connection between the Turkish GAP project’s ideological understanding of politics and economy and the concept of security and sustainable development within the framework of the Copenhagen school.
In other words, considering that the ideological understanding of the principle of excellence and its reproduction prioritizes it over other factors. Elements such as the environment, economic growth, and social welfare, which define the concept of security and sustainable development in the Copenhagen school, become victims of this principle of project excellence. The GAP in Turkey, when security standards are reduced in various aspects, increases its structural ideological function in the public domain.
Concepts such as security, in all its aspects, undergo a fundamental transformation. This evolutionary change of the GAP project is related to the instability of the development space and the discourse of development and sustainable development worldwide. The GAP plan is largely a product of concepts, norms, and criteria borrowed from other places, without considering its compatibility with Turkey’s own internal conditions, sensitivities, concerns, and internal demands. As a result, many concepts, goals, and activities are in conflict with each other.
Using the descriptive-analytical method and library and media sources, this research seeks to answer the question: How will Turkey’s GAP project cause a crisis in the Middle East, especially in the downstream countries of this project? According to the Copenhagen school, the findings indicate that the implementation of the GAP project will result in the political dependence of downstream countries on Turkey. Additionally, it will lead to extensive damage and consequences in these countries, encompassing five security threats: environmental, social, economic, political, and military. These destructive consequences align with Turkey’s ideology, as it treats water as a source of power similar to oil.
In the meantime, Iran, together with the countries affected by the GAP plan, can form a regional confederation at two levels: "regional diplomacy" and "joint management of transboundary waters" to manage the environmental risks of the Turkish GAP plan. If regional diplomacy fails, Iran can pursue this issue legally through international organizations and The Hague Court.

The Middle East region, especially the Persian Gulf, is one of the most strategically important regions in the world. Throughout history, great powers have sought to gain influence in this region through various strategies and policies. In addition to asserting their dominance in the area, they also aim to control their competitors.
For more than half a century, the United States of America has dominated this region with different policies and strategies. On the other hand, China has been trying to expand its influence in this region for about two decades. The gradual weakening of US positions in the region is a long-term trend that originated long before the US withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021.
During Obama's presidency, the "Pivot to Asia" policy was announced. According to this policy, America was preparing to gradually shift the focus of its foreign policy to the Asia-Pacific region, while at the same time reducing America's presence in the Middle East and Europe. This policy continued during the periods of Donald Trump and Biden.
The goal of the Biden administration's Middle East policy, especially after Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022, is to improve relations with Saudi Arabia, encourage this country to increase oil production for the world market, and strengthen ties with Israel to bolster America's position in the region.
At first, China viewed developments and events in the Middle East mainly through the lens of revolutionary ideology.
The Middle East and North Africa have traditionally been outside China's sphere of interest. Geographical distance, loose historical contacts, and social, cultural, and linguistic differences all played a role in adopting this policy. In the early 1980s, after Deng Xiaoping's reforms and the "opening door" policy, China began to look for new partners that could meet the growing need for energy resources, and thus the Persian Gulf countries became the focus of China's attention. Therefore, this country's relations with political actors in the Middle East were mainly based on energy and commercial interests. China has a strong and increasing need for energy and natural resources to maintain economic growth.
China and the United States of America, as two great powers based on national interests, have cooperative or competitive relations in political and economic fields and issues. The purpose of writing this article is to examine the policies of the United States and China in the Middle East region based on the concept of "competition."
The current research methodology involves collecting data from library resources and internet sources and articles. The analytical and explanatory research approach, along with qualitative data analysis methods, will be utilized. The study will focus on the period from 2021 to 2023. The research findings indicate a decline in the power, influence, and capacity of the United States as one of the great powers. The capabilities and power of the United States across various dimensions - political, economic, social, and cultural - have decreased. Conversely, China's power, ability, and capacity have been increasing. As an emerging power, China is working to expand its influence in different regions globally, particularly in the Middle East region.
 
The main question addressed in this article is: What policies will China and America pursue in the Middle East between 2021 and 2023? In the Middle East, these policies revolve around "oil and energy transit," "Iranian threats," and "arms sales." China's strategy in this region involves building political and economic relationships with America's adversaries, such as Iran, while attempting to distance hesitant and distrustful allies of America, like Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, etc., by establishing economic partnerships and gaining access to the oil and energy market. China's foreign relations are guided by principles of non-alignment, non-confrontation, and non-commitment.
 
While the United States of America played a pivotal role in shaping the Middle East order after World War II, its presence in the region has significantly declined over the past decade. A critical turning point for the United States occurred with the remarkable expansion of oil and natural gas production within its own borders since the 2010s, driven by the development of domestic shale reserves starting around 2006. By 2014, the United States had surpassed both Saudi Arabia and Russia to become the world’s largest oil producer. Consequently, the U.S. was no longer reliant on the Middle East for a sustainable energy supply.
In the Biden era, America’s national security strategy emphasizes two fundamental components: military de-escalation and regional integration. The recognition that U.S. military intervention does not necessarily lead to democracy in the region has shifted the focus toward more attainable goals, such as creating stability and safeguarding national interests.
The Middle East policy of the People’s Republic of China is guided by the document titled “China’s International Development Cooperation in the New Era,” published by the Information Office of the State Council of China in January 2021. China’s interaction with Middle Eastern countries operates within the framework of the One Belt, One Road concept. This strategy aligns with China’s broader global plans to reduce commercial, economic, and technological dependence on Western countries and global production chains.
The factors that have increased China's influence in the Middle East are:- Similarity of the political systems (authoritarian systems) of the Middle East Arab countries with the political system of China.
- The principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of countries by China under the pretext of violating human rights.
- China's lack of support for opponents and opposition in Middle East countries.
- The non-establishment of opponents of Middle East political systems in China and the granting of all kinds of asylum to them.
- Lack of colonial history of China in the Middle East region.
- Sharing of economic benefits.
 
The findings of this research indicate that China does not seek to form alliances or coalitions in the Middle East to confront America. The region is not as strategically important to China as regions like the South China Sea or Central Asia. Therefore, low-level competition between the two countries in this region is more likely.
Competition between America and China is ongoing in various regions worldwide, including the Middle East, particularly in the Persian Gulf. The United States is gradually losing its dominant military and political positions in the Middle East. The country has been compelled to abandon its aggressive "regime change" and "democratization" efforts in Arab countries, notably Saudi Arabia, as well as its emphasis on human rights. In essence, America's strategy in the Middle East is evolving gradually.
 
Meanwhile, China is undeniably expanding its influence in both political and economic realms, adhering to a policy of non-intervention. China appears to be striving to steer clear of local conflicts and avoid direct confrontation with the United States. China's foreign relations are guided by principles of non-alignment, non-confrontation, and non-commitment.
 
Research findings suggest that China in the Middle East is not actively seeking alliances or coalitions to counter America, as the region holds less strategic significance for China compared to areas like the South China Sea. Through strategic investments in key infrastructure, China has emerged as a primary economic partner for Middle Eastern countries. In essence, China and the United States are engaged in a competition to enhance their influence and power in the Middle East.

Foreign policy serves as the guiding compass for countries within the intricate international arena and stands as one of the most critical functions of political systems. The involvement of multiple actors, escalating societal divisions, diverse perceptions of friendly, rival, and adversarial entities, structural ambiguities in international politics, historical legacies, political cultures, internal governance structures—all contribute to the intricacy of formulating and implementing a country’s foreign policy. Consequently, achieving successful foreign policy implementation necessitates building consensus among a broad spectrum of domestic actors and elites, all within the context of an inherently ambiguous global environment.
One of the most critical subjects in the study of countries’ foreign policy is the structure, influencing variables, and decision-making processes. Economic development, as well as the political culture of the actors, which is mostly rooted in their history, affects the way and influence on foreign policy. Hereditary rule or patrimonialism is a term coined by the German sociologist Max Weber. Patrimony comes from the Latin word “pater,” meaning father, and it refers to inherited property or assets passed down from fathers or ancestors.
On the other hand, an issue that has received less attention in Iran is the position and internal structures shaping foreign policy decision-making processes in Saudi Arabia. In this regard, the current research states that foreign policy decisions in the countries of the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council, with Saudi Arabia at the head, revolve around three concentrated circles.
 The first circle exclusively includes the head of state, main members of the royal families, close relatives, and political elites. This group encompasses senior positions such as the foreign minister and advisors to the head of state. Neopatrimonialism plays a direct role in shaping the foreign policy decision-making body of the Cooperation Council, particularly concerning the Persian Gulf.
The second group comprises other members of the executive branch, specifically the Council of Ministers. It involves bureaucrats responsible for policy design and implementation. Standard decisions typically follow hierarchical principles, while during crises, the inner circle or the head of government takes charge.
Influences from outside government institutions on foreign policy design are limited. Businessmen and owners of commercial interests, who wield significant influence in foreign policy in some countries, have restricted access to decision-makers. Other institutions of society have limited influence on the design of foreign policy. However, the role of domestic politics over foreign policy in the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council cannot be generally ignored. In the upcoming article, the focus is on unit-level variables, particularly decision-makers comprehension of the internal and external environment. In essence, various internal factors of the system (independent variables) influence decision-makers' understanding - namely, human factors - shaping foreign policy as a dependent variable. This view effectively helps to explain the formation of Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy. The present study believes that the lack of recognition of the political-historical culture of Saudi Arabia has become one of the major challenges for the foreign policy apparatus of the Islamic Republic of Iran when dealing with the regional and international approaches of this country.
The central question of this article is about finding the roots of the formation of Saudi Arabia's foreign policy and the main internal factors influencing it. Previous studies on this topic have often not focused on the decision-making processes within this country. Examining the internal structure of one of the important governments in the region, namely Saudi Arabia, provides a more realistic picture of the country's foreign policy approaches. In this study, to enhance precision and narrow down the research focus, only the structure of power transfer in this country will be discussed in the context of neo-patrimonialism, and the impact of the succession processes on Saudi policy-making will be investigated.
 Accordingly, with the assumption that the adoption of different approaches in the foreign policy of Saudi Arabia is based on the element of the king as the main core of power from the beginning of its formation, it answers the question: What is neopatrimonialism and its impact on the foreign policy of this country? The findings of the research indicate that the reason for adopting different approaches in the foreign policy of Saudi Arabia is related to the power structure in this country, the concepts of identity, succession structure, and political culture, which have been based on the element of the king as the primary core of power since its inception. The behavior of the government in the foreign sphere has always been a function of the status and conditions of the king's power in the political system, succession processes in this country, and its subordinate systems. The research also shows that while the foreign policymakers of the previous generation of Saudi Arabia considered caution, conservatism, and patience important in foreign policy, the transfer of power in the form of neo-patrimonialism to the new generation of Saudi political elites has led to new and aggressive policies.
Saudi Arabia feels insecure and lacks stability in all internal influencing components. At least until King Salman came to power in 2015, Riyadh had always adopted a conservative foreign policy. However, the increase in threats from Riyadh’s point of view prompted Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy to abandon conservatism and embrace a more assertive approach in regional affairs. The seizure of power by Mohammed bin Salman, the Saudi crown prince, further intensified the country’s foreign policy aggressiveness. Saudi Arabia’s involvement in the war in Yemen, interference in the Syrian crisis, and closer ties with China are all indicative of shifts in Saudi foreign policy positions. . Of course, at the same time as the last days of 2021 passed, it seemed that Mohammed bin Salman had a serious will to reverse the trend of hostile and aggressive policies of Saudi Arabia and instead, take a conciliatory process based on several regional initiatives. This issue also serves as an example of a central individual in the foreign policy of Saudi Arabia, which is affected by the structure of neo-patrimonialism in this country. In fact, with a little precision, it can be seen that Alvin Toffler’s theory of power displacement and the three characteristics of power—money, and knowledge—can be appropriately matched with the change of the Ahadi regime in Saudi Arabia.
In this way, Muhammad bin Salman emerged as the first theoretician of the Yemen war, a key figure during the Qatar crisis, and the central tension creator in the Riyadh-Tehran political conflicts. He is also considered one of the most significant supporters of addressing the Syria and Iraq crises, even before assuming the Ahadi governorship.
On the other hand, if we examine Muhammad bin Salman’s economic plans using financial tools, we observe that Saudi Arabia’s Economic Development Document 2030 holds a prominent place among his political measures. As power transitions from traditional monarchs to the young generation symbolized by Mohammed bin Salman, pragmatism within Saudi Arabia has broadened and become more inclusive over the past one or two years. Within this framework, Saudi Arabia’s new foreign policy aims to strike a balance and diversify sources of political and economic support.
It is very important to develop a relationship with China, a country that has been a pioneer in prioritizing economic development in the developing world. Over the past five decades, China has successfully lifted its people out of poverty and hunger, positioning itself on the brink of becoming the world's largest economy. Strengthening relations with China, which both imports oil and provides capital and technology, can indeed play a crucial role in shaping the trajectory of this region.

From a geopolitical and geostrategic point of view, Iraq is located in a bottleneck and faces unique geographic restrictions in accessing open waters and international rivers.
Tigris and Euphrates are the main source of water needs of this country, which originate from Turkey. The Tigris and Euphrates watershed is one of the most important watersheds in the Middle East.
The dispute over the manner and amount of exploitation of the three coastal countries (Turkey, Iraq and Syria) which resulted from the disintegration of the Ottoman government, has a long history.
Turkey has built 14 large dams on the Euphrates tributaries and 8 large dams on the Tigris tributaries by implementing the Gap project. Following Turkey's exploitation of the Atatürk Dam (Turkey's largest dam) in 1992, the issue of "environmental security" has been one of the most important concerns of affected countries, especially Iraq.
Following the exploitation of this big dam and 13 other dams, as well as the construction of three dams by Syria, the Euphrates flow to Iraq has decreased by about 90% in recent years.
Ilisu Dam (Turkey's second largest dam) is built on the Tigris River, and if the capacity of this dam is fully utilized, the natural flow of the Tigris to Iraq will decrease by 56%.
With the completion of the Gap project, Turkey will be able to control more than the average annual flow of natural flows in the Tigris and Euphrates in this country. Turkey's dam constructions have led to widespread problems in various dimensions in the region and affected countries, especially Iraq, due to its location in the lower reaches of the Tigris and Euphrates watershed and the environment.
The purpose of the research is to explain the effects of Turkey's dam construction on Iraq's national security.This research is important because after Iraq and Syria, Iran is the third country affected by Turkey's dam construction because internal and external factors affecting Iraq's national security for reasons such as long border, cultural, historical, religious commonalities, economic exchanges and significant commercial and political and security interests have similar and extensive effects on Iran's national security.
Iran has vital interests in Iraq, and no country is as influential as Iraq in terms of securing Iran's interests and national security, therefore, a threat to Iraq's vital interests is a threat to Iran's vital interests.
The research has tried to answer the main question that Turkey's dam constructions on the Tigris and Euphrates rivers have had on Iraq's national security and the hypothesis of the research is based on this axis that Turkey has controlled the sources of power production through extensive dams on the branches of the international rivers Tigris and Euphrates and developed policies with the aim of strengthening and perpetuating the "geopolitical position" in the course of interaction and conflict with beneficiary countries of Tigris and Euphrates, especially Iraq, should use economic, political and security issues as a means of pressure in negotiations and the manner and extent of exploitation of the mentioned rivers. Turkey's dam building policy on Tigris and Euphrates is considered as an independent variable and Iraq's national security is considered as a dependent variable.
This research is of a qualitative type, which analyzed the data and explained the topic with a descriptive-analytical method and applied approach. Information gathering has been collected using library resources and scanning documents, books, articles, media and electronic resources.
The lack, change and destruction of environmental elements are among the most important factors that threaten the life and survival of human societies and governments. Mastery over water resources is mastery of an element that has a vital and strategic role.
Water has a significant role and importance in the environment, sustainable economic development, cultural-social development, political-security stability and the power of governments in the national, regional and international arenas. Therefore, the competition of the governments to acquire, exploit and dominate the common water resources due to the vital role and strategic importance of water has created the ground for conflict and conflict between the stakeholders. Since the 1960s and following Turkey's extensive dam constructions on the Tigris and Euphrates, water leverage has been used as a tool to exert pressure against Iraq.
The problems caused by the water shortage crisis in combination with factors such as the decrease in precipitation due to climate change, the destruction of vegetation and forests, soil erosion due to the decrease in humidity, air pollution due to the change and destruction of environmental elements, and the devastating consequences of three wars in the last four decades. , Iraqis' indiscriminate exploitation of rivers, lakes and wetlands in the agricultural, industrial and urban sectors, pollution of water resources and exhaustion of the water storage and transmission network, the process of destruction of natural ecosystems and the destruction of environmental elements of this country, accelerating and has intensified and the health, livelihood and security of the residents of the affected area have been jeopardized to a significant extent. The location of this country in the lower reaches of Tigris and Euphrates is a geopolitical bottleneck and a factor for threatening this country.
Turkey, Syria and Iran have superior geopolitical advantages over this country due to being located upstream of the rivers entering Iraq. Environmental elements have a transboundary nature, therefore, managing and controlling challenges requires bilateral, regional and international cooperation. Environmental security is related to water security, food security, job security, sustainable economic development and in the macro dimension with the interests and national security of countries and the power of governments in the national, regional and international arenas. Considering the five parts of Bozan's theory, the military, political, economic, social and environmental power of Turkey has increased against the countries affected by Tigris and Euphrates, especially Iraq. Based on Homer Dixon's theory, three factors: environmental destruction, population increase and unequal social distribution of resources due to lack and change of environmental resources and six factors: climate change due to the emission of greenhouse gases, destruction of Ozone layer, destruction and reduction of agricultural lands, destruction of  forests, reduction and pollution of fresh water sources and reduction of fishing due to destruction of fisheries following widespread climate change, the possibility of conflicts turning into violent conflicts between Turkey and the countries affected by Tigris and Euphrates with this country, between each other, especially Iraq and Turkey, has been strengthened in case of lack of understanding, agreement and constructive interaction. According to Mackinder's theory, the use of power generation resources using natural (energy resources), human and environmental factors (dam construction) has achieved the goal of Turkish hegemony to a significant extent. Based on Ratzel's theory, Turkey has strengthened its national and regional power and vital space against the countries affected by the Tigris and Euphrates, especially in the face of Iraq. Blocking the natural flow of the international channels of the Tigris and Euphrates is an existential threat, and the demand for Iraq's natural and historical water rights in order to preserve survival, manage and reduce the harmful consequences of this threat is that the emergency measures of the policy makers of this country, regional countries, regional and international organizations and Institutions defending human rights and environmental rights and the United Nations are effective.

The Islamic Republic of Iran, as a government formed based on the ideology of political Islam and aiming to export the discourse of the Islamic Revolution to different countries worldwide, cannot disregard other political Islamist currents. Avoiding religious conflicts and the potential for defining discursive and strategic commonalities are fundamental stages of modern Islamic civilization. One of the notable currents in Islamic history is the "Salafi" movement. Neo-Salafism, although sharing similarities with traditional Salafism, also exhibits significant differences. While the distinctions between old and new Salafis may not be immediately apparent, it appears that the new Salafis lean more towards revolutionary actions.
The interactions between Iran and neo-Salafi movements have witnessed fluctuations. These interactions can be categorized into three historical periods and articulated as three levels of engagement: the first historical period was characterized by "movement-movement" dynamics before the Islamic Revolution's triumph. The second phase emerged post the Islamic Revolution victory, fostering "movement-state" relations. The final historical period aligns with the Arab events in 2011, where neo-Salafists actively influenced political and military spheres in the regional countries and engaged with Iran through "government-government" interactions.
 
This study employs an explanatory-explanatory research design with a developmental-applicative purpose. Understanding the current state and evolution of the neo-Salafi movement necessitates an explanatory approach. Additionally, for analyzing recent developments and exploring reasons behind the divergence between the Islamic Republic and neo-Salafi Islamist currents, an explanatory methodology is employed. The primary objective of this study is to dissect the nature of the relationship and the "pathology of Iran's response to the neo-Salafi movement in the Middle East region". By addressing these issues, the study aims to capitalize on the potential of neo-Salafi movements in advancing modern Islamic civilization.
Irrespective of global efforts to counter the influence of the Islamic Revolution's discourse and its impact in the Sunni world, particularly among Salafi and Neo-Salafi factions, the research findings shed light on factors contributing to Iran's divergence from neo-Salafi movements forty years post the Islamic Revolution. The study reveals that "the diminishing activism of the intellectual and instrumental elites within Iran's foreign policy apparatus, prioritizing national interests over movement policies", "a shift towards engagement with secular Islamist groups, Sufis, or Syrian Baathists (notably post-Syrian crisis) over political Islamists", "inadequate and superficial understanding of various Salafi currents, often generalized as Wahhabism", and "the absence of efforts to foster strategic dialogues and constructive engagement with neo-Salafi movements" have led to Iran's separation from neo-Salafi groups.
Scrutiny of the fundamentals and strategic attitudes of Salafis reveals that it is not a monolithic current. Within this broad movement, there exist sub-currents that hold diverse or conflicting views despite sharing common beliefs, leading at times to excommunication, violence, and bloodshed. The Salafi movements can be broadly categorized into three common trends - "[Traditional] Salafiyyah, Jihadi Salafiyyah, and Neo-Salafiyyah."
While the New Salafi or Balanced Salafi movement maintains relative adherence to the foundational principles of Salafism, it critiques certain aspects of traditional Salafism and aims to moderate some of its extremist elements. Despite emphasizing monotheism, the revival of the Islamic caliphate, jihad, and similar principles like traditional Salafism, the New Salafi movement seeks to shift the focus of discussions "from abstract monotheism and takfir to practical monotheism and its manifestations in society." Additionally, it looks to redefine the Islamic government in contrast to non-Islamic governance through a nuanced interpretation of sovereign monotheism and emphasizes jihad against non-Muslim authorities rather than targeting fellow Muslims.
 
Neo-Salafis, on the other hand, emphasize emulation and revitalization of the moral conduct of the Salaf, rather than solely focusing on replicating the exact teachings and interpretations of the Salaf Salih. Methodologically, traditional Salafists tend to adopt a literalist approach to interpreting Salaf texts and place significant emphasis on textual worship. In contrast, neo-Salafists advocate for utilizing Salafism as a direct reference to the primary sources of Islam to advance the "civilizational project" of the Islamic world.
 
Upon conducting the pathology and categorizing the current research as "applied research," solutions have been proposed in two key areas - discursive and operational-strategic domains. In the realm of discourse, in order to progress towards dialogue and eventually foster cooperation, it is imperative to introduce a macro model of trans-religious solidarity, rooted in monotheistic and civilizational perspectives. The "Pattern of Monotheistic Civilization" embodies self-evolution and places emphasis on ijtihad rooted in religious scriptures to address contemporary challenges effectively. By prioritizing the construction and advancement of civilization as a guiding principle, fostering unity among Islamic factions becomes more feasible. Within a civilizational framework, establishing a training mechanism through Islamic world missions and revision of existing processes by relevant institutions is crucial.
 
Adopting a civilizational perspective, specific recommendations for engaging with neo-Salafi groups include:
a) Establishing a strategic research center within ideological and strategic institutions to address the increasing appeal of neo-Salafi movements among Sunni youth.
b) Institutionalizing informal/non-governmental channels to sustain active pursuit of religious diplomacy and advance programs endorsed by esteemed bodies such as the International University of Islamic Religions, the Al-Mustafa Community, or the Organization of the Approximation of Religions.
c) Identifying critical issues within the Islamic world alongside neo-Salafi movements and collaborating to identify shared solutions.

Given the realities of the international system within the current arena of war and its resulting damages, actors persistently focus on each other’s economic advantages. In this context, the West Asia region, characterized by tension and volatility, specifically highlights Syria—a country that has endured a decade of conflict—for its favorable economic traits. These attributes stem from Syria’s access to open waters and its proximity to European and African nations. Notably, Iran has maintained positive relations with Syria for many years, dating back to the era of Hafez Assad. During the eight-year defense against Iraq, Syria supported Iran, fostering strong ties. Considering Iran’s continued presence in Syria, prioritizing economic components to advance national macro strategies becomes a constructive governmental response. Both regional and global powers actively seek to enhance their influence and economic standing in other countries. Since the end of the Cold War, regionalism and power dynamics have gained prominence, prompting large governments across geographical regions to assert their roles in economic and political spheres. Consequently, the power struggle among actors in Syria extends beyond its borders, projecting an external image.
But despite the efforts of some powers to change the power dynamics in Syria, the ISIS caliphate came to an end, and the conflict zone was confined to the north and northwest of Syria. Meanwhile, Bashar al-Assad remained at the helm of power, and relentless attempts were made to overthrow him. This situation opened up opportunities for other governments to establish a presence in Syria, particularly in its economic sector.
Over the past decade, Iran has gained greater importance and status in the eyes of Damascus, especially within the context of the fight against ISIS in Syria. A notable example of Iran’s significance to the Assad government is the administration of the Latakia port, which was granted to the Islamic Republic of Iran. Iran has also engaged in favorable economic activities within Syria.
In light of these developments, the Iranian government has transitioned from military spending and the fight against ISIS to a focus on soft power and economic influence in Syria. It now occupies a unique position in the country’s economic geography.
Based on this fact and Iran’s presence in the Syrian war against opposition forces and ISIS, as well as its support of the central government, this article analyzes the impact of Syria’s geo-economic position on Iran’s strategic situation in the Middle East region between 2018 and 2023. The hypothesis of the article posits that Syria’s geo-economy, following the fall of ISIS, has solidified Iran’s influence within Syria and enhanced its regional role in both political and economic dimensions.
This article has collected data and analyzed it based on geoeconomics theory. According to this theory, controlling and influencing global and regional markets, as well as having access to the economic highways of many countries worldwide, ranks among the most crucial objectives. Achieving these goals necessitates tools such as attractive foreign investments and long-term, low-interest loans.
 
In light of this, concepts that hold significance in the economic sector—such as trade, investment, financial policies, economic aid, and sanctions—have gained prominence in the field of geo-economics. These components, once less critical before the collapse of the Soviet Union, now play pivotal roles in the competition among major powers since the 1990s.
 
These economic tools can spark competition between nations across various domains, particularly within different geographical areas. According to the principles proposed by the theory of geo-economics, Syria possesses a favorable economic geography for other states. Given the challenges faced by the Syrian government over the past decade, revitalizing both the political and economic aspects of the country necessitates attracting foreign capital and engaging in trade with other governments while distancing itself from security-related discussions.
 
This article analyzes the data using a documentary and statistical approach, employing the descriptive-analytical method with the assistance of geo-economics theory.
Based on the obtained data, Iran’s presence in Syria stands as one of the most critical levers within the West Asian region. According to available information, Iran has consistently expanded its cultural and economic footprint in Syria, particularly during the presence of ISIS and even more so afterward. This proactive approach by Iran underscores its recognition of Syria’s unique situation, especially following Ebrahim Raisi’s visit, and its strategic intent to enhance its position in West Asia.
 
Investing in Syria promises significant economic success for the country and contributes to bolstering regional prestige. Consequently, Iran’s presence in Syria, coupled with the creation of economic incentives for domestic investors, will further strengthen its influence in the country and facilitate the return of capital to Iran. From a political perspective, this presence aligns Iran more closely with its allies and strategically positions Syria within the depths of West Asia. As a result, Iran finds itself in the closest proximity to other regional competitors, poised to play an even greater role in shaping the future of regional dynamics compared to the past decade.
Therefore, based on the data, the following results have been obtained: 
1- With its presence in Syria, especially after the fall of the self-proclaimed ISIS government, Iran has demonstrated its intention to leverage the country’s economic interests.
2 -Iran has firmly established its presence in areas like Latakia, strategically exploiting Syria’s economic potential.
3 -Following the liberation of Bokmal by Iranian forces and under their directives, the Al-Tanf route—previously controlled by the US—has been significantly neutralized. This has ensured the continuity of an economic route connecting Iran, Iraq, and Syria.
4-By establishing a transit route between the resistance forces and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Iran facilitates connections across multiple corridors, including the North-South corridor, the China-Pakistan corridor, the China-Central Asia-Iran corridor, and the West Asia corridor. This network enables seamless access for Iran to the Mediterranean Sea via Latakia.
As a result, Iran’s presence in Syria has deepened the country’s strategic significance within the region and the global context. Syria, particularly Latakia, has emerged as a pivotal gateway to other lands.